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Abstract 
Project sustainability is a recent concept predominantly debated and employed by 
international aid organisations in development aid: the meaning of the term, what its 
time and spatial scales are, what dimensions it has, what factors it can be affected, etc. 
It is deemed to be a high-level examination whether the aid intervention has been 
successful or not. Even though all the international aid organisations examined in the 
thesis share the viewpoint that project sustainability has to do with the maintenance of 
the achieved outcomes after the aid intervention has come to an end, there are some 
shortages in their definitions of the term as well as the factors that can affect project 
sustainability.  
This thesis is thus concerned with analysing the sustainability of the project 
“Industrial and Urban Development in Viet Tri city” (Việt Trì Project), which was a 
part of the environmental programme “Danish Environmental Assistance to Vietnam 
2000-2004” (DEA-Vietnam), financed by the Danish International Development 
Agency (Danida) and implemented in Việt Trì city, Phú Thọ province from July 2002 
to July 2005. The main aim is to obtain deeper practical knowledge and understanding 
of project sustainability, the factors that can affect project sustainability in reality, and 
the improvement possibilities.  
Initially, the research problem is introduced and different methods to fulfil the study 
are dealt with. A discussion of sustainability is presented in order to prepare a ground 
for approaching the discussion of project sustainability. The dimensions of and the 
factors that can affect project sustainability are then explored. Seen from the 
theoretical perspectives, project sustainability has to do not only with the capacity of 
the directly involved partner stakeholders to maintain the achieved results after the aid 
intervention has come to an end but also their capacity to produce the results by 
themselves and develop/reproduce them over a period of time. Moreover, the five 
dimensions of project sustainability - financial, institutional, technical, social, and 
environmental - can be affected not only by the partner government and donor 
policies, the partner participation and ownership, the awareness building and training, 
and the external political and economic factors but also by the insufficient and explicit 
addressing and analysis of sustainability throughout the project cycle, corruption, and 
inefficient participation from the donor’s side.  
From the empirical analysis of Việt Trì Project, I found out that the project itself is too 
ambitious in terms of components and activities for a short intended time frame (24 
calendar months), some project outcomes are potentially sustainable while some are 
not. Against the background of the theoretical framework, I suggested that Việt Trì 
Project should be improved by concentrating on the most necessary activities based 
 vii 
upon the characteristics and duration of the project, enhancing the addressing and 
analysis of sustainability in the project cycle, improving the anti-corruption factor, 
and strengthening the participation of the ultimate beneficiaries in the project cycle, 
especially in the Identification and Preparation phase where the efficient engagement 
of Danida’s local staffs should also be enhanced.  
It is concluded from the research that firstly, as far as Việt Trì Project and other DEA-
Vietnam projects are concerned, project sustainability was touched upon at a general 
level in Danida’s working tools. Secondly, the fieldwork in Phú Thọ province has 
played a crucial role to the research. I collected a lot of useful and interesting live 
information which is not available in the documents of Việt Trì Project. Thirdly, the 
professional experiences shared by Plan International and the project experts were 
useful for the analysis of Việt Trì Project’s sustainability problems, especially the 
analysis of the ultimate beneficiaries’ participation. And finally, to talk about 
corruption in general and corruption in connection with development projects is a 
taboo in Phú Thọ province.  
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1. Problem Identification and Research Methodology 
 
1.1. Problem Identification 
1.1.1. Background of the study 
Urbanisation and urban industrialisation in developing countries have been growing 
remarkably in the last 3-4 decades. The former is bringing an ever-increasing demand for 
shelter, employment and resources to support escalating populations while the latter is partly 
meeting the demands of the former and contributing to notable urban environmental 
problems. Both processes are generating daily an almost uncountable amount of domestic 
wastes, solid and hazardous industrial wastes, untreated or poorly-treated wastewater, and 
emissions, whose subsequent impacts on the environment are prevalent and immense. 
Already in the 1992 World Development Report, it is showed that city air pollution in the 
developing countries that are in the throes of industrialisation is far worse than in 
industrialised countries, and as far as solid and hazardous wastes are concerned, open 
dumping and uncontrolled landfilling, despite the huge amount discharged daily, are still the 
main methods in many of such countries (World Bank 1992:63-67) 
In addition, the UN-HABITAT State of the World’s Cities Report 2006/7 reveals that in 2007, 
our world will be entering a historic urban transition where the world’s urban population, for 
the first time in history, will exceed the rural population, and that in the next 20 years, 95% 
of the world’s urban growth “will be absorbed by cities of the developing world, which are 
less equipped to deal with rapid urbanisation”. There is a very clear trend where intense 
urbanization and urban growth are shifting from Europe, North America and Latin America 
to Asia and Africa. Small towns and cities occupied by less than 1 million residents will be 
the major destinations of immigrants, and as it is seen now, “more than half of the world’s 
urban population lives in cities of fewer than 500,000 inhabitants, and almost one-fifth lives 
in cities of between 1 and 5 million inhabitants”.1The released information indicates that 
environmental problems in cities in developing countries, which have been on the rise, will 
possibly be more immense and severe, and the target “sustainable urban development” will 
be coping with more and harder challenges.  
The existing sad fact is, governmental authorities and city planners seem to be more 
concerned with how to accelerate the economic development, to sufficiently provide the 
urban inhabitants with basic services and living requirements than how to develop their cities 
in a sustainable manner, namely the urban inhabitants can have their basic needs met 
“without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (the World 
Commission on Environment and Development 1987:43).  
                                                
1 http://www.unhabitat.org/mediacentre/documents/sowcr2006/SOWCR%20Press%20release.pdf  
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The 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development pointed out that environment 
and development significantly have complementary elements, and the sustainable 
development targets cannot be reached without the simultaneous engagement of 
environmental protection solutions. That is to say, nations should have specific and suitable 
environmental protection measures, and integrate them in their development plans and 
strategies. In this perspective, sustainable urban development is supposed to be a necessary 
and important mission for governmental authorities at all levels in developing countries, for 
city planners, economists, environmentalists, international donors and those alike.  
In the specific context of developing countries, they are often in lack of resources, relevant 
capacity and technologies, etc. to carry out their urban development plans and projects. The 
assistance of international institutions, mostly heard as international development aid 
agencies or international aid organisations, is therefore needed, and as a matter of fact, many 
developing countries have been recipients of international programmes and projects aiming 
at sustainable industrial and urban development. What matter here is: are those programmes 
and projects sustainable even though sustainable development is the focus? What is the 
weight of their sustainability and why is it important for them to be sustainable? Are there 
good sustainability lessons to be learnt and alternatives to be taken into account?  
A review of some programme and project evaluation documents of UNDP, Sida, Danida, 
Plan International, etc. has shown that international aid organisations have been paying 
greater attention to long-term perspectives and lasting improvements, but “far too many 
development initiatives tend to fail once the implementation phase is over, because either the 
target group or the responsible parties do not have the means or sufficient motivation to 
provide the resources needed for the activities to go further” (Danida 1999:60), and “the 
issue of sustainability has been a key failing of many projects in the past.  Simple examples 
include water pumps that are not repaired, health posts without staff…and unprofitable 
income generating initiatives.  These project types provide many examples of where projects 
have not been sustainable due to a wide variety of (or combination of) project specific and 
wider contextual issues” (Plan International 2002a:2). 
My study continues the ongoing discussion of sustainability and sustainable development, 
but more specifically relates to project sustainability with focus on environmental projects. 
On the basis of the viewpoint that external sustainable environmental interventions play a 
significant role to not only sustainable environmental improvement but also sustainable 
development in the recipient locality, I am going to look at the case of the project “Industrial 
and Urban Development in Viet Tri city” (henceforth: Việt Trì Project) financed by the 
Danish International Development Assistance (Danida) and benefited by Việt Trì city, Phú 
Thọ province (Vietnam), and analyse its sustainability.  
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Originally, Việt Trì Project was a part of the bigger environmental programme “Danish 
Environmental Assistance to Vietnam 2000-2004” or DEA-Vietnam for short, which was 
officially launched in 2000 after many discussions and negotiations between Denmark and 
Vietnam began in 1997. In the framework of DEA-Vietnam, there were 16 approved projects 
in all falling under four components, which are sustainability management of natural 
resources and biodiversity conservation, sustainability management of coastal zones and 
marine protected areas, sustainable development of urban areas and industry, and 
environmental education and awareness2. Việt Trì Project belongs to the third component - 
sustainable development of urban areas and industry. Together with other five projects 
distributed to Nghệ An province, Thái Nguyên province, Thanh Xuân Bắc suburb, Hanoi, 
Ministry of Construction, and Hanoi University of Architecture, Việt Trì Project became the 
mainstay of DEA-Vietnam after the Danish Parliament had, at the end of 2001, decided to 
sharply reduce the committed total programme budget from DKK 140-210 million/year to 
DKK 50 million/year for the period 2002-2004.  
The existence of Việt Trì Project is regarded as being important for the improvement of the 
environmental problems caused by the industrial and urban development that has been 
taking place aggressively in Phú Thọ province. Important not only because it is the first time 
Phú Thọ province received a governmental Danish development aid intervention but also 
because Việt Trì Project was meant as a “Phase I project”, namely a subsequent Phase II 
project was also put on the agenda. Therefore, the sustainability of the Việt Trì Project is of 
great significance to the continuation of the Phase II project, and this is the main reason why 
I decide to look at it. The next reason is, Danida seems to be so aware of the fact that 
“sustainability” is a problem of many development projects and programmes, yet from the 
DEA-Vietnam Programme Evaluation Report made by Scanteam of Norway, it seems like 
DEA-Vietnam in general and its individual projects in particular have problems with 
sustainability. Why has Danida not learnt experiences from other international development 
organisations’ failures and not been able to do a better sustainability job? What are Danida’s 
problems with project sustainability? Are there possibilities of enhancing those problems, 
not only for thinking of Việt Trì Project but also other similar projects in future?  
The main objective of the study is to investigate and analyse the sustainability of Việt Trì 
Project, and propose some alternatives for improvement. That is, the target receiver is first of 
all Danida, which I hope will regard the study as an objective and constructive research work 
attempting to debate an issue of its high concern (as stated in several of Danida’s official 
documents). Phú Thọ province and Việt Trì city are the next intended receivers, which 
hopefully may learn how to design, plan and implement projects like Việt Trì Project more 
sustainably in future. And finally anyone sharing the same interest may find the study useful 
for his/her knowledge and inspiration.  
                                                
2 The four components are alternately named ”green”, ”blue”, ”brown”, and ”grey” by Danida.  
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1.1.2. Research question and working questions 
The study is conducted by focusing on this specific research question: 
Why has the project “Industrial and Urban Development in Viet Tri city” (Việt Trì Project) 
not fully achieved the sustainability goal, and what are the alternatives for improvement? 
Solving the question demands a comprehensive investigation of a number of related 
dimensions, following the working questions below:  
i. What are sustainability and project sustainability, and why project sustainability?  
ii. What are the main environmental problems caused by industrial and urban 
development in Phú Thọ province and why is Danida intervening? What is Việt Trì 
Project concerned with?   
iii. How were the aspects relating to sustainability planned and realised in Việt Trì 
Project , and how is its sustainability?  
iv. What alternatives can be taken into account and what are the advantages and 
challenges of the recommendations in Danida’s specific context? 
1.1.3. Expected outcomes 
The study is expected to attain four concrete outcomes below.   
i. To obtain a deeper theoretical understanding of the concept project sustainability and 
the factors that can affect project sustainability; 
ii. To learn about the key environmental problems caused by industrial and urban 
development in Phú Thọ province and the reasons for Danida’s intervention via Việt 
Trì Project;  
iii. To get deeper knowledge of project sustainability in practice by analysing Việt Trì 
Project;  
iv. To recommend some alternatives for enhancing the sustainability of Việt Trì Project 
and hopefully similar Danida’s projects in future. 
1.1.4. Limitations of the study 
Scope of the study  
Việt Trì Project is a quite large project which involves the participation of thousands of 
stakeholders at all levels, among those were 9 wards and commune with more than 15,600 
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individuals. There were ten major achieved outcomes in all (more details about the outcomes 
in Chapter 3), and I, due to time and resources restrictions, have decided not to look at the 
outcomes relating to improvement of awareness and knowledge of the community on 
domestic wastes and sanitation, the efficiency of the production and dissemination of 
brochures, leaflets and videos on environmental issues.  
I also exclude the outcome of capacity development in environmental monitoring and 
pollution data management within Phú Thọ Department of Natural Resources and 
Environment (DoNRE) and Việt Trì City Water Supply Company, as well as the English 
language courses for the project staff. I trust that it is not reliable enough to assess the 
involved staffs’ capacity as well as English language competence before and after the 
courses without being part of the system before, during and after the project. The outcomes 
chosen for in-depth study are of my foremost interests, have visible sustainability 
possibilities, and can be analysed within my time and resources frame on a reliable scientific 
basis.  
Access to official project documents  
It has been possible for me to, from different sources, get access to most of the key official 
project documents except the ones thereinafter. 
- The identification report of Việt Trì Project, which was not by any means archived 
by the Royal Danish Embassy in Hanoi even though it is an important document, and 
as far as I understand from an interview with Mr. Jan Riemer - Senior Technical 
Advisor in the Environment Group of the Technical Advisory Services of Danida, the 
Embassy has the obligation to archive all programme and project documents in form 
of electronic versions or hard copies.  
- The financial and institutional analysis that was made for Việt Trì Project at the 
identification and preparation phase. Nevertheless, none of these institutions which 
should have had a copy of that analysis has a copy: the Royal Danish Embassy in 
Hanoi, Phú Thọ Department of Science Technology and Environment (DoSTE) and 
Phú Thọ Department of Natural Resources and Environment (DoNRE). I thus cannot 
know exactly what were written in that analysis (and the Project Document of Việt 
Trì Project did not include the main content of the analysis either even though it was 
supposed to), so the financial sustainability and institutional sustainability analysis in 
Chapter 4 have to basically be relied on the site visits and the interviews I have 
made with the involved stakeholders in Phú Thọ during the fieldwork.  
- The commissioning minutes for receiving the upgraded market facilities that existed 
only in Vietnamese (!?). By the time I arrived in Phú Thọ province, the project had 
been handed over and all the official project documents had been sealed and archived. 
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It turned to be a very complicated matter for Phú Thọ DoNRE to unseal the 
documents I requested just to satisfy my study purpose.  
- The Strategy and Action Plan and draft Project Document for support to Health Care 
Waste Management in Việt Trì city, the Strategy and Action Plan for support to 
Management of Industrial Cleaner Production (CP) including Occupational Health 
and Safety (OHS) in Việt Trì city, and the Strategy and Action Plan for the Integrated 
Management of domestic and industrial wastewater were not finalized when I did the 
fieldwork and are still not finalized by the time I am writing this sub-section. As a 
consequence, the analysis of the sustainability of Việt Trì Project will exclude these 
documents.  
Despite the shortage of the documents mentioned above, I trust that I am not hampered to 
make an interesting and useful analysis based on the documents I have collected as well as 
the interviews and the site visits I have made.  
1.1.5. Concept definitions 
This sub-section presents definitions of some concepts which are not discussed at theoretical 
level (e.g. sustainability and project sustainability) but utilised in some parts of the research. 
Components: clusters of related topics that may be addressed, and these are to a large extent 
affiliated with certain institutional actors, including the ministry(ies) with the responsibility 
of implementing the elements of the national strategies and plans intended to address these 
issues (Danida 2001a:49).   
Industrial zones: are concentrated and non-resided zones established in defined areas with 
the aim to provide industrial production support services. Industrial zones are under the 
direct management of the central government. Yet the local government can be entrusted to 
manage and supervise them (Mr. Nguyễn ðức Tân - Quảng Trị Provincial People’s 
Committee).  
Industrial complexes: are concentrated and non-resided zones established in defined areas 
with the aim to provide industrial production support services. Different from industrial 
zones, industrial complexes are always under the direct management and supervision of the 
local government (Mr. Nguyễn ðức Tân - Quảng Trị Provincial People’s Committee). 
Project: is either an independent aid intervention or the smallest unit of a bigger aid 
intervention – programme, which may have various components and then a number of 
projects falling under each component, or just a number of projects. The definition of this 
concept is summed up from programme documents of a variety of international aid 
organizations.  
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Stakeholder: in the particular context of this study, the term stakeholder broadly covers the 
following meanings: (i) People who will be affected by an endeavour and can influence it 
but are not directly involved with doing the work; (ii) People who are (or might be) affected 
by any action taken by an organization or group; (iii) An individual or group with an interest 
in the success of a group or an organization in delivering intended results and maintaining 
the viability of the group or organization's product and/or service; (iii) Any organization, 
governmental entity, or individual that has a stake in or may be impacted by a given 
approach to environmental regulation, pollution prevention, energy conservation, etc.; (iv) A 
participant in a community mobilization effort, representing a particular segment of society 
(Wikipedia).  
1.2. Research Methodology  
This sub-chapter attempts to present and discuss the methods I am exploiting to answer the 
research questions.  
1.2.1. About the theoretical background 
In order to analyse the sustainability of Việt Trì Project, I will review, discuss and analyse 
some theories and standpoints about sustainability and project sustainability, and then build 
up a theoretical framework on which the empirical analysis will be based.  
As far as sustainability theory and standpoints are concerned, I will be concentrating on 
discussing sustainability definitions by the World Commission on Environment and 
Development; Lynam and Herdt; Goldsmith and Brinkerhoff; and Spangenberg et al. There 
are two main reasons for my choice: I find their definitions are the most characteristic and 
interesting ones among those I have examined and they help create a good ground to switch 
to the project sustainability discussion. Since the focus of the study is project sustainability, I 
will not dig into the origin and dimensions of sustainability, time and spatial scales, 
measurement of sustainability, etc. but introduce my own interpretation and definition of the 
term and then zero in on the project sustainability discussion.  
With reference to project sustainability, I will devote time to a discussion of the term’s 
definitions by some “senior” international aid organisations like the Danish International 
Development Agency (Danida), the Plan International, the Swedish International 
Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP) and the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group; and by two development aid 
experts working for the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) – 
Young and Hamshire. The discussion will be continued with an examination of the 
dimensions of project sustainability, space and time in project sustainability, factors which 
may affect project sustainability and measures to surmount. Particularly in the discussion of 
the dimensions, the factors and the measures, I will also bring in the standpoints of some 
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other organisations such as the Asian Development Bank, the Global Alliance for Vaccines 
and Immunization, Transparency International, the Utstein Anti-Corruption Resource Centre; 
and such authors as Goldsmith and Brinkerhoff; Aguilar et al, Gill and Pino; Dudley; and 
Cooksey. The idea is to enrich the discussion and form a solid theoretical framework for the 
empirical analysis.  
All the theoretical materials used for the theoretical discussion are mainly found by using 
“quick search” function and typing the key words (like “sustainability”, “sustainable 
development”, “project sustainability”, etc.) on the website of RUC library, and by asking 
for help from RUC librarians and from my supervisors. A part of the materials are got from 
“Google” by typing the key words and then selecting the sources I find suitable for my study. 
Also, in some of the books I have borrowed and read, the bibliographies at the end of the 
books are of great help because they very often provides full and precise references which in 
turn facilitate me in seeking for other relevant materials.  
1.2.2. About the empirical background  
Documentary analysis  
Documentary analysis in this case involves the study of the related documents in order to 
gain a clear insight into the research issue. Five main groups of document are selected for 
analysing: Vietnam’s documents, Danida’s documents, Plan International’s documents, 
Sida’s document, and Young and Hamshire’s document. Each group of document plays an 
important role in helping me with answering the working questions. 
Vietnam’s documents compose of political documents (decisions, decrees, resolutions, 
policies, etc.) and industrial utilities’ documents (history of enterprises, operation reports, 
etc.). The political documents elaborate the functions, obligations and rights of especially the 
state stakeholders engaged in Việt Trì Project; provide information about how environmental 
protection generally and the management of wastes and wastewater are particularly 
concerned in Phú Thọ province’s political documents; and clarify the democratic rights that 
people at grassroots level have which are crucial to the sustainability of Việt Trì Project.   
The political documents provide information about the existing regulations and policies 
relating to environmental protection in Phú Thọ province. The industrial utilities’ documents 
provide a brief history of the involved enterprises and the environmental status at their 
manufactories. The documents simultaneously highlight and help to reason out the industrial 
utilities’ existing serious environmental problems caused by their production activities.  
Danida’s documents consist of guidelines, anti-corruption documents, DEA-Vietnam 
documents, and Việt Trì Project-related documents co-authored with COWI A/S. See Table 
below.   
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Name of documents Relevance of the documents to the 
study 
The documents were 
found via 
Guidelines for Sector Programme 
Support 
Evaluation Guidelines 
Providing basic information on how 
sustainability is interpreted, and 
whether it is a targeted and well-
reflected matter in Danida’s 
theoretical instruments 
The Royal Danish Embassy 
in Hanoi 
Danida’s website 
Danida Action Plan to Fight 
Corruption 2003-2008, Danida’s 
Anti-corruption Code of Conduct, 
and Annual Anti-corruption Report 
2004 
Giving an impression of what kind of 
anti-corruption policy Danida has, 
whether it has been practised and 
what results have been obtained  
Danida’s website 
DEA-Vietnam programme 
document and DEA-Vietnam 
Appraisal report 
 
Evaluation report by Scanteam of 
Norway 
Concretising the planning for and 
designing of sustainability in a 
Danida environmental assistance 
intervention 
Providing objective evaluative 
opinions relating to how the 
sustainability of DEA-Vietnam as a 
whole was practised and what results 
were achieved 
Mr. Jens Lorentzen, Chief 
Advisor of Danida’s Centre 
for Competence 
Development 
Project document, inception report, 
feasibility study reports, progress 
reports, completion report, etc. of 
Việt Trì Project 
Providing fundamental information 
about Việt Trì Project 
Mr. Morten Jørgensen,  
Senior Technical Advisor 
of Việt Trì Project 
Table 1.1 - Danida’s documents 
Plan International’s documents include Evaluation Technical Guides in which project 
sustainability is elaborated in details. Sida’s document is concerned with Evaluation Manual 
where project sustainability is defined and factors which may affect sustainability are 
presented. Young and Hamshire constructed a so-called Promoting Practical Sustainability 
manual where they not only define the concept of project sustainability but also intensively 
introduce the factors that may affect project sustainability and the measures to make good 
those factors. All those documents give an insight into how sustainability in a specific aid 
intervention context is viewed and realised, and they accordingly contribute to the theoretical 
discussion about project sustainability.  
The biggest advantage of using this method is I can quickly get access to the fundamental 
information that provides a preliminary basic understanding of the research issue without 
being present in the location where Việt Trì Project was carried out. However, there are a 
couple of major disadvantages which have to be considered carefully. First of all, analyzing 
sustainability of Việt Trì Project is more than just reviewing a pile of documents. Visiting 
the project sites, observing the operation and maintenance of the project benefits, talking 
with the ultimate beneficiaries and other involved stakeholders - both from the Vietnamese 
and the donor’s sides - are of great importance to making an accurate and reliable analysis. 
Secondly, the existing documents are written by others, and I cannot assure whether they are 
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100% true by just reading and relying on them. Therefore, it is necessary that the subsequent 
methods are supplemented in order to strengthen the validity and quality of the study.  
Site visits  
In the period from 02.3.2006 to 12.4.2006, I carried out fieldwork in Phú Thọ province and 
Hanoi. During my stay in Phú Thọ province, I visited the six upgraded urban markets, the 
upgraded hospital wastewater treatment plant, the newly-built hospital wastewater treatment 
plant, the bio-gas plants, the results of the demonstration projects done at the industrial 
utilities, the Green Belt, and the upgraded environmental monitoring system aside from 
visiting the concerned authoritative institutions (see Annex 1.1. and Annex 1.1.1 for full 
details of the visited sites). The visits are quite useful in the case of my study because I am 
investigating a process which involves a variety of stakeholders at different levels. They 
serve as a good opportunity for me to get a visual picture of the entire project, test the 
trustworthiness of the project documents I have reviewed, see how the given infrastructures-
facilities-equipment things are run since the project termination, what the problems are in 
case they are not well-sustained and why. They are combined with the in-depth individual 
interviews and informal conversations below to make the intended analysis sufficient.  
In-depth individual interviews 
Carrying out interviews with a number of selected internal and external stakeholders both 
directly involved in and not involved in Việt Trì Project is expected to generate “live” data 
and enhance the quality of my study. The interviews help me understand in-depth different 
individual contexts within which Việt Trì Project is located, clarify and deepen the 
investigation of related details around the sustainability of Việt Trì Project, and reflect on 
improvement potentialities. Two kinds of interview are meant here: face-to-face interviews 
and interviews by phone organised in keeping with the convenience of the interviewees and 
interviewer (see Annex 1.2 for details of the interviewees and the Enclosure of Interviews, 
Informal Conversations and Correspondence for full details of the interviews).  
 Face-to-face interviews 
Interviews with two concerned Danida staffs in Denmark help me understand the 
decentralised operating system within Danida through the division of functions and 
responsibilities of Danida staff in Denmark and Danida staff at the Royal Danish Embassy 
Vietnam; clarify some important points in the evaluation guidelines as far as sustainability is 
concerned; get a better understanding of DEA-Vietnam programme to which Việt Trì Project 
belongs; and make clear some crucial points in DEA-Vietnam’s programme and evaluation 
documents. In the meantime, the interview with the national programme officer of Danida at 
the Royal Danish Embassy in Hanoi (Vietnam) brings about important information 
concerning Danida’s actual participation in Việt Trì Project and accordingly help me 
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understand better and assess how Việt Trì Project’s sustainability was prepared and 
implemented, and what responsibilities Danida has in connection with the sustainability of 
the project.  
The local Vietnamese stakeholders in Phú Thọ province are indispensable stakeholders of 
Việt Trì Project. Whether Việt Trì Project is a success or failure, it concerns both Danida and 
the local Vietnamese stakeholders’ participation and coordination in the entire process. By 
using the expression “local Vietnamese stakeholders”, I am referring to the related people of 
Department of Natural Resources and Environment (DoNRE), Department of Planning and 
Investment (DPI), Department of Health (DoH), Department of Industry (DoI), Phú Thọ 
Provincial General Hospital, Phú Thọ Town General Hospital, Phú Thọ Environmental 
Monitoring Station, Việt Trì Urban Environmental Company (Việt Trì URENCO), 7 out of 
12 industrial utilities directly benefited from the project, Market Management Teams of the 
six urban markets, Phú Thọ Market Management Board, and a biogas plant household. The 
interviews with them serve the purposes of finding out how their actual engagement in Việt 
Trì Project was; how resources were planned and distributed to Việt Trì Project and how 
they financially-institutionally-socially-technically prepared themselves to operate, maintain 
and develop the obtained outcomes at the project return-on-investment stage.  
COWI A/S, the Danish international consulting company, was selected by Danida to provide 
technical assistance and financial management to Việt Trì Project. COWI A/S played an 
important role in partly ensuring Việt Trì Project’s financial, institutional, social, and 
technical sustainability because it was involved in transferring technological knowledge to 
the local staff, enhancing the local staff’s knowledge of financial management, building 
capacity for the local staff, and managing the project from beginning to the end. Interviews 
with the Senior Technical Advisor of COWI A/S, who functioned as Senior Technical 
Advisor to Việt Trì Project aim to get a clear impression of the project implementation 
process and of the local counterpart’s capacity of taking over the project when it came to an 
end; to elaborate some project details which are unclear; and to get his viewpoints on the 
sustainability of Việt Trì Project.  
Part of my study is to seek for some alternatives which can help improve the sustainability of 
Việt Trì Project and hopefully Danida’s similar future projects in Phú Thọ province and 
Vietnam. One of the biggest and known international Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs) which has been operating in Vietnam quite long, Plan International, is chosen as 
one of the sources. The idea is to examine its theoretical instruments and experiences with 
project sustainability. A few experienced project specialists who have been engaged in 
different projects funded by international organisations in Vietnam with positions like 
project manager, coordinator, consultant and officer are also interviewed for the purpose of 
getting a wider view and experiences of project sustainability from another angle.  
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 Interviews by phone 
Some of the related stakeholders cannot be available for face-to-face interviews due to time 
or distance irrelevances. The field officer of Plan International in Phú Thọ province and the 
leader of Gát Market Management Board (one of the ultimate beneficiaries of Việt Trì 
Project), for instance, have to be talked to by phone because they cannot always be present 
in their office by the time I am available to interview them.  
Informal conversations  
The word “interview” itself or the nature of the interview sometimes may hinder the 
investigation process because either the interviewees do not want to be “interviewed” or 
“asked” in an official way, or the actual situation does not allow or is not convenient for the 
interviewer to make an official interview. The market vendors, for example, feel comfortable 
to talk to me informally if I am just a curious customer or a “civil-engineer-to-be”. They will 
immediately feel nervous if I show up with a recorder or a notebook and a pen, introduce 
myself, and ask for their permission to raise some questions. I should, instead, play one of 
the two mentioned roles and have a chat with them. The needed information will be provided 
more easily (see Enclosure of Interviews, Informal Conversations and Correspondence 
for informal conversation details). 
Correspondence 
In some cases, it is not possible to talk to the intended interviewees due to distance 
inconvenience. The case of a relevant and experienced staff of CARE International being 
based in Cà Mau city in southern Vietnam, and an experienced project consultant working in 
Quảng Trị province in central Vietnam are two typical examples. Both of them have worked 
with development projects funded by international organisations for between 7-10 years and 
are thus able to share with me a great deal of interesting and useful information about project 
sustainability, yet they are not available to talk to me either face-to-face or by phone by the 
time I am able to make an interview with them. So we agree upon exchanging questions and 
answers by e-mails. This method consumes more time of the interviewees, but in return 
helps them arrange their ideas more clearly and better, and help me save my transcription 
time.   
Moreover, during the period I am collecting information relating to Việt Trì Project, I 
exchange a couple of e-mails both with the national programme officer of Danida in Hanoi 
(Vietnam) and many e-mails the Senior Technical Advisor of COWI A/S. Each of the e-
mails basically contains some questions or some unclear issues which need to be clarified. 
This way of getting information is both efficient and economical (see Annex 1.3 for details 
of corresponded people and Enclosure of Interviews, Informal Conversations and 
Correspondence for correspondence details).  
 13 
Personal professional experiences of working with development projects 
Before I started the master education at TekSam, I had had a couple of years working with 
an international NGO called GVC (Gruppo di Volontariato Civile) as desk assistant and 
project assistant, and then for a local NGO called CSECHE-Hue (Centre for School 
Equipment and Humanitarian Education) as project advisor in Huế city – the capital of Thừa 
Thiên-Huế Province located in central Vietnam. While I was working for GVC, I was 
engaged in different integrated projects dealing with reduction of the rate of malnourished 
children in A Lưới mountainous district, improvement of the agricultural production 
conditions for people in Phú Vang district, poverty reduction in Hương Trà district, forest 
rehabilitation in Quảng Trị province, etc.  
Especially in 2001, I was involved in the Asia Urbs VNM005 Development Project titled 
“Urban Poverty alleviation in Hue in Connection with Heritage Preservation Promotion” 
co-financed by the European Union and co-implemented by Ancona Municipality (Italy), 
Huế city (Vietnam), and Roskilde Municipality (Denmark) as a secretary. The practical idea 
of the project was to provide a pilot community of 50 families with basic infrastructures 
including a nursery, a kindergarten, primary education, a vocational centre, health care and a 
park. Those families were living and working on their boats but mooring them in the moat 
around the ancient citadel of Huế city or in environmentally-sensitive areas. Above all, the 
project also aimed to create a partnership among Asian and European cities and exchange 
expertise and valuable experiences.  
During the period I was working with the above-mentioned projects, I did learn a lot of 
things about how to plan and design a participatory project efficiently; under what 
circumstances corruption occur and how; why it is difficult to prevent corruption when a 
project involves various authoritative partner stakeholders at different levels; and so forth. 
Those experiences are very useful grounds for me to do a good fieldwork and analyse the 
sustainability of Việt Trì Project.  
1.3. Outline of the Thesis 
The entire study is organised into five chapters which can be summed up as follows 
(Chapter 1 is not included here because I have just presented it).  
Chapter 2 is devoted to a deep theoretical discussion of these two important concepts: 
sustainability and project sustainability. In the first part of the chapter, I will present and 
debate some interesting interpretations and definitions of sustainability while in the second 
part, I will dig into the meaning of project sustainability and its dimensions, the factors that 
may affect project sustainability, and how to promote project sustainability. Here, I will 
highlight some shortcomings of the theoretical standpoints, especially the local participation 
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and ownership factor and the anti-corruption factor, and thereby express what my viewpoints 
are.  
Chapter 3 sets up a historical framework for the study by providing some important 
background information about Phú Thọ province and Việt Trì city, describing the main 
environmental problems caused by industrial and urban development that the province and 
the city have been facing, and presenting what the existing conditions and regulations of 
managing those environmental problems are. At the same time, it also tries to explain why 
Danida is intervening in those environmental problems and then goes into some fundamental 
details of Việt Trì Project.  
Chapter 4 is an analysis of the sustainability of Việt Trì Project by methodologically 
combining the theoretical and empirical backgrounds. The four dimensions of project 
sustainability - financial, institutional, social and technical - and the factors that affect 
project sustainability are the cornerstones of the entire analysis while the prerequisites for 
the sustainability of Việt Trì Project will be presented at the beginning. The chapter will end 
off with a discussion of three outcomes of Việt Trì Project which are found strange and thus 
questionable.  
Chapter 5 presents and debates some recommendations for enhancing the sustainability of 
Việt Trì Project and Danida’s similar projects carried out in Vietnam in future. The 
recommendations are based on what have been learnt from Việt Trì Project, and some 
practical and useful experiences shared by one of the biggest and most known Non-
Governmental Organisations that has been operating in Vietnam for a long time - Plan 
International - and some experienced project experts. I will also reflect upon the challenges 
of the recommendations in connection with Danida’s specific context. The chapter rounds up 
main conclusions of the analysis and introduces two possibilities for further studies.  
1.4. Summing-up  
This chapter has presented the research problem and the structure of the thesis, and discussed 
in details the methods that are found relevant for the study. In the next chapter, I will 
continue with an in-depth theoretical discussion. 
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2. Theoretical Framework 
 
The aim of this chapter is to create a theoretical background for the empirical analysis. An 
in-depth theoretical discussion of these two important concepts sustainability and project 
sustainability will be presented in two different parts. As the central term of my study is 
project sustainability and the target of the study is to analyse the sustainability of a Danida’s 
project, the first part about sustainability will basically concentrate on an examination and 
discussion of the various interpretations and definitions of the term. In the second part, I will 
dig into the meaning of project sustainability and its dimensions, the factors that may affect 
project sustainability, and how to promote project sustainability. Some shortcomings of the 
theoretical standpoints will be highlighted, especially the local participation and ownership 
factor, and the anti-corruption factor that has widely been recognised as a threat to project 
sustainability. The chapter, in other words, attempts to answer this working question: What 
are sustainability and project sustainability, and why project sustainability?  
2.1. Sustainability  
Sustainability is a controversial and multi-dimensional concept which has generated 
continuous and multi-disciplinary discussions. So far, there has been a wide variety of 
interpretations and definitions relating to this concept, yet in the limited scope of this study, I 
would like to discuss four definitions which I am interested in and will later be useful for the 
project sustainability discussion.  
“…development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs” (The World Commission on Environment and Development 
1987:43) 
“…the capacity of system to maintain output at a level approximately equal to or greater than its 
historical average, with the approximation determined by the historical level of variability” (Lynam 
and Herdt 1989:384) 
“…the ability of a system to produce outputs that are sufficiently well-valued so that enough inputs 
are provided to continue production” (Goldsmith and Brinkerhoff 1990:13-14) 
…the long term preservation of the viability of the system, its components and their resilience. In a 
dynamic system, this includes not only the ability to resist externally enforced changes, but even more 
the ability to recover from and to adapt to pressures. The resulting state of the system is not a static 
balance, but a dynamic process of permanent change, i.e. a development process” (Spangenberg et al 
2000:21) 
Table 2.1 – Definitions of sustainability 
The definition by the World Commission on Environment and Development (henceforth: the 
Commission) closely relates sustainability to development. Even though the actors of the 
 16 
development process is not explicitly stated, the definition provides a general basis to 
understand the term “sustainable development”, and this probably explains why it has been 
adopted popularly by many international aid agencies. The first part of the definition - 
meeting the needs of the present - implies to satisfy economic needs, political needs, social, 
cultural and health needs; while the second part - without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs - implies to reduce the population growth (especially 
the population growth in third world countries), to use non-renewable resources in an 
environmental-friendly manner, to minimise the utilisation or the waste of non-renewable 
resources, and to use renewable resources properly and effectively. 
The definitions by Lynam and Herdt as well as Goldsmith and Brinkerhoff share a major 
interesting similarity: all of them refer to the system’s ability to maintain or continue the 
obtained results, and give hint that strategic plans and actions are needed for the maintenance 
or continuation. However, Lynam and Herdt just touch upon “the capacity of system to 
maintain output” without considering the ability of the system to produce the outputs by 
itself, to be a part of, and to “develop” or to “reproduce” the outputs (the third one is crucial 
for a development process). In Goldsmith and Brinkerhoff’s definition, we have production 
and maintenance capacities of the system which create a kind of production-consumption-
maintenance circle repeated over and over, but “sufficiently well-valued” does not mean the 
same as “sufficiently and efficiently valued”. In the latter case, it is quantitatively and 
qualitatively implied that possibilities of damaging or negatively influencing the quality of 
the coming production(s) are limited. Goldsmith and Brinkerhoff’s definition also lacks the 
implication of developing or reproducing the outputs.  
Spangenberg et al. comes up with a development-oriented understanding of sustainability by 
allocating sustainability in system analysis, and in this way, he provides a more elaborated 
definition of sustainability. The expression “the long term preservation of the viability of the 
system” is, to a high extent, similar to the first part of Lynam and Herdt’s definition, yet the 
ability to produce and promote the outputs is not implied even though the resistance, 
recovery and adaptation capacities are stressed.  
From what I have found, it seems like there are no single and sufficient definitions of the 
term sustainability which has received critiques for being ambiguous and opening to a wide 
range of interpretations which can sometimes be confusing. Simon and Morse (1999) have 
the viewpoint that the meaning of sustainability is complex and uncertain, and that since 
people differ in the social, economic and environmental conditions in which they live, to 
have a single definition which one attempts to apply across this diversity could be both 
impractical and dangerous. Our world is diverse per se, therefore, the flexibility as to what 
sustainability means can also be great strengths (Simon and Morse 1999:9-10). Kidd also 
argues, “there is not, and should not be, any single definition of sustainability that is more 
logical and productive than other definitions”. Instead, “those who use the term 
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‘sustainability’ should always state precisely what they mean by the term” (Kidd 1992:3). 
However, as how I understand and in accordance with what I have just discussed above, 
sustainability can be defined as follows:  
Sustainability is the capacity of the human society to produce, maintain and develop 
outputs in a manner which satisfies both the present and future generations’ needs.  
In the next discussion about project sustainability, I will get back to this definition at 
relevant points in order to highlight the relationship between the two terms.  
2.2. Project sustainability 
2.2.1. The meaning of and reasons for project sustainability 
Project sustainability is a relatively recent concept but has predominantly been paid attention 
to, defined, and become an increasingly central theme in many international aid 
organisations and experts’ manuals and practices. They are the Danish International 
Development Agency (Danida), Plan International, the Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the World 
Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group3, Young and Hamshire, etc. The fact indicates that 
theorists have not yet devoted a relevant and sufficient position for project sustainability in 
their sustainability forum, probably because they give little or even no consideration about a 
concept which is “far more about operation and maintenance (‘or institutional and 
managerial sustainability’) than about any concept of ecological sustainability” (Pugh 
1996:25), and the international aid organisations and experts possibly have another concern 
of what they are interested in and doing than the theorists. As a consequence, this sub-
section presents and analyses some findings and discussions about project sustainability 
beyond the theorists’ discussions.  
An examination of the manuals, operation strategies, plans and/or working tools of the afore-
mentioned international aid organisations and experts, shows that project sustainability is 
defined in different ways (see Table 2.2 below), yet the core message that the definitions 
above have in common relates to the continuation or maintenance of the benefits/the 
achieved outcomes of project/programme activities after the project/programme has come to 
an end. Here, it is important to note that I am not discussing sustainability of humanitarian or 
emergency relief efforts but interventions with long-term development objectives. Just to 
give a simple example, if Danida, Sida or the World Bank finances Vietnam a three-year 
project to build an industrial wastewater treatment plant in a certain locality, it is naturally 
                                                
3 The Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) is an independent unit within the World Bank; it reports directly to 
the Bank's Board of Executive Directors. IEG assesses what works, and what does not; how a borrower plans 
to run and maintain a project; and the lasting contribution of the Bank to a country's overall development. 
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expected that after the plant has been constructed and the project is completed, the operation 
of the plant should continue rather than fall into immediate decline.  
 
 
 
 
 
Relating the definitions above to the definitions of sustainability, especially my own 
definition, I have presented and discussed in the first sub-section, there are few but important 
shortages. First of all, opposite to sustainability where the central stakeholder is “the system” 
or “the present” and “future generations”, the stakeholders in project sustainability is not 
explicitly expressed. Obviously, the obtained project outcomes cannot continue by 
themselves but such involved partner stakeholders as the partner institution, the ultimate 
beneficiaries, etc. will make them continue. Therefore, it is crucial that the directly involved 
partner stakeholders should be clearly stated in project sustainability definition. Next, 
sustainability should, as I argued earlier, deal with not only the ability of the system to 
maintain the outputs but also the ability of the system to produce and develop or reproduce 
the outputs. In the case of project sustainability, it should be the same, because if the directly 
involved stakeholders, especially the ultimate beneficiaries, are not engaged in and have no 
capacity of producing the outputs, it will be difficult for them to continue and promote those 
outputs. My definition of project sustainability, hereby termed as “aid intervention” to make 
sure that both projects and programmes are included, will thus be as follows: 
Sustainability of an aid intervention is concerned with the capacity of the directly 
involved partner stakeholders to produce, maintain and develop the achieved results 
over a period of time after the intervention has come to an end.  
As far as the question “why project sustainability” is concerned, it is firstly “in many ways a 
high-level test of whether or not the aid intervention has been a success” (Danida 1999:60). 
Secondly, it is important to stress that development projects take place in developing 
countries, and many of them deal with hunger eradication and poverty reduction, education, 
“…is an indication whether the positive impacts are likely to continue after external assistance has come to 
an end” (Danida 1999:61) 
“…the extent to which the objectives of the program will continue to be met after the program is over” (Plan 
International 2002b:24) 
“…the likelihood that the benefits from an intervention will be maintained at an appropriate level for a 
reasonably long period of time after the withdrawal of donor support” (Sida 2004:35) 
“…durability of positive programme or project results after the termination of the technical cooperation 
channelled through that programme or project.” (UNDP)1 
 “…reflects the resiliency to risks of a project as measured by the likelihood that its estimated net benefits 
will be maintained or exceeded over the project's intended useful life” (The World Bank’s Independent 
Evaluation Group)1 
“…the continuation of benefits after major assistance from a donor has been completed.” (Young and 
Hamshire 2000:7) 
Table 2.2 – Definitions of project sustainability 
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health, etc. by providing the recipient locality with infrastructures, facilities, non-refunded 
grants or loans, knowledge of the related field(s) and so forth. The majority of such projects 
need and ought to produce lasting results because if not, the impacts of the intervention on 
the recipient locality will on the one hand be very immediate and temporary, and hence will 
not help the beneficiaries improve their problems in the long run. On the other hand, project 
sustainability is a way to demonstrate that the partner’s institution and the ultimate 
beneficiaries’ were, to a relevant extent, involved in the entire project preparation and 
implementation processes; that their technical and institutional capacities of organising and 
managing the obtained outcomes have been enhanced; that their financial capacity of 
maintaining and developing the outcomes has been discussed, analysed and worked out a 
suitable solution; and especially that their awareness of being responsible for and 
contributing to what have been delivered has been confirmed and strengthened. 
2.2.2. Dimensions of project sustainability 
Different international aid organisations term project sustainability dimensions differently, 
yet they in general refer to five dimensions which are financial, institutional, technical, 
social, and environmental (the last dimension is normally included in non-environmental 
related projects/programmes).   
Financial sustainability  
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) reckons that this dimension has three aspects: (i) the 
availability of adequate funds to finance project expenditures, especially funds drawn from 
the government budget; (ii) the recovery of some of the project costs from the project 
beneficiaries; and (iii) the financial incentive necessary to ensure participation in the project4. 
In the meantime, the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations (GAVI) believes 
financial sustainability: (i) is a shared concern and a shared responsibility of both 
governments and their development partners; (ii) requires matching financing to evolving 
program objectives; (iii) includes concepts of (a) adequate and (b) reliable financial 
resources, focusing not only  on the quantity of funds but also on how well they reach the 
level they are needed; and iv) is related to both mobilization and efficient use of financial 
resources5.  
In Plan International’s Evaluation Technical Guides, a list of questions are raised, the 
majority of which are Yes-No questions (Annex 2.1), and from these questions, it can be 
understood that financial sustainability is concerned with clear and full awareness and 
                                                
4 Asian Development Bank: 
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Guidelines/Eco_Analysis/financial_sustainability.asp. Assessed 02.01.2006 
5 The Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations (GAVI): 
http://www.who.int/immunization_financing/tools/en/FSP_Guidelines_April%202004_En.pdf. Assessed 
02.01.2006 
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participation of the ultimate beneficiaries and related institutions in the budget planning and 
implementation processes of the project activities, with complete discussions about all the 
costs concerned incl. maintenance costs, and with investigation and consideration of 
economic perspectives which the ultimate beneficiaries may have in order to sustain the 
outcomes.  
From the Asian Development Bank’s definition of financial sustainability, points (ii) and (iii) 
make good sense whereas point (i), which is also Danida’s central meaning, does not. In the 
majority of development programmes and projects given to developing countries, the 
financial contribution from the partner country or the recipient locality is usually in kind 
(labour, land and things alike) rather than in cash. That is normally what the partner 
country/the recipient locality can do. Depending on the types of programme/project, some 
partner countries/ recipient localities sometimes commit to covering the maintenance costs 
or part of the operational costs, or paying salaries for the local programme/project staff. This 
mostly has to do with the fact that many developing countries have very limited budgetary 
resources and they thus have difficulties in spending part of their existing resources on 
contributing to a development programme/project. Therefore, it is unrealistic to expect that 
the partner country/the recipient locality can financially sustain the outcomes without 
considering some specific possibilities which can lead to financial sustainability.  
Plan International and the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations seem to have 
included a variety of relevant perspectives even though the latter does not include the roles 
and the engagement of the ultimate beneficiaries who evidently are the key actors of the 
sustainability task. Combining these two institutions’ perceptions of financial sustainability, 
we can come to a common definition, which is:  
Financial sustainability is concerned with the ability of the donor, the authoritative 
partner stakeholder, and the ultimate beneficiaries to plan for, mobilise and utilise 
appropriately and efficiently both domestic and external resources on a sufficient, 
reliable and strategic basis for the purposes of achieving the set targets, maintaining 
and developing the obtained outcomes.  
This definition will be exploited in Chapter 4 where I analyse the sustainability of Việt Trì 
Project.  
Institutional sustainability  
Institutional sustainability has been of major concern of the general process of sustainable 
development, and the term refers to the self-reliance, strength and longevity of institutions 
(OECD 1989; Goldsmith and Brinkerhoff 1990). In Danida’s operational documents, a 
definition of the term is not found, yet from its Guidelines for Sector Programme Support, 
DEA-Vietnam Programme Document and the Project Document of Việt Trì Project, it can 
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be understood that institutional sustainability, in accordance with Danida’s viewpoint, is 
concerned with the organisational and managerial capacities of the involved institutions to 
maintain the outcomes; accordingly, when a programme/project is proposed, an in-depth 
analysis of the organisational structure and the institutional capacity of the involved 
institutions is also required.  
There are three things which I would like to point out here. Firstly, Danida seems to be 
focused on the organisational and managerial capacity of the authoritative partner 
institutions, not that of the ultimate beneficiaries. Secondly, there is no clear implication in 
Danida’s viewpoint concerning whether it is necessary for its program/project to be 
consistent with the local and national governments’ development plans and targets, which is 
an important element to engage the active participation and enhance the responsibilities of 
the authoritative partner institutions in the aid activities. Thirdly, Danida does not appear to 
regard its aid intervention as a process where the ultimate beneficiaries’ influence on the 
local government should be strengthened, which is an indicator of developing the achieved 
outcomes.  
Plan International has no concrete statement of institutional sustainability either, but in its 
Evaluation Technical Guides, a list of mainly Yes-No questions directed towards this 
dimension are raised (Annex 2.2). The questions focus on the roles and the engagement of 
the involved authoritative institutions on the aid intervention, the consistence of the aid 
intervention in relation to the local and national governments’ development targets, the 
possible enhanced influence of the ultimate beneficiaries on the local government, the 
appropriate organisational and institutional structure existing at the ultimate beneficiaries to 
take care of implementing the aid intervention activities, maintaining and developing the 
attained outcomes (Plan International 2002a:4-5).  
To a large extent, I agree with Plan International’s viewpoint, yet I am also concerned the 
problem of undermining the existing organisational and managerial system at the recipient 
locality, and of introducing a completely new organisational and managerial system to the 
recipient locality without respecting its culture, tradition and wishes. Failing to solve any of 
those two problems would be disadvantageous for the institutional sustainability desire. My 
statement of institutional sustainability is thus as follows: 
Institutional sustainability is about the organisational and managerial incentives and 
capacities of the directly involved institutions, including the authoritative partner 
institutions and the ultimate beneficiaries, to implement, maintain and develop the 
achieved outcomes of the aid intervention.  
Technical sustainability 
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In accordance with my findings, technical sustainability seem to exist as clear hints of what 
the term is concerned with rather than as a definition. In Danida’s Guidelines for Sector 
Programme Support, for example, technical sustainability is about the appropriateness of the 
technologies chosen for the aid intervention (Danida 1998:50). Plan International, in its 
Evaluation Technical Guides, means the same thing but with an extra point: the ultimate 
beneficiaries must have access to the technical input required to sustain the project. Both 
points are interesting because if the chosen technologies are not appropriate with the 
particular conditions of the recipient locality, it will be difficult to talk about sustainability, 
seen from the technical perspective. Furthermore, if the ultimate beneficiaries have not had 
the opportunities to approach the technical details in relation to the attained outcomes, they 
will obviously not be able to maintain them, not even to develop or reproduce.  
To my understanding: 
Technical sustainability is concerned with the adoption of appropriate technologies for 
the purpose of maintaining and developing the achieved outcomes.  
Back to the industrial wastewater treatment plant example, we will see that the technology 
chosen to apply for the plant is necessarily suitable for the actual capacities of the recipient 
locality, namely technical, financial and managerial capacities to take over the plant when it 
is handed over. The choice of a very high or too expensive technology will be irrelevant, and 
this may potentially lead to the consequence that the outcomes cannot technically (and also 
institutionally) be maintained and developed.  
Social sustainability  
In many documents of international aid organisations, the social dimension is regarded as a 
factor which affects the sustainability of the aid intervention; nevertheless, too few of them 
state exactly how they understand social sustainability and what it indeed means. In Plan 
International’s Evaluation Technical Guides, a checklist of questions directing at social 
sustainability are introduced even though the organisation does not attempt to define the 
term (Annex 2.3). The questions address some social aspects of sustainability which have to 
do with the active and voluntary participation of the ultimate beneficiaries in the preparation 
phase of the aid intervention (how and to what extent), the inclusion of the poorest and/or the 
most marginalised beneficiaries in continued access to the achieved benefits, the equal 
access of ultimate beneficiaries of different genders, and the respect of cultural, political, 
religious and social aspects of the recipient locality (Plan International 2002a:6).  
All those points directly show how and how far the social aspects are concerned and 
integrated in an aid intervention. Yet I do not completely agree with the first point. To the 
best of my knowledge, the participation and the level of participation of the ultimate 
beneficiaries in the preparation phase is crucial, but that is not enough, for lack of their 
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sufficient and efficient participation in the implementation and phase-out stages will affect 
the quantity and quality of the outcomes, thereby affect the sustainability. My definition of 
social sustainability will therefore be as follows:  
Social sustainability is concerned with the sufficient, equal and efficient participation 
of the ultimate beneficiaries in all related phases of the aid intervention which will in 
turn have positive effects on their continued access to the achieved outcomes.  
In this perspective, social sustainability is actually very close to and can be merged with 
institutional sustainability.  
Environmental sustainability 
The term “environmental sustainability” is very often met and discussed in the context of 
programmes and projects whose objectives and activities have no concern to tackle 
environmental problems. Again, I have difficulty in getting a wider viewpoint from different 
international aid organisations regarding what environmental sustainability refers to. In 
Danida’s Guidelines for Sector Programme Support, a short presentation of environmental 
assessment implies that environmental sustainability relates to achieving the aid intervention 
targets without causing negative impacts on the environment, and this is done by carrying 
out an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) during the identification and preparation 
phase. If the EIA report tells that the intervention is going to cause severe negative effects on 
the environment and there are no solutions to minimise them, the intervention must be either 
totally rejected or thoroughly re-designed (Danida 1998:54-57).  
The point is reasonable but not sufficient because there is no implication of preventing the 
potential negative environmental impacts in long-term perspective. That means in the long 
run, the achieved outcomes will potentially have sustainability problems, seen from the 
environmental angle. Just to give an example, if Danida finances Phú Thọ province to build 
up a health care solid wastes disposal landfill, it is important that the technical solutions 
must take into account all the possible environmental impacts of the landfill, not only until 
Danida has withdrawn from the project area but also in future. Otherwise, the constructed 
landfill will not be environmentally sustainable. My statement of environmental 
sustainability is as follows:  
Environmental sustainability relates to achieving, maintaining and promoting the aid 
intervention outcomes without causing negative impacts on the environment both in the 
short-term and long-term perspectives.  
2.2.3. Relationship among the dimensions of project sustainability 
At this point, it is necessary to discuss the relationship among the dimensions of project 
sustainability because even if the related authoritative partner institutions and the ultimate 
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beneficiaries have enough funding or a suitable financial plan to maintain and develop the 
project outcomes, the complete sustainability objective cannot be obtained if they lack either 
technical or institutional capacities, or even both of them, and vice versa. Neither can the 
target be met if the ultimate beneficiaries have not actively and efficiently participated in all 
project phases, especially the preparation phase. The situation can also get worse if the 
environmental aspect (in the case of non-environmental projects) has not been considered 
and serious impacts on the environment due to the project activities are unavoidable.  
As I mentioned earlier, not many international aid organisations and experts have attempted 
to debate the dimensions of project sustainability, yet several of them touch upon the factors 
that can affect the sustainability of their projects/programmes (called as “sustainability 
factors”). Most commonly, they talk about policy support measures, technological factor, 
environmental factor, social-cultural factor, institutional factor, economic and financial 
factor, local participation and ownership, awareness building and training, and external 
political and economic factors (Danida 1999; Sida 2004; Young and Hamshire 2000). Plan 
International also has the tendency of using “factor” rather than “dimension”. In fact, such 
factors as technological factor, environmental factor, social-cultural factor, institutional 
factor, and economic and financial factor are very similar to the dimensions of project 
sustainability in terms of content. In the case of Danida, for example, “technical 
sustainability” (Danida 2001a:57) and “choice of technology” (Danida 1999:88-89) actually 
mean the same thing; or “financial sustainability” (Danida 2001a:57) and “economic and 
financial aspects” (Danida 1999:89-90), “institutional sustainability” (Danida 2001a:57) and 
“institutional aspects” (Danida 1999:89-90).  
After having read both their manuals and programme/project documents and reports, I found 
out that they use the term “factor” in their manuals and “financial sustainability”, 
“institutional sustainability”, “technical sustainability”, etc. in their programme/project 
documents and reports. To me, “factor” and “dimension” in this context are two different 
things. “Factor” refers to a phenomenon presumed to affect project sustainability while 
“dimension” relates to a parameter required to define the characteristics of project 
sustainability. We can say “the factors that affect the dimensions of project sustainability”, 
and it is wrong to say “the institutional factor that affects the institutional sustainability” 
because they are the same thing. Just to give an example about “factor” and “dimension”. 
Participation from the counterpart side is a factor which can affect any of these four 
dimensions of sustainability: financial, institutional, social and technical because if the 
directly involved partner stakeholders do not sufficiently and effectively participate in a 
project, it cannot be secured that they will be able to overtake and develop the outcomes due 
to lack of incentives, financial considerations and solutions, organisational and managerial 
skills, technical knowledge, etc.  
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In the sub-section below, I will present some factors which can influence project 
sustainability.  
2.2.4. Factors affecting project sustainability 
A review of manuals and working tools prepared by Danida, Sida, Young and Hamshire 
show that there are a certain factors which may affect the sustainability of a project, and 
those factors are defined on the basis of their practical experiences of working with 
development aid. Some similarities and differences are found among the factors they present.  
 Policy support measures, Partner Country priorities, and Partner government and 
donor policies 
By using the term Policy support measures, Danida implies the commitment of the recipient 
country, which is expressed in form of “agreement on objectives, the scope of support to 
responsible organisations and the willingness to provide financial and personnel resources” 
(Danida 1999:88), and is based on the mutual understanding of interests. Commitment is the 
key word and deemed to be among the most important determinants affecting the fruitfulness 
of Danida’s aid interventions.  
Sida utilises the expression Partner Country priorities to address the consistence of the aid 
intervention(s) with the partner country’s development plans and strategies. It believes that if 
the donor bases the aid intervention(s) on the partner country’s development plans and 
strategies, the aid intervention(s) will have higher opportunities to be sustained (Sida 
2004:35) because it means the engagement, responsibilities and commitment feasibility from 
the partner country’s side in connection with the aid intervention(s) will be higher.  
Young and Hamshire distinguish the partner government policies and the donor policies, 
namely the partner government policies can have significant effect on the sustainability of 
the obtained outcomes through the policy environment and policy fit whereas the donor can 
have influence on how contracts are prepared, duration of funding and what is funded. In 
accordance with Young and Hamshire’s experiences, funding policies of the donor very 
often ignore to support the operation and maintenance costs, and they trust that such 
ignorance can have adverse impacts on sustainability.  
It is very sensible that the project should be backed up by the partner country’s commitment, 
consisted with the partner country’s development priorities, and supported by the donor’s 
funding policy for the reasons that Danida, Sida, Young and Hamshire have provided, and 
for they will contribute to the financial and institutional sustainability of the project. 
Nevertheless, in the case of donor’s funding policy, it is not always relevant that the donor 
should be responsible for maintenance costs, because this is also against the original 
meaning of financial sustainability, and as a result render the partner stakeholders depend 
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passively on its funding. The donor should instead get both the authoritative partner 
institution and the ultimate beneficiaries in the project from beginning, discuss with them 
about different financial possibilities to maintain and develop the outcomes.  
 Partner country ownership and Participation, Local participation and ownership 
Sida uses the expression Partner country ownership and Participation to refer to “the active 
participation of the partner country stakeholders in the planning, implementation and 
follow-up of development activities” (Sida 2004:35) that will in turn stimulate the local 
ownership. Similarly, Local participation and ownership in Young and Hamshire’s manual 
are concerned with the active involvement and support as such from male and female 
stakeholders directly involved in the programme or project. They furthermore realise that 
donor-led and top-down projects in general fail to yield sustainable benefits due to inability 
of leading to stakeholder ownership and commitment. Their realisation is supported by the 
World Bank, which admits that “many past assistance efforts, including some of its own, 
failed because the agenda was driven by donors rather than by the governments it was 
trying to assist”6.  
On the grounds of my former experiences of working with various development projects as 
well as the shared experiences of some project experts and Plan International during 
fieldwork, it can be said that a voluntary, sufficient and efficient participation, which then 
brings about a sufficient and efficient ownership, is of first and foremost importance to 
sustainability, because it will make the directly involved stakeholders, especially the ultimate 
beneficiaries, realise from start that the aid intervention is not just something coming “from 
outside” but something being a part of their life. These stakeholders will become more 
engaged in the project activities and have a higher responsibility sense of what they are 
involved in. A very important thing is their real and active participation will help prevent 
corruption. In this perspective, I agree with Young and Hamshire. However, it is not always 
the truth that a top-down project does not result in sustainability because there are some 
projects whose top-down approach is highly relevant, and vice versa. Yet a donor-led project, 
in reality, usually hinders local participation and subsequently ownership.  
It is very interesting that Sida, Young and Hamshire stress the importance of participation 
and ownership of the counterpart. This factor, to a high extent, relates to the financial, 
institutional, social and technical dimensions of project sustainability. But there are some 
shortages in their viewpoints, which are at what stages of the project and how the ultimate 
beneficiaries should participate, and what the challenges of their participation are. I will 
return to these elements in Chapter 5 where I present some recommendations based upon 
the empirical study.  
                                                
6 www.worldbank.org/projects  
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 Awareness building and training  
Young and Hamshire trust that appropriate training for identified target groups is normally 
regarded as a main strategy for achieving sustainable benefits. The training should be started 
at the right time, conducted throughout the programme/project, and allowed for repetition. 
As far as awareness is concerned, it should be carried out early at the design stage, and then 
during the implementation, it can include other types of media and group events, such as 
workshops, seminars, newsletters, community meetings, radio, TV, etc. as a way to 
disseminate project information and create networking among stakeholders. This factor is 
reasonable because it is a way to improve the target groups’ awareness of the problems being 
intervened, solve few of the challenges I have just mentioned above about participation of 
the ultimate beneficiaries, and help strengthen the institutional and social dimensions. The 
factor is closely related to the institutional and social dimensions of project sustainability.  
 External political and economic factors 
Young and Hamshire are particularly concerned about some risks which may affect the 
project sustainability, such as external political and economic factors, internal political factor 
both in the donor country and the recipient countries, and natural catastrophes. They argue 
that we do not operate programmes and projects in isolation from the wider world around 
them. In an unstable political or economic environment, both internally and externally, it 
will be difficult to achieve sustainability. Changes in government policy or lack of direction 
within the executive may make sustainability efforts impossible. The overall level of 
development of the recipient locality can also influence the prospects of sustainability, 
because if the local economy is at a very low and unstable level, the operation and 
maintenance costs cannot be secured. In that case, no commitments with the donor will make 
the resources available. Moreover, external economic shocks and natural disasters like a 
monetary crisis or a serious earthquake can frustrate a sustainability strategy and expectation.  
The consideration of the external political and economic factors is very sensible even though 
these factors are not always a reality for development projects/programmes.We have an 
example of Danida’s sharp funding cut-back in connection with DEA-Vietnam programme 
which caused negative impacts on the continuation and financial sustainability of a number 
of projects belonging to the programme, and it was a really good and useful experience. A 
sudden change with the political structure either in the recipient country or the donor country 
may lead to a sharp alteration in the agreed plan with the recipient partner and this can affect 
the sustainability.  
2.2.5. What are the missing factors?  
All the factors introduced by the above-mentioned appear to be sound and thorough, but they 
are not enough. The factors presented below are very important to sustainability, but they are 
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either not spelled out or not sufficiently referred to in any of the examined manuals, working 
tools and documents.  
 Insufficient and implicit addressing and analysis of sustainability throughout the 
project cycle  
In order that a project becomes sustainability and has clear perspectives of being achieved, I 
have the viewpoint that if sustainability is not a clear and desired target of the project, it will 
risk to exist in the project as an “additional spice of a dish” or even just a word “on the 
paper”. Project sustainability, the factors that may affect project sustainability, and the 
measures to overcome those factors must be identified, sufficiently and explicitly addressed, 
and scrupulously analysed from the very early phase of the project cycle - Identification and 
Preparation. During the Implementation phase, the measures have to be practised and 
improved (if necessary), and at the Completion phase, results of and lessons learnt from the 
implementation of the measures have to be summed up so that it can be assessed how far 
sustainability has been reached and in what way it can be applicable to future projects. The 
addressing, discussion, analysis and implementation of sustainability must be written down 
in different project documents, such as identification report, project document, appraisal 
report, inception report, progress reports, and completion report.  
 Corruption 
Corruption is a very old and popular phenomenon existing as a cultural, economic, political 
and social issue in both developed and developing societies which has increasingly drawn 
much international attention in recent years. Even though it is sometimes believed to 
promote economic growth and boost political development (Theobald 1990:116), it allows 
those with money or connections to bend the law or governance rules in their favour, thereby 
corrodes economic development and growth, escalates poverty level, undermines the 
legitimacy of the public service, damages reputation and investment potential of a country, 
destabilises democracy and governments, weakens moral values7, etc.  
There are many definitions of corruption, but probably the most official and clearest one 
must be that of Transparency International which defines it as “an abuse of entrusted power 
for personal gain”8. In a joint study with my study-mate John Momanyi Birongo about water 
governance in Kibera (Kenya) in 2005, I did find out that the word has been discussed under 
different labels: public corruption (the misuse of public office for private gain), private 
corruption (e.g. between individuals in the private sector), administrative corruption 
(corruption that alters the implementation of policies), political corruption (corruption that 
influences the formulation of laws, regulations and policies), bribery (an offer of money or 
                                                
7 http://www.anticorruption.info/cost.htm  
8 http://www.ti-bih.org/en-GB/default.aspx?TabID=45  
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favours to influence a public official, nepotism (favouritism shown by public officials to 
relatives or close friends), fraud (cheating the government through deceit); and 
embezzlement (stealing money or other government property).  
Particularly in the context of development aid, corruption has been recognised to be a 
problem which distorts development aid investments and impedes their efficiency and 
success (Aguilar et al 2000; Dudley 2000; Cooksey 2000). As development aid projects are 
normally perceived as coming “from outside” and are subject to little external supervision, 
they provide easy targets for corruption. The Utstein Anti-Corruption Resource Centre (U4), 
a web-based resource centre working in associate partnership with Transparency 
International, means that development aid can be undermined by corruption because it can 
divert resources to other purposes rather than for which it was granted, and it can seriously 
influence the efficiency and effectiveness of the aid accordingly. To the best of my 
knowledge, corruption can not only divert resources to other purposes but also change the 
target recipient of a project because many international aid organisations, especially 
Governmental Organisations do normally apply the top-down approach to select a recipient 
locality. In that case, the related national authoritative bodies will be the one to decide which 
locality is “qualified” to be the recipient depending on the commission level they are offered.  
The U4 also believes corruption can “involve a variety of actors including public officials 
and private sector representatives in the recipient country as well as aid agency staff 
themselves. These actors sometimes work in collusion with each other to divert aid 
resources”9. In the case of development aid projects, corruption is not the problem of a 
single individual but a group of individuals and even an entire corrupt system. A study made 
by Dudley shows that honest individuals are directly and indirectly affected by corrupt 
individuals, and promotions and salary increases are frequently used by a corrupt boss to 
force his employees to join in corrupt practices. Weak employees are normally those most 
vulnerable to the enticement because they must consider the consequences of their refusal on 
their family. The corrupt boss also prefers loyalty to qualification when selecting staffs to 
participate in a given project because that would be more beneficial for him.  
A report made by Aguilar et al in 2000 reveals that fraud and corruption can occur in the 
World Bank’s projects in these stages: project design, procurement, implementation, and 
financial management whereas the U4 asserts that corruption can occur at any stage of aid 
delivery (see Table 2.3 in the next page).  
The points mentioned in Table 2.3 are very well-considered, and they reveal that there are 
quite many tricks to cheat and corrupt. My former experiences of working with development 
projects show that very often, the authoritative partner stakeholders try to highlight the 
                                                
9 http://www.u4.no/helpdesk/helpdesk/queries/query76.cfm#1  
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necessity of supporting the recipient locality to upgrade the existing infrastructures, to 
purchase new equipment and facilities, etc. in the project proposal. When the project 
proposal is approved, the authoritative partner stakeholders most of the time insist on taking 
care of the procurement. Whether they are able to provide red bills (the official bills that 
include Value Added Tax - VAT - and have an official stamp) or not, it does not matter 
because they can manipulate the procurement procedures.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.3 – Project stages where corruption can occur 
The missing element in Aguilar et al’s report and U4’s discussion is the exclusion of the 
ultimate beneficiaries from the construction and procurement and/or installation process (the 
implementation process). The authoritative partner stakeholders usually try to limit the 
ultimate beneficiaries in this process to make sure that their scheme will not be known in 
details.  
 Inefficient participation from the donor’s side 
Some donors, especially governmental donors, have the tendency to limit the participation of 
their staffs in the project because they believe that by doing so, the ownership of the 
Project selection stage: a diversion of resources from the social sector to major construction and 
infrastructure projects, or uneconomical projects can happen due to “opportunities for financial 
kickbacks and political patronage”1. 
Project design stage: at this stage, project requirements may be overstated or tailored to benefit a 
particular supplier, consultant, contractor or private party. Manipulations with procurement, 
financial management, supervision mechanisms, and project timing can also happen (Aguilar et al 
2000:3-4). 
Procurement stage: the corruption risk in this stage is deemed to be especially high. The 
authoritative aid recipients can make attempts to limit competition by advertising inadequately, 
declaring short bidding time, misusing of legal and administrative requirements, employing 
unsuitable bidding procedures or procedures that violate the confidentiality of bidding, etc.; while 
the bidder may also apply its own corrupt practices to manipulate the procurement process through 
unjustified complaints, collusion schemes, misleading bids, and malicious front-loading (Aguilar et 
al 2000:4-6).  
Implementation stage: corrupt and fraudulent practices during this stage usually involve collusion 
between the supplier-purchaser and the contractor-employer. Their malpractices are normally 
corrupt contract amendments; unjustified complaints; overbilling/overpayment; fraudulent 
justification of delays; provision of equipment or goods of lower than the specified quality; and 
outright theft of materials, equipment or services (Aguilar et al 2000:7).  
Financial management stage: corruption or fraud can compose of a wide range of actions, such as 
duplication of payments, alteration of and tampering with invoices and other supporting 
documents, adulteration or duplication of accounting records, lack of supporting records, ineligible 
payments, misuse of funds, unauthorised advance payments without guarantee, unauthorised use of 
project property, excessively high operational expenditures, and unreported discounts (Aguilar et al 
2000:8).  
Project evaluation stage: in order to render recipient governmental officials and/or aid agency staff 
to turn a blind eye to sluggishly implemented project, uncompleted contract requirements, 
undelivered equipment, facilities and services, and other instances of malpractice, kickbacks may 
be given. This fraudulent action is meant to ensure future flow of development aid resources1.  
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counterpart will be higher and the intervention will not appear too donor-led. This is not 
always correct, especially at the Identification and Preparation phase where the donor staffs 
have to investigate, understand thoroughly and assess the proposed support before a final 
decision is made. Just communicating with the authoritative bodies is not adequate because 
the project outcomes will finally be taken over by the ultimate beneficiaries. Very often the 
authoritative bodies have “other interests” than the ultimate beneficiaries have and it is rare 
that their “other interests” benefit the ultimate beneficiaries. Failing to be engaged in this 
phase efficiently may lead to lack of understanding of the ultimate beneficiaries’ needs and 
wishes, lack of inclusion of indispensable local stakeholders and thus affect the sustainability.  
The arrival of an appraisal team composing of external national and non-national specialists 
within a very short duration cannot work out all those issues for three reasons. Firstly, there 
is a language barrier which surely hinders a sufficient and satisfactory communication 
between the external non-national specialists and the involved partner stakeholders. 
Secondly, an appraising duration of one or two weeks for a large project is insufficient for 
the appraisal team to communicate with the authoritative bodies at different involved 
administrative levels, not even the ultimate beneficiaries. Thirdly, even if the appraisal team 
can manage to spend some time on the ultimate beneficiaries, an appraising duration of one 
or two weeks for a large project is not enough to create self-confidence in the ultimate 
beneficiaries. Can they tell the appraisal team all about their needs, wishes and so forth? All 
in all, only the local staffs of the donor know about the project area, speak the national 
language, understand the local culture, have experiences of working with local people, and 
especially have knowledge of national and local corruption practices can take care of this 
task.  
2.2.6. Promoting project sustainability 
Promoting project sustainability means to improve the factors that can affect project 
sustainability. Here I would like to focus on promoting the factors that are in favour of 
improving the sustainability of Việt Trì Project and Danida’s similar projects in Vietnam in 
future. They are the inclusion of sustainability in the project cycle, the participation and 
ownership factor, the anti-corruption factor, and the efficient participation from the donor’s 
side.   
Promoting the inclusion of sustainability in the project cycle 
Sustainability has to be sufficiently and explicitly addressed and analysed at different phases 
of the project, and written down in different project documents because such documents are 
produced as a logical chain. If it is missed in most of or all of those documents, sustainability 
risks to either be forgotten during the implementation process or exist only “on paper”.  
Promoting participation and ownership factor 
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Both Plan International and the project experts I have talked to during fieldwork in Vietnam 
share the opinion that the relevant and careful steps taken during the first phase of the project 
- Identification and Preparation - is crucial to the sustainability or success of the project10. 
All of them especially emphasise the participation of the ultimate beneficiaries in this phase, 
which is the most efficient way to secure their ownership of the project benefits later on and 
to prevent corruption, because the more the ultimate beneficiaries know about the project 
details, the more their capacity of implementing the project activities and taking over the 
project outcomes will be increased, and the more corruption possibilities will be minimised. 
In this regard, a clear and participatory project design from the preparation step is considered 
indispensable.  
How the directly involved partner stakeholders should participate is another question which 
has to be clarified in keeping the particular situation of each project and its recipient locality. 
The common point is, the more closely the project objectives target at the ultimate 
beneficiaries, the more intensively the ultimate beneficiaries should participate, aside from 
the participation of the directly involved authoritative institutions. The ultimate beneficiaries 
ought to and need to feel that the project is theirs from beginning, and they must be engaged 
in the whole activity cycle. When the project has come to an end, it will be these people who 
take care of maintaining and developing the benefits. Without having been included in the 
entire process and thus felt not related to the obtained benefits, the risk of discontinuing the 
benefits will be high and the expected sustainability will be threatened.  
Promoting the anti-corruption factor 
Motives of corruption in the context of development aid are the same as in general: either 
demand-driven or greed-driven. When an aid intervention is thought as money coming “from 
outside”, then the corrupt individuals will of course “take a bite” of the “common cake”. The 
boss with high salary would like to have something “extra” to upgrade his house, fulfil his 
dream of owning a car, or send his son/daughter abroad for studying; while his staffs with 
low salary would like to have something “extra” to compensate for the low salaries that have 
not been enough for them to cover their children’s school demands, to have a mobile phone, 
or to upgrade their old-fashioned motorbike. When both the boss and the staff are involved 
in the corrupt system, they will defend each other when necessary. In some cases, a chain 
corrupt system is created, namely if a project given to a district after having passed the 
national and provincial channels, the “cake shares” are already understood – the province 
will have a “bite”, so do the related national authority and the district authority. Such things 
happen because those who sit at the higher level know exactly what the inferior authorities 
do, and it becomes difficult to “take a bite” alone.  
                                                
10 A project cycle may slightly differ from donor to donor in terms of steps, yet it commonly has three 
fundamental phases: Identification and Preparation, Implementation and Monitoring, and Completion. Each 
phase consists of a number of steps, some of which are compulsory/mandatory while some are optional.  
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Bastøe and Masst (2001) suggest that the institutional system of the partner countries should 
be improved via institutional building and financial management reforms in order to make 
the public authorities as well as bureaucrats at local and national levels become more 
accountable to the donors and their own citizens, and set up a more effective and transparent 
system. They also suggest that donors should encourage their partner countries to improve 
transparency in public administration and give citizens easier access to information. 
Furthermore, the donors themselves must have thorough knowledge of their partner 
institutions so as to be able to identify weak links and danger zones which are especially 
vulnerable to corruption before entering into cooperative agreements and providing the 
grants. These three suggestions are sensible because they are the core issues of good 
governance - a concept which is synonymous with zero-corruption.  
Enhancing participation of the ultimate beneficiaries is another way to limit corruption. 
Many examples with construction and infrastructure projects in Vietnam have shown that 
when such projects are launched, not only the officials of the upper echelons, the local 
project staffs or the contractors but also the workers are corrupt. “Everybody’s business is 
nobody’s business”. If the ultimate beneficiaries are fully informed of and engaged in the 
projects, they will keep an eye on what is going on. At least, the quality of the construction 
works will be better because both the workers and the contractors cannot cheat them.  
Another proposal is international donors should coordinate with one another to cause 
pressure on the partner country by making an official declaration that they will withdraw the 
committed Official Development Assistance if corruption, in connection with their projects 
and programmes, happen; and requiring the partner country to present specific action plans 
to minimise corruption in development aid and keep them informed of the implementation 
progress. This proposal is based on a recent scandal where the big Project Management Unit 
18 (PMU 18) corruption case was discovered and international donors had taken action right 
afterwards. Vietnam was required to establish a Corruption Control Committee, to present 
and implement some concrete corruption control strategies and plans, and to keep the 
international donors informed of what have been done and how. In practice, the pressure 
seems to work. Vietnam has been working on the requirements and has just elected a deputy 
prime minister responsible for corruption control.  
The last proposal is not to get unnecessary administrative levels involved in an aid 
intervention. That is to say, if a project is given to a district, the donor should work directly 
with the district instead of moving from the national, provincial to district level, because the 
“common cake” will potentially be divided up.  
Promoting the efficient participation from the donor’s side 
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For the reasons I have explained, it is crucial that the donor pays attention to enhancing the 
participation of the donors’ local staffs at the Identification and Preparation phase. Aside 
from adequate and effective communication with the authoritative bodies, the staffs have to 
spend enough time and labour on communicating with the ultimate beneficiaries involved by 
themselves, not via the authoritative bodies, in order to avoid misunderstanding, conflict of 
interests, irrelevant support proposal, etc. Certainly if the authoritative bodies have “other 
interests” than the ultimate beneficiaries, they will oppose the deep intervention from the 
donor’s side at that phase, yet the donor needs to insist, or else the ultimate beneficiaries will 
not benefit the project outcomes to the best.  
2.3. Summing-up 
This chapter have reviewed and discussed a number of theories and standpoints which will 
be applied in the entire study. Even though the discussion of project sustainability goes 
beyond theorists’ sustainability forum due to the fact that I did not succeed in finding any 
theories about project sustainability, I hope the discussion of international aid organisations 
and experts’ standpoints on that concept has solved the problem. 
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3. Historical Framework 
 
The main aim of this chapter is to create a historical framework for the study by trying to 
answer these two working questions: What are the main environmental problems caused by 
industrial and urban development in Phú Thọ province and why is Danida intervening? 
What is Việt Trì Project concerned with? I will begin with presenting some important 
background information about Phú Thọ province and Việt Trì city, describing the main 
environmental problems caused by industrial and urban development that the province and 
the city have been facing, and presenting what the existing conditions and regulations of 
handling those environmental problems are by reviewing the Report on the Environmental 
Status Quo of Phú Thọ Province and the project documents of Việt Trì Project. Such 
information helps to explain why Danida is intervening in Phú Thọ province’s 
environmental problems.  
After having clarified why Danida should intervene in Phú Thọ province’s environmental 
problems, I will introduce the project “Industrial and Urban Development in Viet Tri city” 
by selectively reviewing a number of Việt Trì Project-related documents which provide 
basic information about the main aims, the inputs, the components, the involved stakeholders 
and their engagement in the project, the organisation and the achieved outcomes of the 
project. I also look at some local political decisions and especially the paper about the 
administrative system in Vietnam I made in 2005 to elaborate the functions, obligations and 
rights of especially the authoritative stakeholders engaged in Việt Trì Project. A review of 
some Reports on Environmental Status made by the involved industrial utilities collected 
during fieldwork supplements information about the environmental problems at the utilities 
which are not mentioned in the Cleaner Production Assessment Reports. And finally, results 
of my fieldwork in Việt Trì city will be integrated in the information of Việt Trì Project-
related documents to better show the investment in, the activities, the participation and the 
real outcomes of the project.  
3.1. Environmental problems caused by industrial and urban development in Phú Thọ 
province 
Vietnam, the South East Asian country with approx. 83 million inhabitants, has been 
undergoing rapid political and socio-economic changes since the initiation of the “ñổi mới” 
(renovation) programme  in 1986. The reform has led to a rapid economic growth during the 
1990s which accounts for a considerable reduction in poverty over the last decade, an 
increased role for the private sector, speedy rise in small-scale entrepreneurship in urban and 
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rural areas; an increased voice for civil organisations, and a decentralisation and opening up 
to participatory processes concerning private sector management.  
As a part of the economic growth, the urbanisation and industrialisation in Vietnam have 
been developing quite fast. In 1990, for instance, there were only 500 urban towns, but in 
2004, this number rose to 671, divided into 4 municipalities, 25 cities, 59 towns, and 583 
townships. Urban population in 1990 was approx. 13 million, but in 2004, this figure was 
almost doubled - about 22 million11, accounting for ca. 27% of the total population. The 
national population growth forecast further shows that the population rate in the urban area 
will make up 33% in 2010 and 35% in 2020. As regards industrialisation, the number of 
industrial zones has grown from 80 in 2002 to 120 in 2005, and the activities of these 
industrial zones have been contributing considerably to the GDP of Vietnam12.  
Located in the northern uplands of Vietnam, Phú Thọ province was founded in 1997 as a 
result of the division of a larger province - Vĩnh Phú - into Phú Thọ and Vĩnh Phúc. With an 
area of 3,519.6 km2, Phú Thọ province consists of 1 capital city which is Việt Trì city, 1 
town, 10 districts, 14 wards, 10 townships and 250 communes (Tổng cục thống kê - General 
Statistics Office 2005). It borders Tuyên Quang and Yên Bái provinces to the north, Hòa 
Bình province to the south, Vĩnh Phúc province to the east, and Sơn La province to the west 
(see map below). The population of the province is 1,314,500 which make up 1.7% of 
Vietnam’s population, and the population density is 373.47persons/km2 (Tổng cục thống kê-
General Statistics Office 2005). The workforce makes up about 60% of Phú Thọ’s total 
population.  
The economy of Phú Thọ relies on the industry-construction sector, which accounts for 
38.1% of the total GDP; the service sector 33.7%; and the agriculture-fishery-forestry sector 
28.2% in 2004. The average income of Phú Thọ residents in the same year is 4,378,000 
VND/person/year (equivalent to 290 USD in accordance with the USD rate at that time), 
which is very low compared to the average personal income level in Vietnam in the same 
year - 500 USD/person. Phú Thọ is thus deemed to be one of the poorest provinces in 
Vietnam generally and the northern uplands particularly even though the geographical 
position appears to be advantageous for it as regards economic exchange relations and 
industrial development (Uỷ ban nhân dân tỉnh Phú Thọ - Sở tài nguyên và môi trường tỉnh 
Phú Thọ 2005:14-15).  
 
                                                
11 Tổng cục thống kê (General Statistics Office): 
http://www.gso.gov.vn/default.aspx?tabid=387&idmid=3&ItemID=3158. Accessed in December 2005. 
12 Bộ tài nguyên và môi trường. 2005. Báo cáo hiện tượng môi trường quốc gia năm 2005 - Phần tổng quan. 
Việt Nam. 
 37 
 
Administrative map of Vietnam in which Phú Thọ province (No.1) is included13 
Regarding industrial development, Phú Thọ is among the very first Vietnamese provinces 
where the establishment and development industrial zones and complexes have taken place 
quite aggressively. Today, Phú Thọ has four industrial zones and 6 industrial complexes with 
                                                
13 http://vi.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vi%E1%BB%87t_Nam  
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63,089 registered enterprises. Main activities at these zones and complexes deal with 
mechanics, assembling, electronics, textile, garments, footwear, chemicals, consumption 
goods, agricultural-forest products, high quality construction materials, minerals, etc. (Uỷ 
ban nhân dân tỉnh Phú Thọ - Sở tài nguyên và môi trường tỉnh Phú Thọ 2005:16-19). In 
accordance with Phú Thọ’s industrial development orientation and policy, the province 
should attempt to become an industrialised province which can contribute to fulfilling the 
country’s industrialisation and modernisation targets. In order to realise this ambition, Phú 
Thọ has so far completed the planning and developed industrial zones in the north, the south 
and the west of Việt Trì city; and been in the process of planning and developing industrial 
zones and complexes in 7 out of 10 districts.  
Urban development has been taking place in Việt Trì city - the capital of Phú Thọ province, 
Việt Trì town and townships, but most noticeably in Việt Trì city, which was founded during 
the 60s at the confluence of Red River (sông Hồng), Lô River (sông Lô) and Thao River 
(sông Thao), and became capital city of Phú Thọ province in 1997. Its total area is 7,125.75 
km2 distributed to 10 wards and 7 communes (Việt Trì city’s Statistics Bureau, 2005). The 
current population of Việt Trì city is 139,701, making up about 15% of the province’s total 
population. The latest statistical figure shows that the urban growth rate in 2004 is 1.56% 
compared to 0.41% in 2003 and 1.14% in 2002 (Uỷ ban nhân dân tỉnh Phú Thọ - Sở tài 
nguyên và môi trường tỉnh Phú Thọ 2005:11), which indicates the urban population growth 
has been on its rise in the recent years.  
In parallel with the industrial and urban development, Phú Thọ has however been facing 
serious problems with air pollution and inefficient planning and management of solid wastes 
as well as wastewater generated by industrial-domestic-health care activities. 
The surface water source from rivers, lakes, and ponds, which is also the primary domestic 
water source for Phú Thọ residents, has been polluted at an alarming level because of either 
the untreated or the poorly-treated wastewater coming from the many thousands of industrial 
utilities based in Việt Trì city and other districts of Phú Thọ. The current industrial 
wastewater volume in Phú Thọ is approx. 6,000 million m3 per year, which is high in 
comparison with the number of industrial utilities in Phú Thọ, yet neither the province itself 
nor the industrial utilities have industrial wastewater treatment plants. Some industrial 
utilities treat their wastewater with chemicals, some treat with microbiological method, and 
many do not treat at all.  
In addition, the domestic wastewater is not treated before being discharged to the canals, 
sewers, ponds or lakes. Neither is the health care wastewater, which contains high volume of 
suspended matters, organic matters (BOD5  - Biochemical Oxygen Demand - and COD - 
Chemical Oxygen Demand), NH4
+, and coliform, treated but just let flow freely. In the 
whole province, there is only one wastewater treatment plant existing at Phú Thọ Provincial 
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General Hospital, yet the plant is not able to meet NH4
+ treatment norms due to old 
technology. The wastewater from the industrial, domestic and health care origins finally 
merges with one of these three rivers: Red, ðà and/or Lô14.  
The unavoidable consequences are the negative impacts of surface water pollution on the 
community’s health, on agricultural and aqua-cultural activities, on the water quality of the 
afore-mentioned rivers, and of course on the eco-system. The story known nationwide about 
Thạch Sơn controversial “cancer village” located nearby Lâm Thao Super Phosphates 
Factory and at the other end of Bãi Bằng Paper Mill (the biggest paper mill in Vietnam) with 
unusually high percentage of residents dying of cancers (34.86% out of 100 of death cases in 
the recent years), uncultivable fields and heavily polluted lakes and ponds is the most 
horrible evidence when talking about the bad impacts of surface water pollution in Phú 
Thọ15.  
Air pollution in connection with industrial and urban development is the next hot issue of 
the province. As mentioned above, many industrial utilities were established during the 60s - 
a period where industrial technology development in Phú Thọ was very limited despite the 
remarkable support from China. The investment in machines, equipment and facilities 
serving industrial production purposes is basically productivity-prioritised and pays little or 
even no attention on environmental impacts. Nowadays, the machines, equipment and 
facilities at most industrial utilities are very obsolete whereas the ongoing technological 
renovation at the industrial utilities takes place quite slowly. It is stated in the Report on the 
Environmental Status Quo of Phú Thọ Province that the industrial utilities are the top air-
polluters, of which the chemical industry, the cement and construction materials industry, the 
paper industry, and the mineral exploitation industry are the most serious ones (Uỷ ban nhân 
dân tỉnh Phú Thọ - Sở tài nguyên và môi trường tỉnh Phú Thọ 2005:33-35).  
As far as solid wastes are concerned, the total volume of industrial hazardous solid wastes 
and non-hazardous solid wastes has been on the rise (Table 3.1), but the collection and 
management of industrial solid wastes have not been implemented because the province is in 
lack of both a suitable disposal landfill and a treatment plant, whereas the industrial utilities 
themselves can not afford to build up a treatment plant on their own. Therefore, the 
industrial utilities have been collecting the wastes by themselves and then either burying or 
accumulating the wastes behind or on the sides of their production area (Uỷ ban nhân dân 
tỉnh Phú Thọ - Sở tài nguyên và môi trường tỉnh Phú Thọ 2005:43-45). Part of the “useful 
wastes” like broken bricks, ceramics, etc. is given away to those who use them for domestic 
building purposes. 
                                                
14 Project Document of the “Industrial and Urban Development in Viet Tri city” project and the Report on the 
Environmental Status Quo of Phú Thọ Province made by Department of Natural Resources and Environment 
(DoNRE) in 2005.  
15 http://www.nea.gov.vn/thongtinmt/noidung/tt4_10_11_05.htm. Accessed: 28.05.2006.  
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Year 2002 2003 2004 
Amount of industrial hazardous solid wastes 
(tons)  
28,500 40,500 48,000 
Amount of industrial non-hazardous solid 
wastes (tons) 
81,450 97,700 130,304 
Table 3.1 - Volume of industrial hazardous solid wastes and non-hazardous solid wastes in Phú Thọ 
province from 2002 - 200416 
The domestic wastes in Việt Trì city, whose total volume is 232,733.13 tons in 2004 
(increasing 113,073.13 tons vis-à-vis 2003 and 126,233.13 tons vis-à-vis 2002), are not 
sorted from origin and not gathered in a proper manner by the residents either. All kinds of 
domestic wastes from cooking, gardening, etc. to construction activities taking place at every 
household, office, enterprise, health care utility, restaurant, etc. are mixed up and dumped 
altogether to the streets to be collected by Việt Trì Urban Environmental Company 
(henceforth: Việt Trì URENCO) daily, and then treated at Vân Phú Domestic Wastes 
Recycling Plant (henceforth: Vân Phú Plant) located 6 km northwest of the city’s centre but 
close to a residential area and a military base (site visit).  
About 35% of the total collected wastes cannot be 
recycled, however. They are day after day accumulated 
on the same hill where Vân Phú Plant is located and 
waiting in vain for a disposal landfill17. All the health 
care solid wastes are partly discharged as domestic 
wastes and partly buried around the health care utilities 
because of unavailability of collection, classification and 
treatment 
systems for solid wastes. Earlier, there was a health care wastes incinerator at Phú Thọ 
Provincial General Hospital which failed to meet the required environmental norms from 
beginning. The incinerator has thus been closed down for a couple of years18.  
3.2. Existing related environmental conditions and regulations in Phú Thọ province 
In May 2000, Phú Thọ PPC promulgated Decision on Regulating the Management of 
Making, Considering and Ratifying, and Implementing Environmental Impact Assessment 
Reports in Phú Thọ Province. According to the Decision, any projects, socio-economic 
development planning and plans, and production utilities and enterprises providing services 
                                                
16 Uỷ ban nhân dân tỉnh Phú Thọ - Sở tài nguyên và môi trường tỉnh Phú Thọ. 2005. Báo cáo hiện trạng môi 
trường tỉnh Phú Thọ năm 2005, pp. 44.  
17 Site visit and Interview with Mr. ðặng Xuân Tạo - technical and production planning officer of Vân Phú 
Wastes Recycling Plant.  
18 Site visit and Interview with Mr. Phạm Nhật Thịnh, head of the Administration Section, Phú Thọ Provincial 
General Hospital 
 
The non-reclaimable wastes are 
dumped on the hill… 
on the side of Vân Phú Plant 
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(briefly referred to as cơ sở - utilities) have the obligation to make EIA reports in which they 
have to describe clearly the existing technological possibilities at place and environmental 
measures thereto, the financial requirements to implement environmental pollution solutions, 
and the duration. The EIA reports have to be submitted in a so-called Provincial Considering 
and Deciding Council. When they are approved, the utilities have to implement immediately 
some pollution mitigating measures, such as to organise the production activities in a proper 
manner, to make internal industrial sanitation regulations, to plant trees in their production 
area, to practise preliminary collection and treatment of wastes, to make financial and 
technical plan for thorough pollution treatment measures, etc.  
In August 2002, Decision on Regulating the Management of Industrial Wastes and 
Harzadous Wastes in Phú Thọ Province was issued by Phú Thọ PPC. In accordance with 
this Decision, Việt Trì People’s Committee is responsible for building up an industrial solid 
wastes disposal and treatment landfill called “Trạm Thản concentrated industrial solid 
wastes treatment zone” (henceforth: Trạm Thản zone) in Trạm Thản commune, Phù Ninh 
district (about 40 km far from Việt Trì city), and bringing it into use before the 1st of January 
2003. It is stated in the Decision that all kinds of industrial wastes and hazardous wastes in 
the province must be collected and transported to Trạm Thản zone, and Việt Trì URENCO is 
assigned to take care of the transport and treatment. The utilities have the responsibility of 
classifying the wastes from origin, disposing a temporary storage place, and either having 
their own specialised truck for transporting the wastes to Trạm Thản zone or making a 
contract with a conveyer, namely Việt Trì URENCO. In fact, by the time I carried out the 
fieldwork in March 2006, Trạm Thản zone remained unfinished due to lack of funds.  
Both Decisions include an implementation provision where any utilities violating the 
Decisions shall be fined in line with violation degree, but not stating how much the fines are. 
Also, the management and treatment of wastewater is not regulated in form of a Decision or 
something alike.  
Concerning urban domestic wastes, there have not been any supporting means to assist the 
households in gathering the domestic wastes properly and sorting them from origin before 
the wastes are collected by Việt Trì URENCO. The urban residents themselves are not aware 
of why they should do so either. Waste containers are disposed in front of public offices, 
enterprises and health care utilities, but not households or restaurants. When the day is about 
to end, people put all the wastes they have produced during the day in front of their house 
where Việt Trì URENCO’s staff will pass by and do the collection. Some of the wastes are 
kept in nylon bags while others like gardening and construction wastes are fully exposed 
(site visits). Waste collection fee is imposed on every household, office, enterprise, health 
care utility, restaurant, and it is Việt Trì URENCO who takes care of the fee collection.  
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As far as health care wastes and wastewater management are concerned, there exist no clear 
regulations regarding the management and treatment of health care wastes. All health care 
utilities heavily depend on the health care fees, whose total amount is spent on medicines 
(about 70%); surgical appliances, machines and medical instruments, and analytical and 
scanning services, management fees, and salaries and awards for the staff (about 30%). The 
fees are normally not enough for covering the above-mentioned items, let alone health care 
wastes and wastewater management. Yet both Department of Health and Phú Thọ PPC have 
no other financial sources to support the health care utilities, and they can hardly get access 
to loans for equipping the utilities with relevant systems for health care wastes and 
wastewater management (Uỷ ban nhân dân tỉnh Phú Thọ - Sở khoa học, công nghệ và môi 
trường tỉnh Phú Thọ 2003:12). As a result, the health care utilities have to bury the solid 
wastes that are not collected as domestic wastes by themselves, and let the wastewater flow 
freely without any preliminary treatment.  
3.3. Why is Danida intervening? 
As mentioned earlier, Phú Thọ province has been taking different actions in order to become 
an industrialised province. Its capital, Việt Trì city, is a major industrial city where big 
industrial utilities like Lâm Thao Super Phosphates Factory, Bãi Bằng Paper Mill, Vĩnh Phú 
Textile Company, Việt Trì Ceramic Company, Việt Trì Chemical Company etc. are located 
and have been under operation for over 30 years. Both the industrialisation and urbanisation 
processes are going on aggressively, yet Phú Thọ province is confronting with very thorny 
environmental problems. From what have just been described above, it is obvious that the 
province needs to solve as soon as possible the following main issues: 
o To improve the existing management and treatment conditions of industrial, domestic 
and health care wastes, wastewater, as well as air pollution control; 
o To enhance the environmental awareness of public - private institutions and 
households, thereby enhance the cooperation among these stakeholders in terms of 
wastes and wastewater management, and pollution control; 
o To improve the enforcement of the promulgated general regulations (mentioned 
above) and define clearly the fines for different levels;  
o To promulgate a Decision on the management and treatment of wastewater and 
another Decision on the management and treatment of health care wastes, and bring 
these Decisions into practice as soon as possible. 
Under the circumstances where the province lacks both financial means, investment from the 
national authorities, and relevant-sufficient-efficient capacity to work out those issues, any 
appropriate external interventions should seriously be considered and appreciated. In 1996 
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and 1998, Việt Trì city alternately received a United Nations Environmental 
Programme/United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (henceforth: 
UNDP/UNIDO) project which supported the environmental and sanitary conditions in the 
city, and a German Official Development Assistance (henceforth: German ODA) project 
which intervened in the water supply and wastewater sector of the city.  
In the case of the UNDP/UNIDO project, an Industrial Pollution Strategy (2000-2005) was 
adopted but never fully implemented. Though a large potentiality for implementing cleaner 
production technologies in industrial utilities were recognised, only four industrial utilities 
took part in the cleaner production initiatives and accordingly benefited from the project. 
Furthermore, three out of four officers trained in environmental monitoring and management 
capacity were transferred to Vĩnh Phúc province, not Phú Thọ province, when Vĩnh Phú 
province was split up in 1997. Whereas in the case of the German ODA intervention, a 
detailed report on priority measures for wastewater disposal for the urban centre of Việt Trì 
city was prepared as a part of the intervention, yet it was, due to financial constraints, finally 
decided to concentrate on the water supply (Danida 2001c:22-23).  
The majority of the emergent environmental issues of both Phú Thọ province and Việt Trì 
city therefore remain severe despite the willingness to cooperate of the provincial and 
municipal authorities. The fact suggests that further external interventions are still and highly 
needed.  
Danida’s assistance to Phú Thọ province and thereby Việt Trì city in terms of industrial and 
urban development took shape during year 2000. The assistance was built on and closely 
linked to the data provided by and lessons learnt from the UNDP/UNIDO and German ODA 
projects. In March 2001, a Project Document was finalised and the assistance was thereby 
named “Industrial and Urban Development in Viet Tri city” (Việt Trì Project). In July 2002, 
Việt Trì Project was officially started.  
3.4. The project “Industrial and Urban Development in Viet Tri city” 
The main aims of Việt Trì Project were to increase the environmental planning and 
management capacity, environmental awareness, and the cooperation among community 
representatives, industrial utilities and local authorities as regards solving environmental 
problems in Việt Trì city; to practise some demonstration projects which serve the purposes 
of bettering the environmental and sanitary conditions in a number of markets and residential 
areas; and to create a Green Belt which was supposed to function as a buffer zone between 
the industrial zones and residential areas. Furthermore, a number of action plans and draft 
project documents for industrial and health care solid wastes management, industrial cleaner 
production management, and integrated management of domestic and industrial wastewater 
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would be prepared. An application for soft loan financing for domestic and industrial 
wastewater treatment facilities was also planned to be fulfilled.  
Following the set aims, the project was arranged in six components, which are: (i) Cleaner 
production & occupational health and safety, and industrial hazardous waste; (ii) Health 
care waste and wastewater; (iii) Industrial wastewater; (iv) Urban markets, tree planting, 
and urban environmental planning and management; (v) Community awareness and pilot 
projects, information and educational material; and (vi) Environmental monitoring. Some 
English courses for the project staff was regarded as an extra component – component vii. 
In terms of inputs, Danida provided 18,518,178 DKK, which was spent on investment, 
procurement (including the interventions) and operational expenses. The Vietnamese 
counterpart contributed to working time of officials from provincial, city and ward 
authorities and agencies spent on meetings, training, and study tours; office facilities, 
electricity and local communication; and labour for ward-level demo-projects, which was 
provided by ward People’s Committees and households (COWI A/S & Danida 2005b :22).   
Việt Trì Project involved a large number of stakeholders at four levels: national, provincial, 
city and ward-commune. The Royal Danish Embassy in Hanoi acted as Danida’s 
Representation in relation to the project.  
At national level 
Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) was the key stakeholder and simultaneously the 
national counterpart to Việt Trì Project. It was responsible for overall facilitation and 
coordination; strategic planning, investment support and financial arrangements; and overall 
monitoring (Danida 2001b:13).   
At provincial level 
There were four groups of stakeholder involved: (1) the authoritative bodies, (2) the 
hospitals, (3) the Environmental Monitoring Station, and (4) the industrial utilities (See 
Table below). The authoritative bodies were selected because one of the aims of the project 
was to increase their environmental awareness and environmental management knowledge, 
and then apply their enhanced environmental knowledge and integrate their environmental 
concerns into socio-economic development and planning. The chosen hospitals were the 
major hospitals in the province urgently in need of intervention in health care solid wastes 
and wastewater treatment, while the Environmental Monitoring Station was selected as it is 
the only institution in the province that takes care of environmental monitoring and is in 
need of being upgraded. The industrial utilities were selected based upon six criteria 
proposed by Viet Nam Cleaner Production Centre: i) they are polluting the environment; ii) 
the production conditions at place can affect human health; iii) they support new 
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technological solutions; iv) they have financial capacity to participate; v) they have 
competent technicians to participate; vi) leaders, technical managers, technicians and 
workers of the utilities are willing to continue the project outcomes in the long run 
(Interview with Mr. ðặng ðình Vượng). See Annex 3.1 for more details about the provincial 
stakeholders.  
No. Provincial stakeholders The stakeholders’ involvement in Việt Trì Project 
Phú Thọ Provincial People’s Committee (Phú Thọ 
PPC) 
 
Executing Agency 
Department of Science, Technology and Environment 
(DoSTE) 
Department of Natural Resources and Environment 
(DoNRE) 
DoSTE acted as Implementing Institution at the 
beginning., yet this role was taken over by DoNRE in 
2003 when DoSTE was divided into Department of 
Science, Technology (DoST) and DoNRE.  
Department of Health (DoH) 
Department of Industry (DoI) 
Department of Labour, Invalid Soldiers and Social 
Affairs (DoLISSA) 
Department of Construction (DoC) 
Department of Planning and Investment (DPI) 
Leaders of Project Working Groups (PWGs).  
Facilitated the implementation of Việt Trì Project in 
accordance with their assigned functions, 
responsibilities and authorities  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) 
 
The Management Board of Phú Thọ Industrial Zones 
Participated in some of the workshops on Cleaner 
Production and Occupational Health Safety 
Was consulted in several times in relation to the tree 
planting and tending in the new industrial area  
 
(2)  
Phú Thọ Provincial General Hospital 
Phú Thọ Town General Hospital 
13 district hospitals, clinics and health care centres 
Were involved in the component about health care 
waste and wastewater.  
  
(3) Phú Thọ Environmental Monitoring Station Was provided with a number of equipment and 
facilities, professional training courses and English 
language courses 
 
 
 
 
 
(4) 
Hữu Nghị Soldering Manufactory 
Minh Khai Tunnel Brick Manufactory 
Nghĩa Hưng Cotton-Yarn Company Ltd. 
Sông Lô Ship-building Factory 
Trí ðức Company Ltd. 
Việt Trì Ceramic Company 
Việt Trì Chemical Company 
Việt Trì Food Processing Factory 
Việt Trì Plywood Company 
Viger Brewery 
Vĩnh Phú Plastic Joint-Venture Company 
Vĩnh Phú Textile Company 
Were involved in activities concerning general 
training and awareness improvement, in a 
comprehensive Cleaner Production and Occupational 
Health Safety training and assessment programme 
delivered by the Viet Nam Cleaner Production Centre, 
and in the development and realisation of Cleaner 
Production and Occupational Health Safety 
demonstration projects 
Table 3.2 - The provincial stakeholders and their involvement in Việt Trì Project 
At city level 
Main stakeholders were Việt Trì People’s Committee (Việt Trì PC) and Việt Trì Urban 
Environmental Company (Việt Trì URENCO). Six urban markets including Bạch Hạc, Dầu, 
 46 
Gát, Gia Cẩm, Nông Trang, and Tân Dân were chosen to be upgraded. Việt Trì PC took 
care of planning and designing the project. Việt Trì URENCO was involved both in the 
component about health care waste and that about urban environmental planning and 
management where it was equipped with a specialized truck for transporting hazardous 
health care wastes from the hospitals, clinics and health care centres to Trạm Thản industrial 
and health care wastes treatment landfill, and contracted to create plant nearly 10,000 trees 
as a part of the Green Belt. The six urban markets belongs to the component about urban 
markets and were provided with new buildings concretised market floors, toilets, clean water 
and electricity supplies, and drainage system. See Annex 3.2 for more information about the 
city stakeholders.  
At ward and communal level 
Main stakeholders at this level are ward and commune representatives (from People’s 
Committees of wards and commune); such mass organisations as the Women’s Union, the 
Youth Union, The Association of War Soldiers, the Association of Farmers, etc. They were 
involved in component five regarding community awareness and pilot projects, information 
and educational material deployed at nine beneficiary wards and communes, including Bạch 
Hạc, Bến Gót, Dữu Lâu, Gia Cẩm, Minh Nông, Tân Dân, Tiên Cát, Trưng Vương and Vân 
Cơ. More than 15,000 residents of those wards and communes attended hundreds of 
meetings about domestic wastes, wastewater, and planting and protection of trees; and in 
demonstration projects in which some sewers and public toilets were constructed, some 
waste-pipes were installed, a number of mini bio-treatment plants and waste-dumps were 
built, an amusement park was upgraded, more than a hundred of dust carts and  waste 
containers were purchased, several hundreds of metres of lane were concretised, several 
hundreds of trees were planted, and 40 biogas plants were constructed (Project Working 
Group 5. 2005:1-4). 
In terms of organisation, Việt Trì Project was organised in a way where a Project Steering 
Committee (PSC), a Project Management Unit (PMU), and Six Project Working Groups 
(PWGs) were established (see Chart 3.1 below). The Project Steering Committee (PSC) was 
created and chaired by the vice-chairman of Phú Thọ PPC, and it acted as the highest body 
of project organisation. The Project Management Unit (PMU) composed of a Project 
Director, a local Project Manager, and an international Senior Technical Adviser. The main 
responsibility of PMU was to take care of managing the project implementation, which is 
concerned with co-ordination and supervision of consultant specialists and contractors, 
procurements in general, reporting to the PSC and Danida, etc. The Project Working Groups 
(PWGs), whose members are listed in Annex 3.3, were proposed in accordance with the six 
major components and acted as assistants to the PMU. Besides, the international consultant 
company COWI A/S Denmark was entrusted to provide both technical assistance with a team 
of international and local specialists and financial management. 
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Chart 3.1 - Project Organisation19 
In accordance with the Logical Framework (Logframe) of the Việt Trì Project Document, 
about 70 activities were planned in order to obtain 15 outputs (See Annex 3.4). Nevertheless, 
during the so-called “fact-finding mission” (COWI A/S, and Danida 2003a:20) carried out in 
March 2002 and the contract negotiations in May 2002, the Danish Embassy and the 
Vietnamese counterpart decided to make some necessary modifications, which indicates that 
the number of the original activities, the content of some of the activities, and the final 
results were altered. As stated in Việt Trì Project’s Completion Report, ten major outcomes 
were achieved. For the purpose of my study, I would like to focus on the outcomes which I 
will analyse in the next chapter.  
- A new wastewater treatment plant at Phú Thọ Town General Hospital was constructed 
(see picture below).  
- The wastewater treatment plant at Phú Thọ Provincial General Hospital was 
comprehensively upgraded (see picture below).  
                                                
19 COWI A/S & Danida. 2005b. Industrial and Urban Development in Việt Trì City. Completion Report. pp. 64. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark 
Government of Vietnam 
Phú Thọ Province 
Government of Denmark 
Danida 
 
Project Secretariat 
Project Management Unit 
(PMU) 
Project Steering Committee 
(PSC) 
International Consultant 
Company 
International and Local 
Specialists 
Local consultants, 
contractors and suppliers 
6 Project Working Groups 
(PWGs) 
15 Expected Outputs and Interventions 
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- Phú Thọ Environmental Monitoring Station (EMS) was upgraded and obtained 
ISO/IEC 17025:2001 accreditation (see pictures below).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- At Minh Khai Tunnel Brick Manufactory, a new grinder (see pictures below) which 
helps to make the most of the redundant soil was invested in to replace the old and 
inefficient crude roller. Thanks to the grinder, 10-15% of soil (equivalent to 35,000m3, 
valuing 700 millions VND) is taken the advantage of, which implies that the mentioned 
amount of soil is no longer discharged to the environment; manpower is saved (10 operators); 
risk of working accidents is minimised to zero; the consumption of diesel and electricity is 
decreased, leading to decreasing of greenhouse gases (reduction of 125.5 tons CO2/year in 
all); and dust emission is considerably decreased (Interview with Mr. ðỗ Thanh Tuấn, chief 
accountant of Minh Khai Tunnel Brick Manufactory; Viet Nam Cleaner Production Centre 
2004i:1-3).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
A part of the upgraded wastewater 
treatment plant at Phú Thọ Provincial 
General Hospital 
 
The new wastewater treatment plant at 
Phú Thọ Town General Hospital 
 
 
Some of the equipment financed by 
Việt Trì Project 
 
 
Ms. Tạ Hồng Yến, officer of EMS is 
starting the scanning spectrophometer 
financed by Việt Trì Project 
 
 
The grinder seen from the front side 
 
The redundant soil is being 
exploited by the grinder 
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- At Trí ðức Textile Company Ltd., a Jet machine 
(see picture on the right) in which the bleaching and 
dyeing processes take place was invested in. The Jet 
machine helps to improve the product quality; reduce the 
production time and hence production costs; reduce the 
wastewater volume (33m3/ton of product); reduce the 
pollution load in the wastewater (2.2 kg of chemical/ton 
of product); reduce the reprocessing rate; increase the 
yearly turnover around 15%; and improve the working 
environment for the workers.  
(Interview with Mr. Phạm Văn Chính, technical manager of Trí ðức Textile Company Ltd.; 
Viet Nam Cleaner Production Centre 2004n:1-3).  
- At Việt Trì Ceramic Company, a heat recovery 
system (see picture on the right) was installed, and the 
recovered heat has been used for mould drying. Thanks 
to this system, the company has been saving 50 tons of 
gas per month, which value 450-500 millions VND, and 
one third of operators; the volume of CO2 discharged to 
the environment is reduced; and the working 
environment of the workers is remarkably improved.  
Furthermore, the company, from what it has learnt during its participation in Việt Trì Project, 
self-made a smaller heat recovery system which helps the company save 7 tons of gas per 
month. (Interview with Mr. Nguyễn Văn Minh, technical manager of Việt Trì Ceramic 
Company).  
- At Việt Trì Chemical Company, 2 economizers and 2 boilers (see pictures below) 
recovering heat from gases were invested in. With these facilities, the company is taking the 
advantage of gases and controlling the water volume in the boiler as well as the volume of 
the steam. The exploitation of heat helps to save the coal consumption about 335 tons/year, 
and reduce the emission of CO, CO2 (about 616.4 tons), S, SO2, SOx, etc. (Interview with 
Mr. ðỗ Quốc Hội, Technical Vice-director of Việt Trì Chemical Company; Viet Nam 
Cleaner Production Centre 2004k:1-2).  
 
 
 
 
The Jet machine 
 
A part of the heat recovering 
system 
 
 
The one part of a boiler 
 
 
 
…and the other part  
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- At Việt Trì Food Processing Factory, a screw 
conveyor was installed to serve the powder levelling and 
dust emission reduction purposes. The screw conveyor 
has helped to improve the needed productivity; increase 
the annual revenue to 100 millions VND/year; reduce the 
number of operators (3 persons); and considerably 
improve the dusty and hot working environment of the 
workers (Interview with Mr. Nguyễn Thanh Bình, shift 
chief of Việt Trì Food Processing Factory; Viet Nam 
Cleaner Production Centre 2004l:1-4).  
- At Việt Trì Plywood Company, a grinder for grinding board cuts and a dust suction 
system (see pictures below) were invested in. The grinder helps to make use of the board 
cuts and thus contributes 1% to the company’s annual revenue. The dust suction system 
collects almost all the dust from production line No.1, which is then made wet and flows to 
the reservoir where the wet dust will settle at the bottom of the reservoir, be taken up, dried 
and finally burnt. Earlier, the dust emission from this production line was in plenty and 
causing heavy environmental and health impacts on the workers and the people living in the 
neighbourhood (Interview with Mr. Vũ Chí Cần, technical manager of Việt Trì Plywood 
Company).  
 
 
 
 
- At Vĩnh Phú Textile Company, a cotton dust 
blowing-suction system was invested in. The yield is 
raised to 3%; 50% of B-rank products are promoted to A-
rank, namely the product quality is improved; the 
operation cost is minimised, so the factory saves 43 
millions VND/year; the electricity consumption is 
reduced; and the working environment of the workers is 
considerably improved due to the remarkable reduction 
of dust.  
The screw conveyor 
Part of the grinder 
 
Part of the dust suction system 
 
Part of the cotton dust blowing-suction 
system 
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All in all, in terms of economic efficiency, the factory’s revenue increases 279 millions 
VND a year (Interview with Ms. Hoàng Thị Lê Hoan, technical manager of Vĩnh Phú 
Textile Company).  
- The six major urban markets Bạch Hạc, Dầu, Gát, Gia Cẩm, Nông Trang and Tân Dân 
(see typical pictures below) were upgraded in terms of infrastructures and facilities with 
particular focus on the improvement of sanitary conditions, flood prevention and 
improvement of food hygiene level. All of them were provided with new buildings and 
toilets; Dầu, Gia Cẩm, Nông Trang and Tân Dân with concretised market floors; Dầu and 
Gia Cẩm with water and electricity supplies; Gát and Nông Trang with clean water supply 
only; and Bạch Hạc, Gát, Gia Cẩm, Nông Trang and Tân Dân with drainage system. 
 
 
 
 
 
- 9,681 trees were planted by Việt Trì URENCO 
along the two main roads Hùng Vương and Trần 
Phú, in Thụy Vân industrial zone, and at the 
entrance of and around the war soldiers’ cemetery 
of Việt Trì city as a part of the Green Belt (see the 
picture on the right) 
- 40 households benefited from the biogas plants 
(see pictures below). 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The trees planted at the war 
soldiers’ cemetery of Việt Trì city 
 
 
Front building of Dầu market 
 
 
The new buildings financed by the 
project at Nông Trang market 
 
 
The tomb of a biogas plant (like others)  
is constructed under the earth 
 
A beneficiary is showing how to 
operate a biogas plant 
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3.5. Summing-up 
This chapter has gone through some environmental problems caused by industrial and urban 
development in Phú Thọ province, explained why Danida should assist the province in 
working out those problems, and presented the most essential information of Việt Trì Project. 
In the next chapter, I will be going deeply into analysing the sustainability of the project with 
selective focus on the outcomes I have just introduced.  
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4. Analysis of the Sustainability of the Project “Industrial and 
Urban Development in Viet Tri city” 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the sustainability of Việt Trì Project which is 
synonymous with the prerequisites for the sustainability of the project and the sustainability 
dimensions - financial, institutional, social, and technical (the environmental is not included 
here because Việt Trì Project itself is already about environment). As discussed under the 
sub-section about social sustainability, institutional sustainability and social sustainability 
are very close to each other, so in this analysis, I will put them together. The analysis is 
fulfilled by defining and analysing some prerequisites for the sustainability of Việt Trì 
Project based upon the theoretical discussions of the factors that can affect project 
sustainability; and combining the theoretical discussion about the dimensions of project 
sustainability and the factors with the related interviews with the directly involved 
Vietnamese stakeholders, the information in Việt Trì Project documents, the correspondence 
with the Senior Technical Advisor of Việt Trì Project, the site visits in Phú Thọ province, 
and  my professional experiences of working with development projects.  
4.1. Pre-conditions for the sustainability of Việt Trì Project 
Whether Việt Trì Project can be sustainable in the long run, there are some preliminary and 
important conditions which have to be met. On the basis of the theoretical discussions of the 
factors that can affect the sustainability of a project, the issue of sustainability should firstly 
be addressed and analysed sufficiently and explicitly in the three phases of the project – 
Identification and Preparation, Implementation, and Completion – and written down in the 
related documents of Việt Trì Project. Secondly, the project must involve the sufficient and 
efficient participation of the ultimate beneficiaries in all phases of the project because it will 
be the ultimate beneficiaries who will overtake, maintain and develop the project outcomes. 
Thirdly, participation of Danida’s local staffs at the Identification and Preparation phase 
must be adequate and efficient in order to make sure that the project was proposed based 
upon the ultimate beneficiaries’ needs and wishes, that there are no conflicts of interests, and 
that all the key ultimate beneficiaries are included.  
4.2. Sustainability in Việt Trì Project documents and participation of Danida’s local 
staffs at the Identification and Preparation phase 
4.2.1. Sustainability in Việt Trì Project documents 
Since I did not have the chance to get access to the Identification Report because it was 
thrown away after the Project Document was made, I cannot know exactly if sustainability 
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was identified in that Report or not and thus cannot suggest whether that Report should be 
improved and how. A number of Feasibility Reports and Surveys were made, but 
sustainability was not even a key word of the documents concerned. If sustainability had 
been identified in the Identification Report, the Feasibility Reports should have assessed the 
sustainability dimensions and concluded whether those dimensions could likely be 
progressed.  
The sustainability discussion presented in the Project Document is very general and 
superficial. There are no discussion and clarification of the engagement of the ultimate 
beneficiaries; of the different dimensions of sustainability - institutional and social, 
economic and financial, and technical - and how they are going to be met.  Moreover, neither 
is there a sufficient discussion and analysis of the factors that are likely to influence the 
sustainability and how they are to be overcome. On page 46 of the Project Document, only 
the following risks are presented: 
o “If enforcement of environmental regulations is not made more effective there is a risk that 
achievements in the field of industrial cleaner production and OHS may not be sustained. 
The Government is aware of this and has long-term strategy for gradually strengthening the 
enforcement. 
o If training, dissemination and awareness activities are not sustained beyond the Project, 
there is a risk that households and local communities will not participate effectively in the 
improvement of the local environment. All stakeholders are ware of the importance of 
continuity in these activities. 
o Any adverse changes in the national or provincial economy could negatively affect the 
sustainability of the Project. However, at present, this risk would appear to be minimal, but 
the Project will follow the economic trends. 
o Capacity building efforts could be undermined if key counterpart staff were to be reassigned. 
However, Viet Tri has experience in this regard (from the division of the province into the 
two provinces Phu Tho and Vinh Phuc in 1997) and are therefore aware of the 
consequences.” (Danida 2001c:46) 
Those risks are not adequate because there are some other important risks like lack of 
economic and financial sources at the hospitals to operate and maintain the wastewater 
treatment plants; lack of effective participation of the market representatives; lack of revenue 
sources at the urban markets (which will in turn affect the economic and financial 
sustainability of the outcomes concerned), lack of preconditions to establish the Green Belt, 
etc. are not mentioned and discussed.  
The Appraisal Report made during the Identification and Preparation phase fails to elaborate 
why all the project components and activities were relevant to be invested in, or at least the 
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Appraisal Team did not realise that some of them were not by any means appropriate. 
Sustainability is mentioned as “a key factor in determining and developing Danida support 
for a Project”, and “relates to issues such as how to ensure that the strategies and action 
plans and demonstrations projects are prepared in a sustainable way” (Danida 2001b:8). 
Yet the Report did not touch upon the technical and social sustainability aspects that are 
important in the case of Việt Trì Project, and the sole and short paragraph below fails to fully 
convince how the project is going to be financially and institutionally sustainable if only 
financial and institutional sustainability was expected by the Appraisal Team: 
“The Project formulation has been undertaken with full involvement of all relevant 
stakeholders in Viet Tri and it is assessed that there is agreement on the Project’s objectives 
and scope and that there is a strong sense of Vietnamese ownership and commitment to the 
Project. Furthermore, the provincial authorities and other relevant stakeholders are highly 
motivated and committed to the Project objectives. Finally, the Project design is built on 
integration into existing administrative structures and use of established mechanisms for 
institutional co-ordination.” (Danida 2001b:8) 
Sustainability is not included in the Inception Report of Việt Trì Project, whereas in the 
Progress Reports, nothing else but the following paragraph that had already been mentioned 
in the Project Document was repeated in two out of five Progress Reports: Any adverse 
changes in the national or provincial economy could negatively affect the sustainability of 
the Project. However, at present this risk would appear to be minimal, but the Project will 
follow economic trends. The Completion Report summarises some agreed measures with the 
involved local stakeholders to maintain the outcomes, yet it fails to address explicitly how 
the wastewater treatment plants and the urban markets are going to be maintained and 
developed, seen from the financial, technical and social viewpoints.  
4.2.2. Participation of Danida’s local staffs at the Identification and Preparation phase 
Danida has a policy where the involved Danida staffs at the Royal Danish Embassy are the 
councillor and the national programme officer, and then an appraisal team composing of a 
few Danish specialists from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Copenhagen will arrive to 
appraise the project. The mentioned staffs were involved not only in a single project like 
Việt Trì Project but also others. For example, the councillor and the national programme 
officer were involved in all projects belonging to DEA-Vietnam Programme, so in relation 
to Việt Trì Project, they could only visit a few industrial utilities and hospitals in Phú Thọ 
province and communicated with the provincial Departments for the rest of the phase. In the 
meantime, the appraisal team, within 3 weeks, had to appraise three projects of more or less 
same budget value but located in different provinces. According to the Appraisal Report, 
about 12 days were spent on Việt Trì Project.  
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It is my viewpoint that the participation of Danida’s local staffs, especially that of the 
national programme officer at the Identification and Preparation phase was too little. There 
was no direct communication between him and the stakeholders involved in the urban 
market activities, and it seems like there was no examination of the Green Belt as a 
questionable activity (explanation is to be provided in the coming sub-sections). 
4.3. Financial sustainability 
As discussed in the Theoretical Framework, financial sustainability has to do with the 
capacity of the donor, the authoritative partner stakeholders and the ultimate beneficiaries to 
plan for, mobilise and utilise appropriately and efficiently both domestic and external 
sources on a sufficient, reliable and strategic basis for the purpose of achieving the set 
targets, maintaining and promoting the obtained outcomes. In the specific case of Việt Trì 
Project, it is relevant to look at how the financial input was distributed to different activities, 
how Danida and Phú Thọ province financially planned for the return-on-investment phase, 
and what actual situation at each ultimate beneficiary institution nowadays is.  
4.3.1. How was the financial input of Việt Trì Project distributed to different activities? 
As mentioned in Chapter 3 under the sub-section 4.3, the Vietnamese counterpart 
contributed mainly in-kind to the project while Danida provided 18,518,000 DKK, which 
was spent on investment, procurement (including the interventions) and operational expenses. 
Details of the budget distribution are thereinafter. The blue-marked items are those directly 
related to the outcomes I have chosen for my analysis. 
Items  Ceiling amount (DKK) 
Fees 
Expatriate key personnel 3,681,361 
Regional/Local key personnel 523,800 
Personnel in Recipient country rather than key personnel 744,500 
Working expenses 
Component-related expenses 381,200  
Short-term international and local key personnel 520,500 
Long-term international key personnel 262,666 
Personnel in Recipient country rather than key personnel 31,225 
Investment and Procurement 
Project-related expenses 383,500 
Personnel-related expenses 30,000 
Pilot demonstrations at ward-level 747,826 
Improvement of markets 2,699,000 
Information, education and communication materials 203,252 
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Training in English 101,626 
Training and awareness raising 101,626 
Study tours 542,026 
Laboratory equipment 960,000 
Grant for the Green Belt 1,910,569 
Surveys 203,252 
Cleaner Production pilot demonstration projects 1,219,512 
Cleaner Production sub-contracts 406,504 
Environmental monitoring and Data management capacity 
development 
136,000 
Hospital waste and wastewater treatment systems 2,515,812 
Total 18,305,758 
Table 5.1 – Budget distribution of Việt Trì Project compiled from the Completion Report20 
4.3.2. How did Danida and Phú Thọ province financially plan for the return-on-investment 
phase? 
From Table 5.1, we can see that most of the reimbursed amount was spent on the investment 
phase, meaning during nearly three years of project implementation. In terms of legal 
documents, however, before Việt Trì Project was officially launched, the Government of 
Denmark and the Government of Vietnam signed a common agreement on Việt Trì Project 
where the Government of Vietnam committed to providing the implementing agencies 
adequate working capital to maintain the normal operation when the project is handed over. 
In a direct way the Government of Vietnam did promise that there would not be any 
financial barriers for the beneficiary institutions to continue the project attained outcomes at 
the return-on-investment phase.  
Moreover, in the Completion Report, the sustainability of the project benefits is expressed as 
follows: 
“The PMU expects that the benefits generated by the project to a high degree can be sustained 
and even enhanced. From the outset, the PMU actively involved all relevant partner 
stakeholders directly in project planning and implementation through establishing Project 
Working Groups (PWG). The authority or agency currently in charge of a certain sector was 
made responsible for the actual implementation of the related project component. Thereby, the 
basic ownership was secured, and the project activities were conducted within the institutional 
framework that would have the future operational responsibility.” (COWI A/S & Danida. 
2005b:13) 
From the financial sustainability perspective, the statement was made in that way because 
there were some agreements made among the local institutions. For instance, in the case of 
                                                
20 COWI A/S & Danida. 2005b. Completion Report, pp. 21.  
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the wastewater treatment plants at Phú Thọ Town General Hospital and Phú Thọ Provincial 
General Hospital, there was an “agreement regarding operational responsibilities and cost 
recovery has been made between the involved parties: PPP, Department of Health, and the 
two hospitals” (COWI A/S & Danida. 2005b:14). In the case of the six urban markets, “the 
market vendors will contribute significantly to recover the operation and maintenance costs” 
(COWI A/S & Danida. 2005b:13). As regards the Green Belt with 18,000 trees planted, the 
Educational Division of Việt Trì city and Việt Trì URENCO “have acknowledged their 
responsibility for tending and protecting the trees in the following years” (COWI A/S & 
Danida. 2005b:14) while the Project Management Unit (PMU) is so sure that the forty 
households benefited from the biogas plants will operate and maintain the plants. Financial 
sustainability of the cleaner production demonstration projects at the industrial utilities and 
of the Environmental Monitoring Station (EMS) was not touched upon.  
Altogether, it has been strongly believed that the financial sustainability of Việt Trì Project is 
secured on the basis of the commitments made by the Government of Vietnam and by the 
majority of beneficiary institutions. Except the industrial utilities which made an investment-
benefit analysis in the submitted cleaner production proposals, neither the other beneficiary 
institutions nor the PMU have made any other analyses which could practically and visibly 
demonstrate how the activities would be sustained and developed, seen from the financial 
viewpoint.  
4.3.3. What is the actual situation at each ultimate beneficiary institution nowadays? 
At the visit paid to Phú Thọ Town General Hospital and the interview with Mr. Phạm Huy 
Thưởng, head of the Administration Section, I got the information that there was no 
agreement either between Phú Thọ PPC and Department of Health (DoH) or Danida and Phú 
Thọ Town General Hospital concerning recurrent costs. As far as how the hospital’s budget 
is handled, all the revenues must be paid in DoH, which will then cover all the expenditures 
of Phú Thọ Town General Hospital. That is, the amount of money that DoH is able to 
provide Phú Thọ Town General Hospital relies on the collected hospital fees. So far, there 
have not been any extra sources which can specifically be used for operating and 
maintaining the wastewater treatment plant at Phú Thọ Town General Hospital.  
Mr. Phạm Huy Thưởng also added that he participated in two meetings organised by Phú 
Thọ PPC and Danida where the issue of recurrent costs were mentioned. Until further, there 
is no funding for serving this purpose. An interview with Mr. Phạm Văn Tính, medical 
specialist of DoH, confirms that Phú Thọ Town General Hospital has to be self-reliant in 
terms of recurrent costs because Phú Thọ PPC and DoH are facing with difficulties in 
allocating budget for solving solid wastes and wastewater treatment at hospitals.  
In the case of Phú Thọ Provincial General Hospital, Mr. Phạm Nhật Thịnh, head of the 
Administration Section, is more optimistic with the operational and maintenance costs of the 
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wastewater treatment plant. He said that the hospital, on the basis of its revenues budget, 
could cover those costs by itself, yet in the long run, comprehensive repairing or upgrading 
costs must be communicated with DoH. In that case, he had no idea how the matter would be 
figured out.  
Phú Thọ Environmental Monitoring Station (EMS) seems to have well-planned for the 
recurrent costs. Ms. Tạ Hồng Yến, technical specialist of the Station, told me the equipment 
and facilities are maintained and regulated once per year, and the Station can pay for the 
expenses. The Station also has an independent budget to cover other costs like monthly 
cleaning or potential repairing in future.  
The 7 industrial utilities do not have any problems with continuing the demonstration 
projects. As mentioned earlier, all the involved industrial utilities made an investment-
benefit analysis in the submitted cleaner production proposals where they analysed pros and 
cons of the investment, and they could present in figure what economic benefits, aside from 
the social and environmental ones, they might yield. With the actual economic benefits they 
have been attaining, the issue of recurrent costs is not a burden for any of them, as far as I 
was confirmed when visiting them. Table 5.2 below shows the results of the investment. 
Name of industrial utility Invested item Invested amount 
(VND) 
Annual economic 
benefit (VND) 
Minh Khai Tunnel Brick Manufactory 1 new grinder 600,000,000 700,000,000 
Trí ðức Company Ltd. 1 jet machine 675,000,000 272,518,400 
Việt Trì Ceramic Company 1 heat recovery system 533,000,000 5,400,000,000 
Việt Trì Chemical Company 2 economisers and 2 
boilers 
533,000,000 1,248,000,000 
Việt Trì Food Processing Factory 1 screw conveyor 129,000,000 100,000,000 
Việt Trì Plywood Company 1 grinder for grinding 
board cuts and 1 dust 
suction 
105,000,000 37,734,000 
Vĩnh Phú Textile Company 1 cotton dust blowing-
suction system 
805,000,000 279,000,000 
Table 5.2 – Cost-benefit clarifications of the 7 industrial utilities21 
Việt Trì URENCO was supposed to be responsible for taking care of and protecting the trees, 
as part of the Green Belt, it had planted. 16% of the trees no longer exist, and it seems like 
Việt Trì Project has to bear that loss. In the long run, how many of the trees can survive, how 
many will be lost, and who will compensate the possible loss are unanswered questions.  
At the six major urban markets, the maintenance and upgrading expenses depend on the so-
called business fees contributed by the market vendors though it was misunderstood that the 
vendors should not pay for those expenses. The fees that the vendors have to pay now are the 
same to before the new buildings were constructed, and the plan to increase the fees is still 
                                                
21 Source: Feasibility Study Assessment of Cleaner Production Options for industrial utilities. The benefit 
calculation presented in the table is relative.  
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under discussion and consideration because that will be problematic for the vendors who are 
not making better business than earlier. At Gia Cẩm and Dầu markets, the buildings are 
filled with vendors, yet at the other markets - Bạch Hạc, Gát, Nông Trang, and Tân Dân, the 
new buildings are max. 50% occupied. Many vendors at Nông Trang and Tân Dân either 
already moved to another market or wish to move. Phú Thọ Market Management Board and 
the People’s Committees of Bạch Hạc, Dầu and Tân Dân markets are now facing with a 
reality: what if the buildings are downgraded? How long do those markets have to wait for 
being allocated with money for repairing or upgrading them? The answer for this future 
problem is very unsure. At least, Phú Thọ Market Management Board cannot tell exactly 
whether there will be enough money for major repairing or upgrading, and in case of No, 
what it is going to do to.  
The biogas plants were invested in connection with the pig production at the households. No 
cost-benefit analysis seems to have been made before the activity was launched, but 
according to the 32 families I visited and talked to, they annually save min. 1 million VND 
and max. 6 millions VND from buying gas for serving daily cooking activities, especially 
cooking bran for the pigs. With the amount they can save per year, they confirmed with me 
that they would be managing well to cover any recurrent costs.  
4.3.4. Partial summing-up 
The financial analysis of the selected outcomes of Việt Trì Project has showed that not all of 
them are likely to be maintained well. Phú Thọ Provincial General Hospital, Phú Thọ 
Environmental Monitoring Station, the 7 industrial utilities and the biogas plant households 
have clear financial perspectives to keep on the attained results, but Phú Thọ Town General 
Hospital and the 6 urban markets do not have the same capacities. I am in doubt that Việt Trì 
URENCO’s responsibility in relation to the Green Belt is gradually weakened due to very 
loose commitment.  
The Government of Vietnam has committed with the Government of Denmark (in this case 
represented by the Royal Danish Embassy) that it would provide the implementing agency 
with sufficient budget to maintain the usual operation, yet the real situation is not that simple, 
because very rarely does a national authoritative body intervene in very local financial 
problems except extremely urgent, important and special cases. That is to say, if a 
wastewater treatment plant in Phú Thọ province is downgraded, for example, it will first and 
foremost the responsibility of Phú Thọ PPC to work out the question. The case of the urban 
markets will be much harder and more complicated to call for national financial assistance.  
Phú Thọ Town General Hospital (and also Phú Thọ Provincial General Hospital) is not 
directly dependant on Ministry of Health but DoH of Phú Thọ, meaning all of its internal 
budget issues can only be discussed and solved together with DoH, not Ministry of Health. If 
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DoH says it does not have money and so does Phú Thọ PPC, then Phú Thọ Town General 
Hospital will have to close down the wastewater treatment plant in case of serious technical 
problems. The markets are dependent on Department of Commerce, which dealS with 
repairing and upgrading issues at each individual market by reflecting on the fees collected. 
The fewer the fees are, the more difficult it will be for and the longer it will take the markets 
to be helped.  
4.4. Institutional and social sustainability  
Institutional and social sustainability, as discussed in the Theoretical Framework, is 
concerned with the extent that the directly involved partner stakeholders have sufficiently, 
equally and efficiently participated in the project activities; with the utilisation and 
enhancement of their existing managerial-organisational structures and capacity; and with 
their ability to overtake the achieved outcomes when the intervention is finished. To ease the 
analysis of this factor, I would like to, on the basis of the overall meaning of institutional and 
social sustainability, focus on these strategic questions: How and how far did the directly 
involved partner stakeholders, especially the ultimate beneficiaries participate in Việt Trì 
Project’s activities? How were their managerial-organisational structures and capacity used 
and enhanced? And how is their ability to maintain and promote the achieved outcomes 
when Việt Trì Project has today come to an end?  
4.4.1. How and how far did the directly involved partner stakeholders, especially the 
ultimate beneficiaries, participate in Việt Trì Project’s activities? 
Seen from the content and characteristics of the achieved outcomes, we get a quite clear 
impression that aside from the authoritative bodies concerned, the ultimate beneficiaries who 
directly benefit from the wastewater plants, the cleaner production demonstration projects, 
the Green Belt, the urban markets, and the biogas plants must have participated in Việt Trì 
Project in all phases. In practice, some of them were involved to a large extent, some to a 
certain extent, and some to a very limited extent.  
Phú Thọ Town General Hospital 
The participation of the Phú Thọ Town General Hospital as an ultimate beneficiary was very 
limited, not due to lack of willingness or relevant staff to participate from the hospital’s side 
but due to project planning and design, and implementation practices. At the interview with 
Mr. Phạm Huy Thưởng, head of the Administration Section of Phú Thọ Town General 
Hospital, who, together with an electrician, was assigned by the hospital director to 
participate in the related activity, I was told that at one of the two meetings taking place at 
Phú Thọ Town General Hospital, the hospital director and he himself were informed of the 
decision to build a new wastewater treatment plant for the hospital, yet during the survey, 
design and implementation process, there was no chance for him to participate. Both he and 
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the hospital director knew nothing about the invested amount in the plant, were not in the 
position to act as a supervisor while the plant was under construction, were not by any means 
consulted in and informed of the technical specifications of the plant, were not invited to 
participate as a receiver when the plant was handed over, and were not given any operational 
and maintenance instructions and other related information. As Mr. Phạm Huy Thưởng 
implied, the hospital was just a witness of the project, not a participant. 
Phú Thọ Provincial General Hospital  
The situation at Phú Thọ Provincial General Hospital is different from that at Phú Thọ Town 
General Hospital. Mr. Phạm Nhật Thịnh - head of the Administration Section of Phú Thọ 
Provincial General Hospital, two technical operators and about 70 officers had the 
opportunity to participate, not in the identification and preparation phase but partly in the 
implementation. The hospital was informed of the invested amount (300 million VND, 
equivalent to ca. 20,000 USD), the technical operators were instructed how to operate and 
maintain the upgraded plant, and the 70 officers were trained in classification and collection 
of hospital wastes. When the plant was handed over, a technical instructions document was 
also delivered.  
Phú Thọ Environmental Monitoring Station (EMS) 
In the case of Phú Thọ EMS, a number of new equipment and facilities like Palintest, fridge 
and thermostat cabinet, scanning spectrophometers, soil analysis instruments, water 
measuring equipment, turbidity meter, etc. were purchased and delivered to the laboratory of 
the Station. In that sense EMS was “upgraded”. The laboratory staffs were engaged in the 
implementation phase where capacity improvement and English courses were carried out.  
The 7 industrial utilities - Minh Khai Tunnel Brick Manufactory, Trí ðức Company Ltd., 
Việt Trì Ceramic Company, Việt Trì Chemical Company, Việt Trì Food Processing Factory, 
Việt Trì Plywood Company, and Vĩnh Phú Textile Company 
The industrial utilities were involved from the implementation phase where the representing 
industrial technical and organizational managers had the opportunities to participate in a 
three-phase intensive course on occupational health and safety and industrial cleaner 
production starting in December 2001 and ending in May 2004, and the utilities were 
requested to make some cleaner production proposals in accordance with the actual and 
urgent needs at the utilities. At each industrial utility, one out of several or many submitted 
proposals was selected for deploying a cleaner production demonstration project, namely 
there were 7 demonstration projects in all.  
The six major urban markets - Bạch Hạc, Dầu, Gát, Gia Cẩm, Nông Trang, and Tân Dân  
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The case of the six major urban markets is a little bit complicated because it looks like there 
was some confusions as regards who should be participants, how and how far. From the 
organizational perspective, a two-level or dual management scheme is imposed on five out 
of six markets. See the chart below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 4.1 – The organizational structure of Bạch Hạc, Dầu, Gát, Gia Cẩm, Nông Trang, and Tân Dân 
markets 
The organizational structure shows that the day-to-day management and supervision of Gát, 
Gia Cẩm and Nông Trang markets are taken care of by their Market Management Teams 
established at each market. The Teams are regarded as representatives of the market vendors 
and customers who communicate with them directly in all daily practical and/or 
administrative matters. The Teams have to be responsible to Phú Thọ Market Management 
Board in terms of fee collection and delivery, report on all the daily administrative and 
practical issues going on at the markets, and submission of such proposals as repairing or 
upgrading some stalls, buildings, etc. The similar situation is applicable for Dầu and Tân 
Dân markets, whose sole difference is that they are under the superior management of their 
ward People’s Committees. Bạch Hạc market has no Market Management Team because the 
number of current vendors and customers are so few, yet it is under the direct management 
of the People’s Committee of Bạch Hạc ward. At the highest level, Phú Thọ Market 
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Management Board and the ward People’s Committees have to be responsible to Department 
of Commerce.  
Since the collected fees are mainly used for operational and maintenance costs, repairing, 
upgrading or new construction of the markets when necessary, it is important that the market 
vendors and customers have their voice in the Việt Trì Project’s activities concerned. No one 
else but them will be paying for the maintenance, repairing and upgrading costs of the 
buildings to be built and the facilities to be installed. That means, aside from Phú Thọ 
Market Management Board and the three ward People’s Committees, the Market 
Management Teams of all the markets should participate from the moment the markets were 
identified to be supported until they were handed over. No one else but the Teams know 
about the actual conditions, the needs and desires of the vendors and customers, the market 
culture and practices at those markets best. As a result, they could be acting as helpful and 
useful co-operators in the entire process, and this would certainly influence the long-term 
impact and sustainability of the urban markets component. 
In reality, the participation of the Teams and even Phú Thọ Market Management Board as 
well as the ward People’s Committees was extremely limited. At the interviews with leaders 
of Gát, Gia Cẩm, Nông Trang and Tân Dân Market Management Teams and the Acting 
Head of Phú Thọ Market Management Board, I was told that they were only invited to one 
common meeting where several key project stakeholders were present for the purposes of 
commenting the drawings. The Team leaders constructively commented on the drawings, but 
most of their comments were not listened to. After the drawings had officially been approved, 
the Teams and Phú Thọ Market Management Board were informed. And when the 
construction activities were completed, they were invited to witness the hand-over. The 
interview with the leader of Dầu Market Management Team gave no new information except 
that his opinions were, to a certain extent, influential while the construction of Dầu market 
was going on.  
It is important to note that a survey focusing on the sanitary and environmental conditions at 
a number of markets in Việt Trì city was conducted by a socio-economist and members of 
the Project Working Group 4 before the six markets were selected and their construction 
started. The survey was supposed to be a good chance for the market vendors to express their 
opinions by themselves, yet only 50 out of 2,151 vendors and 50 out of 35,000 customers at 
the ten markets were interviewed (Hoang, Van Hoa. 2003:5-6). It is very difficult for me to 
understand how and why the results of such a survey with an extremely humble number of 
participants could have proved sufficient and efficient, and then accepted and approved by 
first the Project Management Unit (PMU) and then the Project Steering Committee. When I 
asked Mr. Morten Jørgensen, Senior Technical Advisor of Việt Trì Project, why the market 
survey reports were approved even though they were poorly made, and who had the 
authority to approve them, I got the following answer: 
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“The surveys were designed by a VN team member in consultation with DOSTE and the Viet 
Tri City Market Management Board (MMB), and - after the PMU had approved the 
questionnaires - subsequently conducted by local students under the supervision of the VN 
team member and MMB staff. The results, including the rudimentary report, were discussed 
with MMB, Viet Tri City PC and the PMU. The PMU in the end approved the selection of 
market locations and which facilities to upgrade. I guess that the Project Director during the 
discussions consulted with the Phu Tho PPC Vice-chair.” (Correspondence with Mr. 
Morten Jørgensen dated the 7th of June, 2006) 
The Green Belt  
The Green Belt created along Hùng Vương and Trần Phú roads, around the war soldiers’ 
cemetery and around Thụy Vân industrial zone of Việt Trì city was contracted to plant and 
taken care of by Việt Trì URENCO. This institution was actively engaged in this activity 
from starting. Yet the industrial utilities located in Thụy Vân industrial zone and the people 
living on the mentioned roads were not by any means involved. It is furthermore unclear 
whether Việt Trì URENCO is able to check often the well-being of all the 9,681 trees they 
have planted as the trees are in risk of being damaged by people, animals, or natural reasons.  
The 40 households benefited from the biogas plants project 
Due to restrictions in terms of time and resources, I could only visit 32 out of 40 households. 
Though the idea of introducing biogas plants to Việt Trì city came later compared to the 
launching of Việt Trì Project, the households were involved in the entire process – since the 
moment the idea was presented to them until the construction of the plants was finished and 
put into use. My conversations with all the households revealed that they had the opportunity 
to follow closely the whole construction-installation process and they were very satisfied 
with their participation and ownership.  
4.4.2. How were their existing managerial-organisational structures and capacity used 
and enhanced? 
As a general situation, the managerial-organisational structures and capacity of the directly 
involved partner stakeholders were used and strengthened to a certain level and consequently 
appreciated. At least, the involved authoritative stakeholders are satisfied, and the 
satisfaction can be seen in the Completion Report. In particular cases, the picture is different 
from among the authoritative partner stakeholders and the ultimate beneficiaries.  
Phú Thọ Town General Hospital feels that its capacity and roles in relation to the activity 
related were underestimated. Mr. Phạm Huy Thưởng, head of the Administration Section of 
Phú Thọ Town General Hospital, said that it would have been more relevant for the hospital 
to be engaged to a larger extent in the activity, namely from starting to the end, and there 
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should not have been an intermediary body (in this case Department of Health) to deal with 
the activity. It had the right to know all the technical details of and the plan to construct the 
plant, to comment on them on the basis of its knowledge and sharp understanding of the 
practical conditions at the hospital, to closely follow the construction of the plant, and to 
participate in the hand-over of the plant. If all those aspects had been respected, the situation 
experienced by the hospital nowadays would have differed. I will continue this point in the 
next section about technical sustainability.  
Mr. Phạm Huy Thưởng joined a domestic study tour to hospitals in Sơn Tây, Thanh Hoá and 
Thái Nguyên provinces where he had the chance to visit the hospital waste incinerators in 
those places and learn some practical experiences with health care solid wastes treatment, 
yet nothing about wastewater treatment.  
An electrician of the hospital was instructed in 15 minutes about electrical operation. Yet 
other issues like chemicals (what kinds of chemical to be used, how and where to buy them), 
deodorisation, treatment, were not communicated with anyone from the hospital even though 
a chemical specialist of the hospital, for instance, could have been engaged and instructed.  
The case of Phú Thọ Provincial General Hospital is better because it was informed of all the 
new technical details, its technical operators were well-instructed, and quite a number of 
staffs were selected to participate in training activities on classifying and collecting hospital 
wastes. Furthermore, the hospital seems to have had the chance to follow the upgrading 
process. Mr. Phạm Nhật Thịnh, head of the Administration Section of Phú Thọ Provincial 
General Hospital joined the same domestic tour as Mr. Phạm Huy Thưởng did. In some way, 
the hospital is more pleased with its status as far as the related activity is concerned. It feels 
that its capacity has been used and enhanced to a certain extent.  
Phú Thọ Environmental Monitoring Station (EMS) is fairly pleased with the level it was 
allowed to participate in the activity concerned. They were well-instructed how to use the 
equipment and facilities provided by the project, and especially improved to a high extent 
their environmental monitoring capacity thanks to the environmental monitoring and data 
management capacity enhancement course.  
In the case of the 7 industrial utilities, I get a very clear impression that they are, to a high 
level, satisfied with the way their technical and managerial skills have been utilized and 
strengthened via the intensive training courses and demonstration projects. The fact that the 
industrial managers – both organizational and technical – were selected to participate has 
resulted in a sharp turning point in the industrial leaders’ way of thinking – general directors, 
directors, vice-directors, etc. – in terms of cleaner production and its economic-social-
environmental benefits. At most interviews with the technical managers of the industrial 
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utilities, I was told that their and their leaders’ awareness of cleaner production had 
remarkably been improved, and they would like the activities to be continued.  
The too limited engagement of the six major urban markets in the activities concerned 
highlights the underestimation and insufficient exploitation of the organizational-managerial 
capacities of the Market Management Teams, Phú Thọ Market Management Board, and the 
ward People’s Committees. Their knowledge of the business status quo of the market, the 
needs and wishes of the vendors and customers in terms of sanitary conditions and other 
appropriate things, and the so-called market culture; and their capacity of contributing to 
more suitable market technical drawings and supervising the construction activities for the 
purpose of assuring the right construction materials and the proper construction quality, were 
not made used of. The Team and Board leaders do not feel like they were really a part of the 
game, as well as their capacities were by any means used or improved.   
In the case of the households benefited from the biogas plants project, the households 
contributed their labour to the building and installation activities, aside from the 30% of 
financial contribution. They felt they were a part of the support, their available capacities 
were used, and they learnt how to handle the plants by themselves later on.  
4.4.3. How is their ability to maintain and promote the achieved outcomes when Việt Trì 
Project has today come to an end?  
The extent to which the beneficiary institutions participated in the project as well as the 
utilisation and enhancement of their capacities play a decisive role in whether they are able 
to maintain and promote the attained fruits by themselves.  
In the case of Phú Thọ Town General Hospital, its role as a witness rather than a genuine 
player of the activity concerned has caused difficulties in dealing with technical issues, 
namely it does not know how to manage if any technical problems happen. Already by the 
time I visited the newly built wastewater plant in March 2006, the chemicals that the hospital 
was given when the plant was handed over had already been finished. The hospital does not 
know what kinds of chemical they are, whether it can afford, and where to buy them. That is 
to say, the hospital wastewater is presently being gathered at the plant but not treated before 
flowing further. Opposite, Phú Thọ Provincial General Hospital seems not to have problems 
with continuing the operation of the plant, and that is understandable because two technical 
operators of the hospital were trained in operation and maintenance.  
Phú Thọ Environmental Monitoring Station (EMS) does not cope with any difficulties in 
maintaining the equipment and facilities they were provided for. The technical specialists of 
the Station were explained well about the equipment and facilities, and instructed how to 
maintain them. All the equipment and facilities have been used quite much, according to Ms. 
Tạ Hồng Yến – specialist of the Station, but they look like they are in good hands when I 
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visited the laboratory and thus had the chance to see them.  The technical managers of the 7 
industrial utilities were fully involved when the demonstration projects on cleaner 
production were implemented at each utility. They understand well all the technical details 
of the given machines and equipment and they are able to operate, maintain and promote 
them.   
The situation at the six major urban markets is not positive. At Bạch Hạc market, the 
building looks fine, yet the sanitary condition is quite nasty: wastes are discharged 
everywhere in small piles and there are no waste-containers disposed in the market; the 
drainage system is blocked at one of the four ends, both wastewater and rain water have no 
outlet, so they just either blocked when it rains lightly or spill over when it rains a lot (see 
pictures below). The toilet is piled up with used toilet papers which mix up with toilet water 
and human faeces. The few vendors sitting at the market told me that there is no one keeping 
an eye on what’s going on at the market even though the market is under the management of 
the People’s Committee of Bạch Hạc ward (see pictures below).  
 
 
 
 
At Dầu market, the buildings are in good condition, 
but there is neither a wastewater drainage system nor 
a wastes collection system, and the toilets are 
presently “out of order” due to technical problems. 
Sitting on the back yard of the market are fish and 
shellfish vendors who also prepare the fish for their 
customers if required, or sometimes they prepare the 
fish beforehand to save the customers’ time. All the 
water they use to wash the fish is discharged to a rice 
field located at the foot of the yard, creating a very 
bad hygiene environment to experience.  
Most shockingly, the water they use to wash the fish is picked up from a little well dug by 
the construction workers to serve the construction activities when the market was under 
construction. The well lies on the mentioned rice field, filled with extremely dirty water and 
 
Wastes are discharged everywhere... 
 
 
…whereas this end of the drainage 
system has no outlet 
 
Water from this little well is being 
used by the fish and shellfish vendors 
to wash their items.  
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millions of larvae. Being aware that the water is dirty, the vendors still use it because the 
price of tap water is too high for them (see pictures below).  
The newly built restaurant for Gát market was the very first one to have been handed over. 
About two years old, but the building looks much older than its actual age. The toilet seems 
to be in good condition, judged from its appearance. It was closed when I visited the market, 
so I could not see whether it was in or out of order (see pictures below). There are no waste 
containers in the market in general and in the restaurant in particular, so all the wastes are 
piled up here and there. Gát Market Management Team takes care of the restaurant as well 
as the toilet, and collects fees from the food vendors, yet it cannot be responsible for the 
downgrading situation of the building due to poor construction quality. More details 
regarding the technical aspect will be presented and discussed under the sub-section about 
technical sustainability.  
 
 
 
 
The Market Management Team of Gia Cẩm is able to carefully keep an eye on the buildings 
and request the vendors to take good care of the stalls they rent to do business. All the 
buildings financed by the project looked fine and the sanitary condition was much better 
compared to other markets when I visited them.  
The two high and solid buildings at Nông Trang market 
used for the fresh meat vendors are the newest. Nông 
Trang Market Management Team has the responsibility 
of protecting them, but this is not the most important 
point of the whole story. The two buildings are half-
empty, and that happens because the vendors cannot do 
a good business as before any longer and they decided 
to move to another market (see picture on the right).  
The story at Tân Dân market is not better than at Nông Trang market. Like the other fellow 
Market Management Teams, the Team of Tân Dân market is responsible for keeping things 
in the market in order and especially protecting the newly invested infrastructures. The Team  
 
Profile of the newly built restaurant for Gát 
market… 
 
…and the toilets 
 
 
50% of the new buildings at Nông 
Trang market is empty 
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is willing to and capable of fulfilling this task. What 
is happening to the market is that it has no water, 
electricity and fire control-prevention system, partly 
because Việt Trì Project did not include them, partly 
because Tân Dân ward and the vendors cannot afford 
to invest in them. Furthermore, the design of the 
building is irrelevant, according to the Team leader 
and markets vendors, and this has led to the 
consequence that 20% of the stalls are not rented, and 
the majority of the remaining vendors wish to move 
out.  
The households benefited from the biogas plants project spent quite much time and labour 
on building the plants solidly. They followed the biogas plant specialist in every single step 
when the construction and installation were under progress, so they knew how things were. 
Importantly, the plants are theirs and are helping them to produce economic, social, and 
environmental benefits. Particularly the economic benefits have strongly motivated them to 
use correctly, protect and maintain well the plants.  
4.4.4. Partial summing-up 
The analysis above has demonstrated that the institutional and social sustainability of Việt 
Trì Project depends heavily on the participation and participation extent, as well as the 
management and maintenance capacities of the directly involved partner stakeholders, 
especially the ultimate beneficiaries. We have thereby experienced two different pictures: 
the one of those who were restricted to participate to a relevant extent in the activities 
concerned, and the other of those were engaged in the activities concerned at an appropriate 
level. In the former case, institutional and social sustainability is quite unsure because the 
ultimate beneficiaries are unsatisfied with their participation and ownership, whereas in the 
latter case, it is more secured because the ultimate beneficiaries are happy with the level they 
have participated and simultaneously feel that the achieved results are really theirs.  
As discussed under the anti-corruption factor, the exclusion of the ultimate beneficiaries 
from the project implementation where the construction and procurement activities taking 
place can be a signal of corruption because the authoritative partner stakeholders do not 
want the ultimate beneficiaries to know all details about what materials are used for the 
construction, how much they cost, how their quality is and so forth. At this point, I would 
like to strengthen my doubt of corruption by discussing a little bit the problem of corruption 
in connection with development projects in Vietnam.  
 
50% of the external kiosks at Tân Dân 
market is not occupied, for no one 
wants to rent them. 
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Corruption in Vietnam is taking place in different kinds of projects financed by different 
types of international aid organisations, but most severely in infrastructure construction 
projects. Even though no reports have been made to demonstrate how many projects have 
been corrupted until now, what the corruption level is and so forth, an analysis made by 
Vietnam Investment Review shows that many infrastructure projects are causing huge 
wastes due to the current management structure, yet it is difficult to criticise those projects 
because high-ranking people in the sector to whom the projects belong will be touched upon. 
Losses occur in all phases of bidding, implementation, and supervision. Lack of 
transparency, trouble-making administrative procedures, unclear and overlapping laws and 
regulations are blamed for allowing under-the-table payments. 
Corruption in development projects in Vietnam is at an alarming level presently, and the 
message was released at the mid-term meeting of Vietnam’s Consultative Group (CG) 
between the Vietnamese government and donors in Nha Trang in June 2006. The meeting 
focused on Vietnam’s fight against corruption and effective use of official development 
assistance (ODA), and it was the first time that corruption became a central issue of a CG 
meeting vis-à-vis at other meetings. Background of the focus was the very recent graft 
scandal at the Project Management Unit 18 (PMU18) which had rocked the nation and many 
international news headlines, and has put the international donors in a “difficult situation” 
and raised doubt on the essence of usage of ODA in Vietnam (See Annex 4.1 for more 
details about the PMU18 case).  
Corruption in development projects in Vietnam is a national issue and it concerns both large 
and small scale projects at any locality of the country, namely Việt Trì city and Phú Thọ 
province are not excluded. As some Vietnamese project officers joke: if the cake is big, “we” 
take big bites; if the cake is small, “we” take small bites. The common experience is, the 
larger the projects are and the more levels they have to pass through, the more serious 
corruption will be.  
Relating the discussion to my question of corruption above, it is very questionable that the 
responsible persons of Phú Thọ Town General Hospital and the representatives of the urban 
markets were too limited to participate in the both the Identification and Preparation, and 
Implementation stages; and that the trees planted were kept only for the knowledge of the 
authoritative partner stakeholders and Việt Trì URENCO even though these activities 
consume quite an amount of the project’s budget. What is going on here?  
4.5. Technical sustainability 
The sustainability of the technical aspect of Việt Trì Project concentrates on three elements: 
Have appropriate technologies for the activities been carefully considered and adopted? 
Have the relevant beneficiary institutions been sufficiently involved in the technology 
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transfer process? And are they able to maintain the outcomes by themselves, seen from the 
technical perspective? 
4.5.1. Have appropriate technologies for the activities been carefully considered and 
adopted? 
Since I am not an expert on wastewater treatment plant technology, cleaner production 
technology, environmental monitoring technology, or biogas plant technology, what I am 
presenting and discussing in this sub-section is based upon the judgement and opinions of 
the recipients of the transferred technologies. Here, it is important to stress that “appropriate 
technologies” imply the technologies that match with the existing needs of the recipient, 
with the capacity of the recipient to undertake them, both in technical and financial sense.  
As mentioned earlier, except electrical instructions, Phú Thọ Town General Hospital was not 
by any means involved in the technological discussions around the wastewater plant, and it 
was not given any technical guidelines or instructions either. Whether the chosen technology 
for the plant is appropriate or not and in what way it is suitable, it is totally beyond the 
hospital’s awareness, as far as I could hear from Mr. Phạm Huy Thưởng. When I asked him 
“what are you going to do if technical problems happen”, he answered honestly “that we 
really don’t know”. Furthermore, the hospital has never bought the chemicals to be used for 
the plant by itself, so it is not known yet how expensive it is and whether the hospital can 
afford. Without knowledge of the plant’s specifications, it has, on the one hand, been 
difficult for the hospital to estimate how much it would cost to maintain the plant, and, on 
the other hand, been obvious that the hospital is not in the position to handle any technical 
problems which may occur.   
At Phú Thọ Provincial General Hospital, I did not have the chance to talk to the technical 
operators due to their unavailability, yet Mr. Phạm Nhật Thịnh could tell that the operators 
were satisfied wit the technology and they believed that it is relevant.  
Very confidently, Ms. Tạ Hồng Yến, technical specialist of Phú Thọ Environmental 
Monitoring Station (EMS), asserted that the equipment serving environmental monitoring 
and data management purposes they were provided with, and the additional knowledge they 
received via the capacity enhancement course are totally suitable for EMS and its staff. 
When being asked “according to you, has the efficiency of the Station’s activities been 
improved thanks to the new equipment”, she answered “Definitely. Before the equipment was 
given to us, we had to work over time very often. Some of the tasks, which could have been 
handled efficiently by machine or equipment, were done by hands. Since we received the 
project equipment, we have used them and saved a great deal of time. Furthermore, we can 
today dispose the same equipment both at the Station and on site, and thanks to them, the 
tasks of the officers at the Station and on site are not hampered due to lack of equipment. I 
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work with environmental monitoring and I understand very well the value of such equipment, 
so I really appreciate them.” 
Before the intervention of Việt Trì Project, cleaner production was a concept which the 
industrial utilities just heard about, but understanding what it’s precisely about was not part 
of their knowledge. Being closely involved in the entire technological transfer process, the 
technical managers of the utilities have learnt a lot and grasped valuable practical 
experiences about cleaner production technology. Since it was them who made the cleaner 
production proposals, they are fully aware of the cost of the technology, whether it is 
suitable with the actual conditions at their production utilities, and whether they can take 
over the technology when the international industrial specialists leave. I did notexperience a 
single case where any of the technical managers appeared unsure of what is going on. Việt 
Trì Ceramic Company even self-made an extra heat recovery system based on what had been 
learnt, and with this system, it can save 84 tons of gas consumption per year, which is 
equivalent to 840,000,000 VND.  
In the case of the six urban markets, there appropriate technology implies the buildings must 
be designed in accordance with the needs and the actual circumstances at each market, the 
construction contractor purchased the right and good construction materials, and the 
buildings were carefully and correctly constructed.  
Concerning the design, only people at Dầu market do not complain about it. People at the 
other markets point out several design things which should have been taken into account 
from beginning.  
At Bạch Hạc market, the buildings were constructed with no consideration of sun and rain 
directions for the building’s front and back sides, so when it is sunny, all the strong sunlight 
shines directly on the vendors and their items, and when it is rainy, the rain makes them wet.  
Also, as already described in sub-section 5.4.3, the drainage system of the market has no 
outlet, so the wastewater and slight rain water are blocked at the one end, whereas water 
from heavy rains will spill over the buildings’ floor.  
At the restaurant of Gát market, there are no doors and 
windows but open entrances and light openings only. 
The vendors have to use some temporary frames or nylon 
sheets to cover some of the open entrances and their 
raincoats to cover the light openings when it rains.  
At Gia Cẩm market, the design of the new garment building is exactly the same to that of the 
former one, meaning there are really a number of big columns - one at every square metre – 
 
The side opening of the restaurant 
of Gát market is covered with 
nylon sheets when it rains.  
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which make it very difficult for the garment vendors to display the items. They have to make 
some extra bamboo frames to hang the clothes, and the frames do not make the whole 
garment building look nice. Also, the roofs of both the garment building and the fresh meat 
building are made of sheet irons with roof windows. In summer, it is very hot, so the 
garment vendors had the initiative of using some pieces of cloth to cover the roof windows, 
while the fresh meat vendors made temporary separate bamboo ceilings which look quite 
miserable to isolate the heat. 
At Nông Trang market, both the Market Management 
Team and the vendors complained the two new buildings 
are too high and with no consideration of sun and rain 
directions for the building sides, the aisles are too broad, 
and the orientation should have been vertical instead of 
horizontal because with the current horizontal orientation, 
the buildings are turning their backs to the entrance, 
which is extremely avoided by Vietnamese people.  
Nông Trang market has several entrances, and the entrance to the new buildings is one of 
those, but very few people use this entrance since they do not want to “enter a market from 
the back side”. The consequences of the design are first of all the strong sunlight shines 
directly on the meat and the vendors when it’s sunny, and the rain makes both of them wet 
when it’s rainy. Next, the fresh meat vendors sitting at the buildings closest to the vegetables 
vendors do business best, whereas those sitting at the building near to the entrance can sell to 
very few customers. Psychologically, Vietnamese customers, who are mostly female, would 
like to buy things in the market as fast as possible because they have many other things at 
home to take care of, among which is to make lunch and dinner for the family. Buying 
vegetables, fish or meat for vendors sitting closely to each other is normally their most 
preferable choice of convenience. This explains why one of the two buildings is under 
insufficient and inefficient use.  
The design of Tân Dân market is very strange. The 
external part is used for disposing small fresh meat 
kiosks around the building while the internal part is used 
for garment and plastic items. The internal part is without 
ventilation, so it is very hot in summer. The stalls look 
like “dog cages” (some even compare with “prisons”) 
due to its design (see picture on the right). Fewer and 
fewer customers are coming to visit the internal part of 
the building because they do not like the peculiar design. 
After the whole building had been put into use, it became One of the “dog-cage” stalls 
 
The aisles of the fresh meat 
buildings are too broad… 
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difficult for the Market Management Team to arrange the fresh meat kiosks. Again, it is 
problem with the strong sunlight, which no doubt affects the quality of the meat. The 
People’s Committee of Tân Dân ward had to make a decision of convenience which is to 
dispose the consumer goods vendors in the kiosks instead.  
As regards construction quality, at least at the restaurant of Gát market, the beams and 
rafters made of poor-quality metal already rust a lot, and as the food vendors said, just if it 
breezes, many small rusty pieces will fall on our food and us. The walls are cracked here and 
there, and I have no idea how long the restaurant can maintain.  
 
 
 
 
 
Though the buildings of the other markets still look fine, but since they were tendered by the 
same contractor and built by the same workers, I am in doubt there will be quality problems 
by time.  
4.5.2. Have the relevant beneficiary institutions been sufficiently involved in the 
technology transfer process? 
As described above, Phú Thọ Provincial General Hospital, Phú Thọ Environmental 
Monitoring Station, the 7 industrial utilities, and the biogas plant households participated in 
the whole technological transfer process, yet Phú Thọ Town General Hospital and the six 
urban markets did not. This has led to the consequences presented in the subsequent sub-
section.  
4.5.3. Are they able to maintain the outcomes by themselves, seen from the technical 
perspective? 
The extent to which the beneficiary institutions participated in the technological transfer 
process plays a crucial role in deciding if they can maintain the benefits by themselves or not. 
Phú Thọ Provincial General Hospital, Phú Thọ Environmental Monitoring Station, the 7 
industrial utilities, and the biogas plant households confirmed that they knew how to handle 
in case of technical problems. Opposite, Phú Thọ Town General Hospital has no idea what it 
has to do but call for help from Technical University in Hanoi, for instance. Regarding the 
urban markets, serious lack of participation has created the feeling that “these buildings are 
 
The walls are cracked on both 
sides of the restaurant… 
 
 
…and at the door-ledge of the 
side entrance 
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not ours”, so the awareness of protecting the buildings is lessened. At Gát, Nông Trang and 
Tân Dân markets where no new vendors are moving in but just more vendors moving out, it 
may happen that the new buildings will have to be used for other purposes rather than for the 
vendors selling fresh meat and food. At Bạch Hạc market, the vendors do not really care 
about protecting the building. It is just purely a place for them to come and do business for a 
couple of hours and then leave again. Dầu and Gia Cẩm markets seem to be “in good hands 
and eyes” despite problems with design (at Gia Cẩm market) and sanitary maintenance (at 
Dầu market).  
4.5.4. Partial summing-up 
Technically seen, the analysed outcomes are not likely to be sustained altogether, and this 
has basically to do with sufficient or insufficient, and efficient or inefficient engagement of 
the ultimate beneficiaries. It is evident that the wastewater treatment plant at Phú Thọ 
Provincial General Hospital; the equipment and facilities at Phú Thọ Environmental 
Monitoring Station; the machines, systems and facilities at the 7 industrial utilities, and 
biogas plants at the households have positive sustainability perspectives. In the meantime, 
the situation with the wastewater treatment plant at Phú Thọ Town General Hospital and the 
six urban markets are questionable. Particularly in the case of the markets, I was told by Phú 
Thọ Market Management Board and the Market Management Teams that when they were 
invited to a meeting for commenting on the drawings, and the majority of their comments 
and arguments gave a clear message that the architects should make some necessary changes 
with the drawings, yet no significant changes had been made.  
Mr. Morten Jørgensen, Senior Technical Advisor of Việt Trì Project wrote to me that “the 
technical design of the 6 market upgradings were sub-contracted to local state-owned design 
company, which was told to me to be the largest, most capable and reputable of its kind in 
Viet Tri” (Correspondence with Mr. Morten Jørgensen dated the 7th of June, 2006), yet my 
site visits at the markets do not support that fame. Furthermore, “all draft design documents 
were discussed with and at the end approved by the MMB and the PMU” (Correspondence 
with Mr. Morten Jørgensen dated the 7th of June, 2006), but I was told at the interview with 
the Acting Head of Phú Thọ Market Management Board that the Board did not agree with 
and approve the design.  
4.6. Further discussions of the Green Belt, Gát market and Bạch Hạc market as 
questionable interventions 
Among the 7 outcomes I have chosen for the analysis, there are three activities which I 
would like to discuss a little more: the Green Belt, Gát market and Bạch Hạc market.  
The Green Belt 
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The Green Belt is the strangest activity of Việt Trì Project. Việt Trì People’s Committee 
suggested this activity in its project proposal, which was then adopted by the Project 
Steering Committee. The argument for the creation of the Green Belt was that it would 
function as a buffer zone between the residential areas and industrial areas for the purpose of 
improving the polluted urban environment. In fact, Việt Trì city is not in shortage of trees. 
There are many trees in both the residential and industrial areas, and a number of those trees 
were planted thanks to financial support from earlier projects.  
I corresponded with Mr. Morten Jørgensen, the Senior Technical Advisor of Việt Trì Project, 
who, with his position and roles in Việt Trì Project, would have had the right to discuss the 
necessity and relevance of the Green Belt component about this matter. Mr. Morten 
Jørgensen answered me as follows: 
“Already at the fact-finding visit (before our bidding), COWI asked representatives from both 
Danida and Phu Tho about where to establish the green belts between the industrial and 
residential areas, which were mentioned in the Danida Project, because we couldn't see any 
vacant land for the planting. COWI, again in its Proposal, mentioned this as an issue, and 
finally at the contract negotiations, COWI raised the issue. At all occasions COWI was told the 
executing and implementing agencies would sort out this issue (which of course never 
happened in a way that could satisfy the wording of the Project Document). In the end, an 
adjusted approach was proposed in the Inception Report, which - after appropriate discussion 
- was approved by the Steering Committee.” (Correspondence with Mr. Morten Jørgensen 
dated the 7th of June, 2006) 
At least, the issue was mentioned three times to the authoritative people at the highest 
executive level - Danida and Phú Thọ PPC – by Mr. Morten Jørgensen (on behalf of COWI), 
but it was not seriously taken into consideration. The people sitting at the Steering 
Committee of Việt Trì Project made a decision to ratify this activity without providing any 
convincing arguments. Based upon my fieldwork’s observation, I do agree with Mr. Morten 
Jørgensen completely: there is no vacant land for tree planting. And therefore 1,761/9,681 
trees ended up at… the war soldiers’ cemetery of Việt Trì city located on a large and 
peaceful hill which has no particular connection with either the residential area or the 
industrial area. On the other hand, it is the obligation of the industrial utilities based in Thụy 
Vân industrial area to plant trees in and around their location, according to Regulation on the 
Management of Making, Considering and Ratifying, and Implementing Environmental 
Impact Assessment Reports in Phú Thọ Province promulgated by Phú Thọ PPC in 2000. In 
that case, why was necessary for Danida to have 3,446 trees planted in this industrial area?  
The “Minutes of Checking Danida Project Trees” in September 2004 shows that 1,566/5,207 
trees planted in Thụy Vân industrial area and the war soldiers’ cemetery of Việt Trì city 
were either “died or lost”, while 1,392 trees planted on Hùng Vương and Trần Phú roads 
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seem to be in well-being and this sounds sensible because the head office of Việt Trì 
URENCO, Phú Thọ PPC and some other important public offices are located on those streets. 
When I was brought around by Việt Trì URENCO’s staff, who were very enthusiastic in 
assisting me, I got quite confused of which trees were the results of Việt Trì Project and 
which trees were the results of others’ because many trees born by different aid interventions 
were more or less of the same height with Việt Trì Project’s trees. Mr. Morten Jørgensen 
himself, as a key member of the Project Management Unit, was also confused for the same 
reason when being showed around after the trees planting had been completed.  
My conclusion on this activity is that its relevance is highly questionable while the 
efficiency, effectiveness and long-term impacts are hard to judge since it is not assured how 
the trees will be protected and whether “died or lost” cases can be efficiently prevented. The 
trees planted, at least to my eyes, did not create any buffer zone because the locations where 
the trees were planted are very scattered. When an intervention has questionable relevance, 
unsure efficiency, effectiveness and impact, its sustainability is also questionable. And if we 
relate this activity to the corruption discussion, it is worth asking ourselves: why should the 
Green Belt activity be approved though it was very clear that the activity was not by any 
means a necessity? Were there any manipulations with procurement, billing and planting?  
Gát market 
Gát market is the third largest market of Việt Trì city in 
terms of area: 7,000 m2 compared to Nông Trang market 
(12,000 m2) and Trung tâm market (10,000 m2). The 
business capacity of this two-floor and old market has 
reduced since 1996 due to the increasing development of 
many temporary markets in the neighbourhood. As a 
result, 60% of the total area, mostly on the first floor, has 
been unoccupied.  
With the 4,200 m2 unused, it should and would have been possible to arrange a relevant 
section inside the huge building for the food vendors instead of constructing a new and 
separate restaurant behind it. That is a waste of space, labour and money. At a conversation 
by phone with Mr. Lưu ðức Thắng, leader of Gát Market Management Team, I was told that 
no one ever asked for either his or the Team’s opinions whether it was relevant to build a 
new restaurant. The Team has been facing with difficulty in terms of fee because there are 
not many vendors doing business at the market. The Team proposed Phú Thọ Market 
Management Board to repair the ceiling of the big building some time ago, but the proposal 
has not been approved due to lack of funding. When being asked what the Team is going to 
do with the newly-built but downgrading restaurant, he answered that the Team would have 
 
Almost the whole first floor of Gát 
market is unoccupied 
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to discuss with Phú Thọ Market Management Board, yet personally, he was not optimistic 
that the problem would be solved within a foreseeable time - again due to lack of funding.  
Bạch Hạc market 
As described in Annex 3.2, Bạch Hạc market almost did 
not exist until Việt Trì Project was implemented. There 
were no nothing but a piece of land. After the market had 
been constructed, some vendors sitting on the roads in 
the neighbourhood were moved in after the market 
construction had been completed. The number of vendors 
at Bạch Hạc market today is very few and the vendors 
occupy 30% of the entire market area. The rest is empty 
and under poor protection conditions. Why should so 
much money be invested in building this market? What 
are the sensible arguments?  
It is not clear what the People’s Committee of Việt Trì city was thinking when it proposed 
the construction of the restaurant at Gát market and the entire Bạch Hạc market, whether the 
activities were solely the local authoritative partner stakeholders’ interest, what the 
Appraisal Team and PMU of Việt Trì Project were able to see when they visited the market 
and later on contributed the final decision of having them built. Nevertheless, on the basis of 
what I have just analysed, these two activities, together with the Green Belt, should not have 
been included in Việt Trì project.  
4.7. Summing-up  
This chapter has analysed the sustainability of Việt Trì Project seen from financial 
institutional, social and technical perspectives. The next chapter will be continued with 
discussing some alternatives which can potentially help to improve the sustainability of Việt 
Trì Project.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Only 30%of the total area at Bạch 
Hạc market is occupied at the 
moment.  
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5. Recommendations, Conclusions and Research Perspectives 
From the analysis in Chapter 4, it is clear that some activities of Việt Trì Project have 
problems with sustainability. The purpose of this chapter is therefore to introduce and 
discuss some alternatives for enhancing the sustainability of Việt Trì Project and hopefully 
similar Danida’s projects in Vietnam in future by trying to answer the last working question: 
What alternatives can be taken into account and what are the advantages and challenges of 
the recommendations in Danida’s specific context? The alternatives are based on the 
discussion of how to promote project sustainability in the Theoretical Framework with 
concentration on the options particularly suitable for the case of Việt Trì Project. Right after 
the recommendations, I will conclude from the entire research and suggest some possibilities 
for future studies.  
5.1. Recommendations 
5.1.1. To improve the addressing and analysis of sustainability in the project documents 
Following the theoretical discussion in page 31, I recommend that the Project Document 
should have elaborated the four stated risks (refer back to page 54). Simultaneously, it 
should have included and analysed the other important risks to the sustainability of Việt Trì 
Project, which are the lack of financial source at the hospitals to operate and maintain the 
wastewater treatment plants, lack of effective participation of the market representatives, 
lack of revenue sources at the urban markets, and lack of preconditions to establish the 
Green Belt; and explicitly described the equivalent plans and actions. In other words, the 
Project Document should have addressed the sustainability question in an explicit way, 
scrutinised the dimensions of sustainability in the specific context of Việt Trì Project, 
considered carefully all the factors that might affect Việt Trì Project’s sustainability, and 
discussed the measures to surmount them, otherwise they are just “on the paper” and 
worthless. 
The Appraisal Report should have explained scrupulously why all the project components 
and activities were relevant for the intervention, and on what grounds different aspects of 
sustainability would likely be met. The Inception Report should have addressed clearly what 
actions to be taken in the Implementation Phase and by whom in order to make the project 
sustainable, and each of the individual Progress Report should report what exactly have been 
done to assure the four dimensions of sustainability; what positive and negative lessons have 
been learnt from each period, how the positive lessons are going to be promoted and how the 
negative lessons are going to be improved in the next period. The Completion Report should 
have provided a more specific elaboration of the covering perspectives of the operational and 
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maintenance costs, the technical capacities of the hospitals to keep on the operation, and the 
social perspective of the urban markets.  
5.1.2. To focus on the most necessary activities for a pilot project 
Việt Trì Project is a pilot Danida’s project in Phú Thọ province and was intended for a 
duration of only 24 months, but there are too many components with too many big and small 
details as well as major and minor activities. Aside from the fact that the duration had to be 
prolonged so that all the committed components could have been completed, the 
sustainability could also be affected because the sparse disposition of components and 
activities do not match with the management and supervision time capacity of the Project 
Management Unit (PMU). The Green Belt is such an example. The PMU could not manage 
to check where and whether the number of committed trees was planted until the trees had 
grown up. Or the Bạch Hạc and Gát markets case. The PMU even did not know that there is 
too much space inside the main building of Gát market which could have been used to 
allocate an area for the food vendors instead of building a new house behind; or the business 
capacity of Bạch Hạc market is very limited.  
My point is, the activities like the creation of the Green Belt and the construction of Bạch 
Hạc and Gát markets should not have been included in Việt Trì Project because they are too 
strange to be accepted. The efficiency and sustainability of the investment could have been 
increased without the inclusion of those activities, aside from the other factors mentioned 
below.  
5.1.3. To enhance the anti-corruption factor 
It is suspected that corruption exists in the case of the urban markets and the Green Belt 
because most of the market representatives were completely marginalised from the 
construction supervision stage that is very important, and the industrial utilities and the local 
people located in the Green Belt area were not involved in the implementation and 
completion processes of the tree-planting. The first delivered market is now downgrading 
due to poor construction quality, and it is questionable whether the others will bear the same 
situation. Many trees planted by Việt Trì URENCO died or were damaged, and it is very 
confusing whether all the committed trees were planted. On the basis of the theoretical 
discussion of how to promote the anti-corruption factor, I would like to propose some 
actions which could have been exploited. 
Firstly, Danida should have paid more attention to the fact that corruption in construction 
and infrastructure projects in Vietnam is quite popular, and a Danida project to a high extent 
can not be exceptional. There are many fraud and corruption tricks which Danida should be 
aware of and have further explicit measures to cope with them in specific cases. Some 
changes in technical details can, for example, alter a part of the construction budget, and this 
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is not always detectable by the donor and/or the external project manager. Therefore, Danida 
should have used the eyes and ears of its ultimate beneficiaries to prevent corruption in 
connection with the investment in the public demonstration projects.  
Secondly, Danida should have enhanced at least the participation of the market 
representatives in the three project phases because these people know about the construction 
materials used to build a market and their prices, and included the participation of the 
industrial utilities and the local people located in the Green Belt area in the implementation 
and completion phases because they could at least contributing to counting the trees planted 
in the area they live and protecting them. Dishonest authoritative people, contractors and 
workers can only be kept an eye on by them - the people who will finally receive and 
maintain the completed products. Especially in the case of the Green Belt, Danida should 
have considered more carefully these three elements: why it was necessary to be supported, 
if there was vacant land for the planting, and by whom the Green Belt should be protected. 
As I have argued earlier, the Green Belt is a questionable intervention which consumed quite 
an amount of the project budget. The best solution is still to have excluded it completely 
from the project.  
Aside from the urban markets and the Green Belt, the investment in Phú Thọ Town General 
Hospital should have been made more transparent to the responsible persons of the hospital. 
To have a construction firm built a wastewater treatment plant for the hospital without the 
awareness of the hospital’s technical staffs as regards technical details, construction 
materials, quality, etc. is irrelevant. The Project Management Unit is not there daily to check 
whether the agreed materials have been used (the receipts should not be relied on because in 
Vietnam, you can buy material A and ask the seller to write material B in the receipt for you), 
whether the plant was decently constructed, etc. The exclusion of the hospital responsible 
persons’ engagement in the mentioned aspect has a possible implication that corruption in 
connection with the construction of the plant might have occurred.  
5.1.4. To enhance the participation of the ultimate beneficiaries in the project cycle, 
especially in the Identification and Preparation phase 
The project experts and the officers of Plan International I have talked to during fieldwork 
share the opinion that the direct recipient partner, especially the ultimate beneficiaries, 
should be encouraged to participate in all project stages, from planning, designing to 
implementing and evaluating, as the real owner of the project. Their participation at the 
Identification and Preparation phase is particularly crucial because it is the phase where the 
donor can discuss with them about their needs and wishes; identify their institutional and 
financial capacities; discuss with them about implementation plans and activities; find out 
what implementation strategy or strategies are relevant; etc. This is the most fundamental 
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phase where the direct recipient partner feels whether or not it is a part of the aid 
intervention.  
In the analysis about the financial, institutional, social and technical sustainability of Việt Trì 
Project, I highlighted two different pictures of the ultimate beneficiaries’ participation in the 
project activities and the effects of their participation on sustainability: the one of Phú Thọ 
Provincial General Hospital, the 7 industrial utilities, households benefited from the biogas 
plants; and the other of Phú Thọ Town General Hospital, the six urban markets, and the 
Green Belt. The former is quite positive and has clear signals of being sustainable whereas 
the latter is very unsatisfactory as far as sustainability is concerned. No doubt the 
enhancement of the ultimate beneficiaries’ participation in and a complete exclusion of the 
Green Belt activity from the project would have helped to improve the situation.  
Following the local participation discussion under Promoting participation and ownership 
factor, the project design should have explicitly included and elaborated the participation of 
Phú Thọ Town General Hospital, the six urban markets from the Identification and 
Preparation phase. The responsible persons of Phú Thọ Town General Hospital and the 
representatives of the six urban markets (namely the Market Management Teams) should 
have been well-informed of all the intended investment details and discussed with as regards 
how the hospital and the markets could benefit from the investment best, how the investment 
would match with the economic and financial as well as technical circumstances at the 
hospital, and how the investment would match with the revenue and expenditure sources at 
each market. If these steps had been taken, it would have helped reveal the irrelevance of 
investing in Bạch Hạc and Gát markets. And then a preliminary participatory plan for the 
implementation and completion phases (who, when, how, etc.) should also have been 
discussed with them.  
At the Implementation phase, the participatory plan should have been modified if necessary, 
and then confirmed with the responsible persons of the hospital and the representatives of 
the market. The responsible persons of the hospital should have been informed of the 
wastewater plant’s construction and the fundamental technical details, and especially in 
following the construction and installation process, both for assuring that all the committed 
items were properly fulfilled and that neither fraud nor corruption happened. In this way, it 
would have been possible for them to understand the technical problems which might occur 
in future and look for solutions. The market drawings should have been not only showed to 
the representatives of the market but also discussed with them and modified in accordance 
with the relevance of their suggestions. The representatives should furthermore have been 
involved in following the construction process in order to make sure that no fraud and 
corruption actions happened, that the technical construction details were followed, and that 
the construction quality was respected.  
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At the Completion phase, both the responsible persons of the hospital and the representatives 
of the market should have not only been summoned to receive the finished works but also 
participated in evaluating the plant and the markets. Their confirmation of these elements 
had been indispensable and thus crucial before the plant and the markets were handed over: 
the works were constructed in accordance with the technical design agreements and they 
were satisfied with the construction and installation quality.   
There are certainly several challenges of the ultimate beneficiaries’ participation which I 
would like to highlight and discuss here. The first challenge is they are sometimes not aware 
of their responsibilities and benefits in project participation, and this has to do with the 
democracy practices where they come from. As a consequence, they are not always 
concerned about participating in policy-making except when they have to contribute money 
or labour, partly because they are familiar with being decided by the superior bodies, partly 
because they think that their opinions are not listened to. It has been experienced by many 
Vietnamese project experts that the ultimate beneficiaries feel they are “tiny” because they 
were despised by the local officers for a long time, and they behave quite passively when 
participating in a project.  
The second challenge is the awareness of the ultimate beneficiaries of an aid intervention is 
not as expected. Experiences of the Vietnamese project experts I have talked to show that 
many beneficiaries still think that a project is about a donor from somewhere bringing 
money to them, so they do not feel from beginning that they have responsibility of being 
engaged in the project activities to a high extent. It thus requires time, professional 
experiences and patience to make them understand what a project is and why they should 
participate in it. 
The third challenge is the limited participation capacities of the ultimate beneficiaries which 
derive from their low education level. It is not an easy thing to make them understand all the 
related issues, and certainly not even complicated technical matters. Failing to apply suitable 
approaches as an attempt to help them overcome their education level limit and get to 
understand the issues can easily lead to project failure.  
The fourth challenge is the attitude, education level and capacities of local officers when 
encouraging the ultimate beneficiaries to participate. Again, in Vietnam, many local officers 
do not provide the beneficiaries with adequate information about the project and thus make 
the beneficiaries feel unclear what the project is about. Some officers have the viewpoint to 
have a meeting with people is to inform them what has/have been decided, not to discuss 
with them, because they think that the beneficiaries’ opinions are unimportant. Some officers 
have not really understood the significance of the ultimate beneficiaries’ participation in the 
project, and have limited wish to encourage people to participate because such a task 
consumes much time and labour. Some officers also have low education level, so they do not 
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even understand what an aid intervention or a project is about. Some project experts have the 
common experience that sometimes, it is much harder and more time-consuming to render 
the local officers understand the issues and get them fully involved in their assigned tasks 
than to motivate the ultimate beneficiaries to participate in a project.  
Last but not least: the participation policies of the international aid organisations. Very often 
they, particularly the Governmental Organisations, stress the participation of the partner 
authoritative institutions and do not pay much attention to that of the ultimate beneficiaries. 
Many of them do not have clear policies regarding when and to what level the ultimate 
beneficiaries should participate. If the aid organisations themselves have no such policies, 
the partner authoritative institutions intentionally “ignore” to mention the participation of the 
ultimate beneficiaries, and the participation of the ultimate beneficiaries is not clearly 
defined and clarified in the project document, there will accordingly be no chance for the 
ultimate beneficiaries to participate.  
5.1.5. To enhance the efficient engagement of Danida’s local staff in the Identification 
and Preparation phase 
The improvement of the sustainability of Việt Trì Project could have been realised by a more 
sufficient and efficient engagement of Danida’s local staffs during the Identification and 
Preparation phase. At the interview with Mr. ðào Nhất ðịnh, national programme officer of 
the Royal Danish Embassy in Hanoi, I was told that the embassy mostly communicated with 
the provincial departments and only visited some industrial utilities and hospitals during the 
preparation phase. In fact, a direct communication with all the ultimate beneficiaries and/or 
their representatives would have helped the local staff know what their actual needs and 
wishes were, what proposed components and/or activities were necessary and unnecessary, if 
and how the ultimate beneficiaries should participate in the project activities, etc.  
5.1.6. What are the advantages and challenges of the recommendations in Danida’s 
specific context? 
Advantages: there are four main advantages.   
1) In Vietnam, participation of people at grassroots level was discussed and recognised 
officially in 1998 when the Grassroots Democracy Decree regulating the implementation of 
democracy at the lowest administrative levels was promulgated. According to the Decree, 
the communal authorities have the obligation to inform the people the issues that they have 
the right to know, to discuss and decide directly, to be consulted with before the state bodies 
make a decision, and to supervise. The Decree is a step forward to improve transparency in 
the political decision-making process, and simultaneously opens opportunities for 
international aid organisations implementing development projects and programmes in 
Vietnam (including Danida) to communicate directly with the ultimate beneficiaries at not 
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only communal but also village level. The conversation with the national programme officer 
of Sida and the interview with the program support manager of Plan International confirm 
the positive effect of the Decree on their activities in Vietnam. In addition, in the national 
Socio-economic Development Plan for the 2006-2010 period, the intention to “improve 
people’s participation in policy-making for projects, programmes, for poverty reduction and 
hunger elimination mechanism and policies” was also highlighted (Ministry of Planning and 
Investment 2005:84). 
2) When I interviewed with the officers of Plan International and the other project experts 
listed in the List of interviewees, and especially when I talked to the market representatives 
and the hospital officers, I got a very clear impression that the ultimate beneficiaries have a 
very strong desire to be respected, to be consulted in and to decide the issues directly relate 
to them instead of being decided by the authoritative bodies. They, in other words, would 
like to be a part of the project concerned and have influence on it. Another good news is 
none of the interviewees has ever experienced that participation of the ultimate beneficiaries 
delays or prolongs a project’s duration, and that the process of encouraging them to 
participate in a project takes a long time. Plan International in Phú Thọ province, for 
example, consults in the ultimate beneficiaries (also termed as “the community”) by 
organising two meetings a year at each commune and one session for each meeting while 
Mr. Nguyễn Quang Phước - coordinator of Care International in Cà Mau Province - 
experiences that participatory workshop approach is an efficient method to engage the 
ultimate beneficiaries and it normally takes one to a few days depending on the number of 
beneficiaries, not weeks or even months.  
3) Danida has adopted a zero-tolerance policy against corruption and bribery which is 
expressed very clearly in “Danida’s Action Plan against Corruption 2003-2008” (Action 
Plan) and the Anti-corruption Code of Conduct launched in 2004. The Action Plan targets at 
preventing corruption within Danida aid delivery system, preventing corruption in the use of 
development aid provided by Denmark, and helping combat corruption in the countries that 
receive Danish development aid. It has been practised in Danida’s partner countries incl. 
Vietnam which, in accordance with Danida’s Annual Anti-corruption Report 2004, was 
involved in three specific activities: support the design of national anti-corruption 
plans/strategies/programmes and the implementation of the plans/strategies/programmes, 
support the improvement of governance in the public administration at central and lower 
levels, and support legal and judiciary reforms (Danida 2004:11). The Anti-corruption Code 
of Conduct has also been practised in Danida’s partner countries and embassies.  
4) After the recent scandal of PMU18, the international community (i.e. international aid 
organisations) has been paying more attention to corruption problems in connection with 
development aid in Vietnam and pressing the Vietnamese government to undertake concrete 
action programmes to curb corruption, and to keep them informed of what have been done 
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and how. The international community has even threatened to withdraw their support to 
Vietnam if the Vietnamese government fails to make efficient efforts of fighting against 
corruption.  
Challenges: there are two main challenges.  
1) Danida has so far been more familiar with top-down approach rather than bottom-up. 
Top-down here can be understood as either “donor-driven”, “Vietnamese authority-driven” 
or a combination of both. Even though the mentioned 1998 Grassroots Democracy Decree 
has been practised by international aid organisations, Danida still does not know about it 
(Interview with Mr. ðào Nhất ðịnh).  
2) Danida has a very automatic rule about administration spending, namely the number of 
Danida’s staffs engaged in its programmes and projects is limited to the minimum. For a 
five-year programme like DEA-Vietnam, there were only the counsellor and a national 
programme officer involved. Mr. ðào Nhất ðịnh told me at the interview that a new policy 
about reducing administration costs had been put into practice by gathering all projects in 
one programme and sharing the management responsibilities with the counterpart by 
empowering the Vietnamese ministries to function “as the manager and beneficiary of a 
project” and Danida itself “will only take care of support and money transfer”. By doing so, 
Danida believes that the ownership of the Vietnamese counterpart will be enhanced. 
Whether this belief will come true is still an open question. What has been learnt from the 
interview with an official in Phú Thọ implies that the new power that the Vietnamese 
ministries have been given potentially strengthens corruption practices at the highest 
administrative level.  
5.2. Conclusions 
The main conclusions from the research are as follows.  
As far as Việt Trì Project and other DEA-Vietnam projects are concerned, project 
sustainability was touched upon at a general level in Danida’s working tools. An 
examination of the Guidelines for Sector Programme Support and the Evaluation Guidelines 
has shown that sustainability is not a key and well-reflected matter. As I analysed in the 
theoretical discussion about project sustainability, Danida has no clear statement of financial 
sustainability, institutional sustainability and social sustainability, as well as what to be done 
to obtain these dimensions. Even though technical sustainability and environmental 
sustainability are defined, it is not clear how they are going to be achieved. Furthermore, 
corruption is a very important factor which can seriously affect project sustainability, but it 
is not integrated in Danida’s sustainability guidelines.  
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The fieldwork in Phú Thọ province has played a crucial role to the research and I trust that 
the same results could not have attained if I had only relied on the available project 
documents, especially the completion report in which both Danida and the authoritative 
counterpart are satisfied with the achieved fruits. It was very useful to see reality of the 
outcomes of Việt Trì Project with my own eyes and assess them, and talk to the 
representatives of the implementing agency and the ultimate beneficiaries. I experienced a 
very complex picture where Phú Thọ Provincial People’s Committee (Phú Thọ PPC) is 
powerful and decides the participation of the end beneficiaries, a number of ultimate 
beneficiaries seemed not to have their voice in what would to be decided by Phú Thọ PPC 
and thus were disappointed with their marginalisation from the activities concerned, Danida 
was too far away from their reach, and there was a big language barrier for free 
communication between them and the Senior Technical Advisor. This picture is significant 
to the sustainability of Việt Trì Project, yet it was by no means reflected in the completion 
report.  
The professional experiences shared by Plan International and the project experts (listed in 
the List of interviewees and List of corresponded people) were useful for the analysis of Việt 
Trì Project’s sustainability problems, especially the analysis of the ultimate beneficiaries’ 
participation. As mentioned in the subsection about the empirical backgrounds, both Plan 
International and the project experts are familiar with community-based projects and 
programmes. They know about the problems of working the ultimate beneficiaries and the 
strategies to work with them effectively and sustainably. Though it may not be easy for 
Danida to approach the ultimate beneficiaries in the same way, such experiences are still 
worth being discussed and learnt.  
To talk about corruption in general and corruption in connection with development projects 
is a taboo in Phú Thọ province. At an interview with one of Phú Thọ’s officials, for instance, 
I was requested to turn off the Dictaphone when he should like to tell me some details about 
corruption at local and national levels. Or at some interviews with the ultimate beneficiaries, 
the interviewees felt very uncomfortable to touch upon the issue. Either they requested me to 
turn off the Dictaphone or to promise not mentioning what they have told me in my thesis.  
5.3. Research Perspectives 
After having studied the sustainability of Việt Trì Project, I realise that there are some 
perspectives to do further researches in Phú Thọ province particularly and in Vietnam 
generally. The two perspectives presented below are regarded as the most relevant ones.  
The first perspective is to make a comparative study of the sustainability measures of 
DEA-Vietnam and the new environmental programme titled “Vietnam-Denmark 
Development Cooperation in the Environment Sector 2005 – 2010” (DCES) launched in 
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September 2005. At an interview with Mr. Jens Lorentzen, Chief Advisor of Danida’s 
Centre for Competence Development, in January 2006, I had the impression that the 
sustainability of DEA-Vietnam was not as expected because Danida was practising the 
project-by-project approach at that time, namely funds were programmed annually and not 
as a comprehensive programme with components. From Mr. Jens Lorentzen’s viewpoint, 
project-by-project approach of DEA-Vietnam is less sustainable and has less impact than the 
programmatic approach of DCES that Danida has been following. It is of course interesting 
to study the new approach and its effects on the sustainability of DCES vis-à-vis DEA-
Vietnam.   
The second perspective relates to the conflict of interests among these three stakeholders: 
Danida, the Vietnamese ministries, and the Vietnamese local counterpart. As I have 
explained earlier, Danida is interested in diminishing its administration costs at the embassy 
by withdrawing considerably from programme management position and thereby 
empowering the Vietnamese ministries to undertake this task. The Vietnamese ministries are 
interested in having the full power of deciding programme beneficiaries and selecting the 
location and the implementing agencies they prefer (even though the selected implementing 
agencies are sometimes not the right ones to implement the programme activities), whereas 
the Vietnamese local counterpart is occupied by communicating directly with Danida as 
regards location and implementing agency selection and not via the ministries concerned.  A 
study could deal with how this conflict is going to influence the anti-corruption element 
and the benefits of the ultimate beneficiaries of Danida’s new programmes.  
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Annexes  
Annex 1.1: List of visited sites in Phú Thọ province  
 
Date  Site Address 
10.3.2006  Environmental Monitoring Station Nông Trang ward, Việt Trì city 
11.3.2006  Nông Trang market Nông Trang ward, Việt Trì city 
12.3.2006  Dầu market Diêu Lâu ward, Việt Trì city 
12.3.2006  Tân Dân market Tân Dân ward, Việt Trì city 
13.3.2006  Gia Cẩm market Gia Cẩm ward, Việt Trì city 
13.3.2006  Wastewater treatment plant at Phú 
Thọ Provincial General Hospital 
Tân Dân ward, Việt Trì city 
13.3.2006 Gát market Thọ Sơn ward, Việt Trì city 
14.3.2006  Wastewater treatment plant at Phú 
Thọ Town General Hospital  
Âu Cơ ward,, Phú Thọ town, Phú Thọ 
province 
14.3.2.006 Biogas plants (See also Annex 1.1.1) Tiên Cát ward, Việt Trì city 
15.3.2006 Việt Trì Chemical Company  Thọ Sơn ward, Việt Trì city 
15.3.2006 Trí ðức Company Ltd.  Hồng Hà St., Bến Gót ward, Việt Trì city  
15.3.2006 Biogas plants (See also Annex 1.1.1) Minh Nông commune, Việt Trì city 
17.3.2006 The Green Belt Hùng Vương boulevard, Việt Trì city 
Trần Phú street, Việt Trì city 
War soldiers’ cemetery of Việt Trì city 
17.3.2006 Việt Trì Plywood Company Hồng Hà St., Bến Gót ward, Việt Trì city 
18.3.2006 Vĩnh Phú Textile Company 
 
Hùng Vương boulevard, Nông Trang ward, 
Việt Trì city 
18.3.2006 Bạch Hạc market Bạch Hạc ward, Việt Trì city 
21.3.2.2006 Việt Trì Ceramic Company Hồng Hà St., Bến Gót ward, Việt Trì city 
21.3.2006 Vân Phú Domestic Wastes 
Recycling Plant  
Vân Phú commune, Việt Trì city 
22.3.2006 Minh Khai Tunnel Brick 
Manufactory  
Minh Phương commune, Việt Trì city 
22.3.2006 Việt Trì Food Processing Factory  Hồng Hà St., Bến Gót ward, Việt Trì city 
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Annex 1.1.1: List of visited households benefiting the biogas plants 
Households in Tiên Cát ward 
 
No. Full name Number of plant 
1 Cao Xuân Hưng 1 
2 ðinh Hồng Kha 2 
3 Lê Hồng Bện 1 
4 Lưu Văn Tập 1 
5 Nguyễn Ngọc ðính 1 
6 Nguyễn Văn Nghĩa 1 
 
Households in Minh Nông commune 
 
No. Full name Number of plant 
1 ðào Duy Hùng 1 
2 ðào Văn Thân 1 
3 ðào Văn Tiếp 1 
4 ðỗ Xuân Tám 1 
5 Lê Văn ðồng 1 
6 Lê Văn Thảo 1 
7 Nguyễn Văn Tân 1 
8 Nguyễn Văn Hậu 1 
9 Nguyễn Quốc Hoan 1 
10 Nguyễn Văn Nông 1 
11 Nguyễn Văn Hồng 1 
12 Nguyễn ðức Xuân 1 
13 Nguyễn Quang Sáng 1 
14 Nguyễn Văn Tiến 1 
15 Nguyễn Thị Hường 1 
16 Nguyễn Văn Lâm 1 
17 Nguyễn Văn ðường 1 
18 Nguyễn Quang Trung 1 
19 Phạm ðức Công 1 
20 Phạm Văn ðoàn 1 
21 Lê Văn Lợi 1 
22 Nguyễn Văn Lâm 1 
23 Nguyễn Thị Liên 1 
24 Nguyễn Văn Long 1 
25 Nguyễn Văn Bảo 1 
26 Nguyễn Văn Cường 1 
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Annex 1.2: List of interviewees 
 
Date & Time Name and position Contact information 
06.7.2005 
19.10.2005 
Mr. Morten Jørgensen 
Senior Technical Advisor of Việt Trì 
Project 
 
COWI A/S 
Parallelvej 2 
Kongens Lyngby 
Tel: (0045) 45972211 
Email: mjo@cowi.com   
05.01.2006, at 
14.00 
Mr. Jan Riemer 
Senior technical advisor in the 
Environment Group of the Technical 
Advisory Services 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Asiatisk Plads 2, Copenhagen K 
Tel: (0045) 33920219  
E-mail: janrie@um.dk   
08.01.2006, at 
10.00 
Mr. Jens Lorentzen 
Chief Advisor of Danida’s Centre for 
Competence Development 
12 Strandgade, Copenhagen K 
Tel: (0045) 49760028  
Email: jenlor@um.dk 
10.3.2006, at 
10.00 
Ms. Tạ Hồng Yến 
ISO 17025 technical specialist of the 
Environmental Monitoring Station 
(EMS) 
Phường Nông Trang, thành phố Việt 
Trì  
 
11.3.2006, at 
15.45 
Mr. Vũ Sứ Quý 
Vice team-leader of Nông Trang Market 
Management Team 
Chợ Nông Trang, phường Nông Trang, 
thành phố Việt Trì  
Tel: (0084-210) 847280 
12.3.2006, at 
11.00 
Mr. Lưu Hùng Lục 
Leader of Dầu Market Management 
Team 
Chợ Dầu, phường Dữu Lâu, thành phố 
Việt Trì  
Tel: (0084-210) 940532  
12.3.2006, at 
16.00 
Mr. Bùi ðức Ngọc 
Leader of Tân Dân Market Management 
Team 
Chợ Tân Dân, phường Tân Dân, thành 
phố Việt Trì  
Tel: (0084-210) 091 5 378232 
13.3.2006, at 
9.30 
Mr. Mai Ngọc Thắng 
Leader of Gia Cẩm Market 
Management Team 
Chợ Gia Cẩm, phường Gia Cẩm, thành 
phố Việt Trì  
Tel: (0084-210) 854249  
13.3.2006, lúc 
8.45 
Mr. Phạm Nhật Thịnh 
Head of the Administration Section of 
Phú Thọ Provincial General Hospital 
Phường Tân Dân, thành phố Việt Trì  
Tel: (0084-210) 846519  
13.3.2006, at 
14.00 
Mr. Lưu ðức Thắng 
Leader of Gát Market Management 
Team  
Chợ Gát, phường Thọ Sơn, thành phố 
Việt Trì  
Tel: (0084-210) 910531 
14.3.2006, at 
9.00 
Mr. Phạm Huy Thưởng 
Head of the Administration Section of 
Phú Thọ Town General Hospital 
Phường Âu Cơ, thị  xã Phú Thọ, tỉnh 
Phú Thọ  
Tel: (0084-210) 822311  
14.3.2.006, at 
15.30 
Mr. ðinh Hùng Kha – beneficiary of 
two biogas plants  
Phường Tiên Cát, thành phố Việt Trì  
15.3.2006, at 
8.30 
Mr. ðỗ Quốc Hội 
Technical vice-director of Việt Trì 
Chemical Company 
Phường Thọ Sơn, thành phố Việt Trì  
Tel: (0084-210) 911696 
15.3.2006, at 
10.00 
Mr. Phạm Văn Chính 
Technical manager of Trí ðức 
Company Ltd. 
ðường Hồng Hà, phường Bến Gót, 
thành phố Việt Trì  
Tel: (0084-210) 862626 
16.3.2006, at 
9.00 
Mr. Nguyễn Thế Yên, vice-director of 
Department of Industry  
ðường Châu Phong, thành phố Việt Trì  
Tel: (0084-210) 848510 
16.3.2006, at 
14.00 
Ms. ðỗ Huyền Bảo Ngọc 
Expert of Section of Economic and 
ðường Trần Phú, thành phố Việt Trì  
Tel: (0084-210) 848400 
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External Relations, Department of 
Planning and Investment 
16.3.2006, at 
15.00 
Mr. Nguyễn Bình Hoà 
Acting head of Phú Thọ Market 
Management Board 
Chợ Trung tâm, thành phố Việt Trì  
Tel: (0084-210) 811467  
17.3.2006, at 
10.30 
Mr. Phạm Văn Tính 
Specialist of Department of Health 
ðường Trần Phú, thành phố Việt Trì  
Tel: (0084-210) 846322  
17.3.2006, at 
14.00 
Mr. Vũ Chí Cần 
Technical manager of Việt Trì Plywood 
Company 
ðường Hồng Hà, phường Bến Gót, 
thành phố Việt Trì  
Tel: (0084-210) 862362 
18.3.2006, at 
7.00 
Mrs. Hoàng Thị Lê Hoan 
Technical manager of Vĩnh Phú Textile 
Company 
ðại  lộ  Hùng Vương, phường Nông 
Trang, thành phố Việt Trì  
Tel: (0084-210) 846409/841516  
20.3.2006, at 
13.30 
Mr. ðặng ðình Vượng 
Director of Department of Natural 
Resources and Environment 
ðường Nguyễn Tất Thành, phường Tân 
Dân, thành phố Việt Trì  
Tel: (0084-210) 856 889  
21.3.2.2006, at 
9.00 
Mr. Nguyễn Văn Minh 
Technical manager of Việt Trì Ceramic 
Company 
ðường Hồng Hà, phường Bến Gót, 
thành phố Việt Trì  
Tel: (0084-210) 846487  
21.3.2006, at 
10.00 
Mr. ðặng Xuân Tạo 
Technical and production planning 
officer of Vân Phú Domestic Wastes 
Recycling Plant 
Xã Vân Phú, thành phố Việt Trì  
Tel: (0084-210) 952799  
22.3.2006, at 
8.00 
Mr. ðỗ Thanh Tuấn 
Chief accountant of Minh Khai Tunnel 
Brick Manufactory 
Xã Minh Phương, thành phố Việt Trì  
Tel: (0084-210) 844920  
22.3.2006, at 
14.00 
Mr. Nguyễn Thanh Bình 
Shift chef of Việt Trì Food Processing 
Factory  
ðường Hồng Hà, phường Bến Gót, 
thành phố Việt Trì  
Tel: (0084-210) 844468  
28.3.2006, at 
15.00 
Mr. ðào Nhất ðịnh  
National programme officer of the 
Royal Danish Embassy 
19 ðiện Biên Phủ, Hanoi 
Tel: (0084-210) 8231888 
Email: nhadin@um.dk  
02.4.2006, at 
17.00  
Mr. Nguyễn Tất Thắng 
Former Manager of Việt Trì Project 
Phòng 503, Nhà A, Khu di dân Vĩnh 
Phúc, Phố  ðội Cấn, Hanoi 
Tel: (0084) 98 9 556756 
Email: nguyentat_kl@yahoo.co.uk  
07.4.2006, at 
14.00 
Mr. Peter Van Dommelen 
Program Support Manager of Plan 
International in Vietnam 
10th floor, Toà nhà thủ ñô, 72 Trần 
Hưng ðạo, Hanoi 
Tel:  (0084-4) 8220661  
Email: peter.vandommelen@plan-
international.org  
11.4.2006, at 
17.30 
Mr. Nguyễn Chiến Thắng 
Manager of Plan International Project 
Office in Phú Thọ 
 
Plan International Project Office in Phú 
Thọ, Tổ28, phường Tân Dân, thành phố 
Việt Trì Tel.: (0084) (210)940136 
Email: thang.nguyenchien@plan-
international.org  
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Annex 1.3: List of corresponded people 
 
Date  Name and position Contact information 
03.4.2006 Mr. Nguyễn ðức Tân 
Project officer and officer of Quảng Trị 
Provincial People’s Committee 
45 Hùng Vương St., ðông Hà town, 
Quảng Trị province 
Email: newsnow2603@yahoo.com  
07.4.2006 Mr. Nguyễn Quang Phước – Coordinator 
of Care International in Cà Mau Province 
191 Lý Thường Kiệt St., Ward 6, Cà Mau 
city 
Tel.: (0084-780) 567944    
Email: nqphuoc@carehcm.org  
07.6.2006 Mr. Morten Jørgensen, Senior Technical 
Advisor of Việt Trì Project  
COWI A/S 
Parallelvej 2 
Kongens Lyngby 
Tel: (0045) 45972211 
Email: mjo@cowi.com   
 
Annex 2.1: Checklist of Plan International’s economic and financial sustainability 
questions22 
 Can the project continue without further funding from Plan? 
 Does the community know for how long Plan will finance the project? 
 Is there a gradual reduction of Plan’s contribution to allow communities / other 
institutions to adjust to their own increasing responsibility? 
 Are the government / other institutions required to provide continued financing 
(and/or human resources, materials)?   
 What evidence is there that this commitment will be fulfilled (e.g. contractual 
agreement, previous experience)? 
 Is the community required to fund this project in the future? 
 Was the ongoing community contribution clearly explained during planning?  Were 
the community members involved in setting contribution levels required?  Are 
community members aware of their ongoing commitment? 
 What evidence has there been to date that the community can make financial 
contributions – e.g. capital contribution at start of project, regular contributions to 
other projects? 
 Can members of the community afford to contribute towards this project?  Are there 
mechanisms to ensure that the poorest can still benefit from the project? 
                                                
22 Plan International. 2002a. ETG 0.4 Program Sustainability in CPME Evaluation Technical Guides, pp. 3-4.  
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 Do cost recovery mechanisms include contributions for operational (including 
running costs and repair costs) and replacement costs if appropriate? 
 Does the community have access to markets/supplies required to sustain the project?   
 Are income-generating projects resulting in increased income among participants?  Is 
the increased income sufficient to justify the time/monetary commitment of 
participants?  Is the income sufficient after considering all future costs (including 
replacing equipment, travel costs, delivery costs originally covered by Plan)? 
 Is there long-term demand for the products of income generating projects? 
Annex 2.2: Checklist of Plan International’s institutional sustainability questions23 
 How does the political situation at the community, district or national level impact on 
the sustainability of the program? 
 Are community leaders and district/national politicians involved in Plan’s work? 
 Are the aims of the program/project consistent with what local leaders and 
district/national government are trying to achieve – e.g. is it consistent with current 
Government policy? 
 Is the project / program susceptible to a change in government or change in 
government policy? 
 Are Plan communities able to access and influence local government? 
 Has the project improved the community’s ability to access government (or other) 
funding? 
 Does the community have structures in place to manage project implementation (e.g. 
project development committee)?  Are roles and responsibilities clearly defined? 
 Is the community structure responsible for the management of Plan projects 
compatible with the established community leadership structure?   
 Does the community have the capacity to manage all aspects of project 
implementation?  If not, is Plan working to build this capacity of the community? 
 Has the community developed links with local government or other institutions for 
ongoing support/technical input – e.g. Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education, etc? 
                                                
23 Plan International. 2002a. ETG 0.4 Program Sustainability in CPME Evaluation Technical Guides, pp. 4-5.  
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 Are records kept in a format that is transparent and accessible to members of the 
community? 
 Does the community have a system to ensure that all contributions are made when 
required? 
 What has been the experience so far in getting the community to contribute – money, 
materials, labour - as required?  Have the community been able to solve problems 
that have arisen? 
 Does Plan monitor project performance and community management performance 
and assess (over time) the financial sustainability of the project? 
 Is the community (or other) contribution recognized in the project plan? 
Annex 2.3: Checklist of Plan International’s social sustainability questions24 
 What evidence is there that all target groups (women, men, girls, boys) support the 
project? – e.g. how were the community management committee selected? 
 How actively are these target groups involved and to what extent have they been 
consulted in project preparation? 
 Are community relations conducive to the continuation of the program goals?  Has 
the project caused any divisions in the community (social, political, religious)? 
 If the program has had an impact on cultural values or priorities (e.g. - education for 
girls, traditional circumcision practices), to what extent will this continue after Plan’s 
support is withdrawn? 
 How will the project/program ensure that the poorest/most marginalized have 
continued access to the program benefits? 
 Will the project lead to sustained and equitable access to women and men, girls and 
boys to the services and infrastructures? 
 
 
 
 
                                                
24 Plan International. 2002a. ETG 0.4 Program Sustainability in CPME Evaluation Technical Guides, pp. 4-5.  
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Annex 3.1: Further details of the provincial stakeholders 
Phú Thọ Provincial People’s Committee (Phú Thọ PPC), like any other Provincial 
People’s Committees belonging to the Vietnamese administrative system, is the highest day-
to-day executive authority at provincial level. It is elected by its corresponding People’s 
Council and is responsible for executing the Constitution, laws and written documents issued 
by upper echelons, and resolutions of its corresponding People’s Council. Its general 
obligations, responsibilities and rights are as follows (Le 2005:18-23).  
In the economic field  
 To make general socio-economic development planning, branch planning, and rural 
and urban development under its management; to make annual and long-term 
projects and plans in relation to provincial socio-economic development in 
submission to its corresponding People’s Council; 
 To participate in the division of economic zones; to implement ministerial and 
central-level programmes and projects in its territory; to organise and inspect the 
implementation of programmes and projects;  
 To draw up state budgetary revenue in the locality; to draw up the local revenues and 
expenditures; to plan for budget allocations in its territory andsubmit to its 
corresponding People’s Council for consideration and approval; the estimate of 
revenue budget at its level; to plan for budget adjustments in necessary cases; to draw 
the balance-sheet in the locality and submit to its corresponding People’s Council for 
consideration in line with provisions of law;  
 To supply concrete guidance to and inspect tax offices and budget-collecting bodies 
entrusted by the State, in line with provisions of law; 
 To set up projects on collecting charges and fees and  people’s financial contributions, 
and the level of capital mobilisation; submit the projects to its corresponding 
People’s Council for consideration and approval; 
 To set up projects on decentralising investments in the construction of socio-
economic infrastructures of the locality in line with provisions of law and submit the 
projects to its corresponding People’s Council for consideration and approval; 
organise and supply concrete guidance to the implementation of the approved 
projects; 
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 To establish a financial contingency fund in accordance with provisions of law, 
submit to its corresponding People’s Council and report to the financial organ of 
higher level. 
In land field 
 To make plans for land use in submission to its corresponding People’s Council for 
approval; to adopt planning and plans on land use of People’s Committees under its 
jurisdiction; to decide land allocation, recovery and rent; to solve land disputes; to 
inspect land management and use, and some other tasks in accordance with 
provisions of law; 
In the fields of industry and minor handicrafts  
 To make plans for the development of industry and minor handicrafts in the locality; 
to organise the state management on industry and minor handicrafts enterprises in the 
locality under its jurisdiction; 
 To organise the implementation of programmes and projects on developing industry, 
construction, industrial zones, processing zones, planned economic zones; to supply 
concrete guidance to and inspect the construction and development of industrial, 
commercial, services and tourist complexes, branches, occupations and traditional 
occupational villages in the locality; to develop foundations for processing 
agricultural-forestry-fishery produces and other industrial foundations; 
 To organise the implementation of protecting unexploited natural resources and 
minerals in the locality.  
In the fields of construction and urban development and management 
 To organise the establishment, submission for approval, or consideration for approval 
by jurisdiction plans on building zones, urban areas in the locality; to manage the 
architecture, construction and construction land; to adopt plans and investment 
projects on construction works in line with its jurisdiction; to administer the 
construction and issue construction permits in the locality; 
 To manage the investment, exploitation and utilisation of urban infrastructure 
technical works, urban areas, populated areas in rural areas; to administer the 
implementation of policies on housing and residential land; to administer public 
houses; 
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 To make plans for developing construction materials; to administer the exploitation, 
production and selling and buying of construction materials in the locality in line 
with its jurisdiction. 
In the fields of health and social issues 
 To administer the activities of provincial health units and issue health and 
pharmaceutical operation permits for individuals; 
 To supply concrete guidance to and inspect the implementation of measures of 
protecting people’s health, caring for elder people, the disabled and homeless 
orphans; to protect and take care of mothers and children; to implement population 
and family planning policies; 
 To supply concrete guidance to and inspect the implementation of policies and 
privileged regulations for war invalids, sick soldiers, martyrs’ families, people and 
family to whom the country is indebted;  
 To carry out plans and measures of using labours and solving employment-related 
problems; to figure out unemployment problems; 
 To carry out policies on labour protection, social insurance and aid, hunger 
elimination, poverty reduction and improvement of living conditions for people; to 
give guidance to the implementation of charitable and humanitarian work; to prevent 
and fight against social evils and epidemics in the locality. 
In the fields of science, technology, natural resources and environment  
 To supply concrete guidance to and inspect the implementation of concrete tasks and 
plans relating to science and technology development, and environmental protection; 
to implement measures of encouraging researches, promoting technological 
improvement initiatives, applying technological and scientific advances to production 
and life; 
 To supply concrete guidance to and inspect the implementation of measures relating 
to the management and utilisation of land, forests and mountains, rivers and lakes, 
water sources, underground natural resources, sea beneficial sources in the locality in 
accordance with provisions of law; 
 To supply concrete guidance to, organise the implementation of and suspect the 
protection and improvement of environment; preventing, fighting against and 
rehabilitating consequences of natural disasters, storms, floods, environmental 
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pollutions and degradation; to define responsibilities of organisations and individuals 
connected with environmental problems in accordance with provisions of law; 
 To administer scientific research projects and programmes at provincial level or 
assigned by upper echelons; to administer the technological transfer activities; to 
participate in making a state expertise on technology in relation to important 
investment projects in the locality; 
 To supply concrete guidance to, investigate and inspect the implementation 
provisions of law with reference to measurement standards and product quality; 
radiation safety and control; industrial possession; execution of policies and laws on 
science, technology and environmental protection in the locality; prevention of 
producing and circulating on the market false or bad-quality commodities. 
Department of Science, Technology and Environment (DoSTE); Department of Planning 
and Investment (DPI); Department of Health (DoH); Department of Industry (DoI); 
Department of Labour, Invalid Soldiers and Social Affairs (DoLISSA); and Department of 
Construction (DoC) are provincial line representatives (cơ  quan chuyên môn) acting as 
advising bodies to Phú Thọ PPC in accordance with their functions, obligations and rights. 
They assist Phú Thọ PPC in realising state management tasks within Phú Thọ province and 
ensuring a unified management of the concerned sector from national to local level. All these 
departments operate under the overall and direct supervision of Phú Thọ PPC, and 
simultaneously under the steering, instruction and professional monitoring of their line 
ministry.  
According to Government Decree No.171/2004/ND-CP regulating the organisational 
structure of line representatives of People’s Committees of Provinces and Municipalities, 
provincial line representatives have the following fundamental duties and rights (Le 
2005:27-28): 
 To propose their corresponding People’s Committee to issue decisions and 
instructions related to their assigned tasks; 
 To submit to their corresponding People’s Committee projects; annual, 5-year 
and long-term plans; 
 To submit to their corresponding People’s Committee programmes and measures 
of implementing the assigned administrative reform tasks; 
 To submit to their corresponding People’s Committee decisions concerning the 
establishment, merging or disintegration of their sub-units; 
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 To propose their corresponding People’s Committee to issue standards and titles 
for directors and vice-directors of line representatives of districts, precincts, 
towns and cities; 
 To organise the implementation of legal documents, projects, plans; 
 To organise the implementation and take responsibility of making a valuation, 
registering, issuing permits, diplomas and certificates in accordance with 
provisions of law or the assignment or entrustment of their  corresponding 
People’s Committee;  
 To help their corresponding People’s Committee in managing and supervising 
enterprises, collective economic organisations, individual economic organisations, 
civil societies and NGOs; 
 To take care of international cooperation in accordance with provisions of law or 
the assignment or entrustment of their corresponding People’s Committee; 
 To chair or coordinate with Department of Home Affairs and Department of 
Finance to inspect and instruct the self-reliance and self-responsible mechanism 
of units under their jurisdiction; 
 To carry out researches and applications of science and technology advances;  
 To solve claims and accusations; 
 To regulate functions, obligations and rights of offices, professional divisions and 
career units under their jurisdiction.   
Here I would like to note that until 2003, Department of Science, Technology and 
Environment (DoSTE) was responsible for doing researches, transferring and applying 
scientific and technological advances into practice, managing water and mineral resources, 
environmental-related issues, hydrometeorology, and surveying. In 2003, however, DoSTE 
was divided into two different departments: Department of Science and Technology (DoST), 
and Department of Natural Resources and Environment (DoNRE). Since then, DoST has 
only been having the responsibility of doing researches, transferring and applying scientific 
and technological advances into practice, whereas DoNRE is assigned to take care of 
managing land-water-mineral resources, environmental-related issues, hydrometeorology, 
and surveying  (People’s Committee of Phú Thọ Province 2006:91-100).  
The Management Board of Phú Thọ Industrial Zones is the body that was set up in 1997 
and has the authority of monitoring all industrial zones located in Phú Thọ province. It 
assists domestic and international investors in terms of legal procedures; receives, considers 
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and approve projects; issues, allocates or withdraws investment licences; organises the 
implementation of the ratified projects and supervise the activities of enterprises located in 
the industrial zones.  
Phú Thọ Provincial General Hospital was founded in 
1964. It is located in Tân Dân ward, Việt Trì city, and is 
under the direct management of Department of Health. It 
has 28 departments and divisions and more than 500 
employees (Interview with Mr. Phạm Nhật Thịnh, head 
of the Administration Section, Phú Thọ Provincial 
General Hospital), and is capable of receiving 850-900 
patients per day, 750-800 of whom are in-patients.25  
 
Being located in Âu Cơ ward, Phú Thọ town, Phú Thọ Town General Hospital was set up 
under the French colonial period and is, like Phú Thọ Provincial General Hospital, directly 
administered Department of Health. It has 20 departments and 230 employees, and is 
capable of serving 230 patients per day even though the actual number of daily patients is 
always up to 270 and 300 (Interview with Mr. Phạm Huy Thưởng, head of the 
Administration Section, Phú Thọ Town General Hospital).  
There were 13 district hospitals, clinics and health care centres selected to participate in 
Việt Trì Project, but their participation was very little, not as Phú Thọ Provincial General 
Hospital and Phú Thọ Town General Hospital’s.  
Phú Thọ Environmental Monitoring Station is based in Gia Cẩm ward, Việt Trì city, and 
administered by Phú Thọ DoNRE. It has three Divisions: Division of General 
Administration and Planning, Division of Environmental Analysis and Monitoring, and 
Division of Environmental Management. The key functions, obligations and rights of the 
Station are to periodically monitor, supervise and control environmental data both in the 
province and the neighbouring area; to collect and archive environmental data and database; 
to carry out environmental statistical surveys; analyse the environmental status quo and 
make solution proposals; to organise environmental consultation and technological transfer 
activities; etc. (Ủy ban nhân dân tỉnh Phú Thọ 2005).  
Hữu Nghị Soldering Manufactory is located in Nông Trang ward, Việt Trì city and owned 
by the Financial and Administration Section of Phú Thọ Provincial People’s Committee. The 
Manufactory has two similar production lines which produce solders of all types, and 
automatic and semi-automatic welding wires. Major environmental problems are high 
emissions of dust and noise (Viet Nam Cleaner Production Centre 2004b:1).  
                                                
25http://www.baophutho.org.vn/baophutho/vn/website/tin%2Dtuc%2Dsu%2Dkien/100CFB8155A/2007/12/109
9A057BBE/  
Phú Thọ Provincial General 
Hospital 
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Minh Khai Tunnel Brick Manufactory (henceforth: 
Minh Khai Manufactory) is a subsidiary of Phú Thọ 
House Construction and Development Company and was 
established in 1958 in Minh Phương commune, Việt Trì 
city. Before 1998, Minh Khai Manufactory was producing 
bricks and tiles using vertical shaft kiln, but since 1998, 
Minh Khai Manufactory has been focusing on producing 
2-hole bricks using tunnel kiln (tunnel bricks for short) 
thanks to the installation of a semi-automatic brick 
production system.  
The new system has positively changed the production capacity at Minh Khai Manufactory, 
from 3 to 5 million pieces to 18 million pieces per year. Main production inputs are clay dust, 
electricity and clay. Major environmental problems at Minh Khai Manufactory are 
accumulated wastes deriving from broken bricks and redundant clay; CO and SO2, which are 
not by any means filtered before they are discharged to the air; gases, which used to burn the 
rice fields nearby; and dust (Viet Nam Cleaner Production Centre 2004a:2&7).  
Nghĩa Hưng Cotton-Yarn Company Ltd. was set up in 1996 and is located in Minh 
Phương commune, Việt Trì city. The company produces low-grade yarn from fibre wastes 
imported from textile and garment companies in the northern Vietnam, and paper tubes with 
diameters from 20 mm to110 mm in form of cone shape and cylinder. The main environmental 
problem of the company is high concentration of dust, which is 1.45 times higher than 
Ministry of Health’s allowed standard (Viet Nam Cleaner Production Centre 2004b:3&4). 
Sông Lô Ship-building Factory is a public enterprise owned by Việt Nam Shipping 
Industry Company, Ministry of Transportation. The factory was constructed in Dữu Lâu 
commune, Việt Trì city in 1969 and put into use in 1975. It has three yards: wood shell 
building yard, steel shell building yard, and mechanic-machine yard, which produce 400 
DWT freighters, passenger boats, tourist boats, ferries, 200-600 DWT barges, ship 
accessories, and steel compositions serving industrial-agricultural purposes; and repairs 
freighters, barges, and ferries. The most serious environmental problem faced by the factory 
is sand dust, which is just blasted in the open air without any shielding or dust suction, 
affecting the workers/ heath and the residents living nearby (Viet Nam Cleaner Production 
Centre 2004j:1&2). 
Trí ðức Company Ltd. was established in 1995 and is located in Bến Gót ward, Việt Trì city 
with 412 employees. At the beginning, the company had 20 weaving machines and 30 
employees. In 2000, the company bought and installed an integrated production line from 
yarning, weaving to dying and other fabric finishing processes. Main production inputs are 
Minh Khai Manufactory under 
production 
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polyester fibre (PE fibre), chemicals (silicate and soda), coal, electricity, DO oil, lubricant, 
gas, and water.  
Primary products of the company are grey fabric, 
and bleached and dyed fabric, whose total capacity 
was approx. 1,230,000 tons in 2003, yarn, whose 
total capacity was approx. 460,000 kilos in the same 
year. The company’s main solid wastes are cinders; 
such gases as CO2, NO, SO2, and H2S; and 
wastewater containing BOD5 and COD
26.  
Việt Trì Ceramic Company was set up in 1974 and is 
affiliated to Viet Nam Glass and Ceramic for 
Construction Corporation. Being located in Tiên Cát 
ward, Việt Trì city, the company has been producing 
such advanced ceramic products such as tiles, lavatories, 
wash basins, accessories, etc. with “Viglacera” 
trademark. Main inputs for production activities are clay, 
fenspat, China clay, quartz, gas, electricity, water, and 
other additives.  
Primary solid wastes are from the clay, whose daily volume is about 2 tons, which are partly 
buried and partly given to a pagoda in the neighbourhood for serving construction purpose. 
Basic gases are CO, CO2, NO, SO2, and NO2. Wastewater, whose average volume is 20 m
3 
per day and night, contains BOD5, COD, Fe, Al, Zn, Cr, Ba, and suspended matters. It passes 
micro-organic treatment before flowing to the lake nearby. The current number of employees 
at the company is 37827 (See Annex 4.3 for pictures of the company).  
Việt Trì Chemical Company was founded by China’s 
support in Thọ Sơn ward, Việt Trì city in 1961 on an 
area of about 11 ha. It produces liquid NaOH 100% 
(6,000 tons/year), HCl 31% (11,000 tons/year), liquid Cl2 
(1,000 tons/year), javel solution 7% (4,500 tons/year), 
CaCl2 powder (2,500 tons/year), detergent (4,000  
tons/year), NPK fertilizer (7,000 tons/year), and Na2SiO3 (2,000 tons/year).  
                                                
26 Interview with Mr. Phạm Văn Chính, technical manager of Trí ðức Textile Company Ltd.; Viet Nam 
Cleaner Production Centre. 2004c:3&6; Trí ðức Textile Company Ltd. 2005:1-3. 
27 Interview with Mr. Nguyễn Văn Minh, technical manager of Việt Trì Ceramic Company; Việt Trì Ceramic 
Company. 2004:2-5.  
 
Completed ceramic products at 
Việt Trì Ceramic Company 
 
 
The backyard of Việt Trì Chemical 
Company is congested by cinders 
 
Trí ðức Company Ltd. under 
production 
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The main production line, however, is NaOH-Cl2 based upon the electrolysis of NaCl, 
Javelle water and HCl. Key resources and raw materials which have been used for 
production activities are coal; such chemicals as NaCl, Na2CO3, Lah, Na2SO4, NPK 
fertilizer, urea, MAP; DO + FO oil, electricity; and water. The company is facing a serious 
problem with accumulated solid wastes mainly deriving from cinders, whose daily volume 
is about 3.5 tons. Due to lack of a treatment place in the locality, the company has been 
solving the solid wastes by partly burying them and partly let them accumulate in the back-
yard of the company (Viet Nam Cleaner Production Centre 2004e:3).  
Việt Trì Food Processing Factory is the precursor of 
Việt Trì Vermicelli and Noodles Factory. It was 
constructed in Thọ Sơn ward, Việt Trì city in June 1962 
on the basis of China’s support. At the beginning, the 
main products composed of green bean vermicelli, 
monosodium glutamate, noodles, soya sauce, and shrimp 
chips for export. In 1989, the factory cooperated with 
Hải Hà Confectionery and focused on the production of 
hard and soft sweets.  
The factory was merged with Hải Hà Confectionery in 1994 and has expanded and 
diversified the production since then. Today, there are two soft sweet production lines, one 
glucose production line, one jelly (a kind of sweet) production line, one instant noodles 
production line, and one starch paper production line at the factory. Main production inputs 
are granulated sugar, imported glucose, starch, cassava, oil, coal, electricity, and water.  At 
the factory, 50% of wastewater, which mainly contains BOD5, COD and suspended matters, 
is reused. The rest is not treated and just discharged to the nearest river. Emitted gases are 
CO, SO2, and NO2. Solid wastes are partly collected by Việt Trì URENCO and partly sold 
(Việt Trì Food Processing Factory 2004:2&8).  
Việt Trì Plywood Company is located in Bến Gót ward, 
Việt Trì city and is possessed by Thái Nguyên Woodchip 
Board Company. The two main products of the company 
are fibreboards, whose annual production capacity is 
10,000 m3, and woodchip-boards, whose annual 
production capacity is 2,000m3. Main production inputs 
are wood, urea adhesive 51%, ammonium chloride, 
paraffin 20%, CaCO3 powder, sand paper, oil, coal,  
 
Sweet processing at Việt Trì 
Food Processing Factory 
 
The reservoir where all the 
wastewater is gathered and 
receives preliminary treatment 
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electricity, and water. The wood powder deriving from the section fibreboard production 
lines, the wood dust coming from woodchip-boards drying activities, phenol formaldehyde, 
and other chemicals whose pH, BOD5, COD, and SS values exceed the allowed level are 
primary environmental problems at the company (Viet Nam Cleaner Production Centre 
2004m:1&6).  
Viger Brewery is a public enterprise and owned by Sugarcane Corporation No. 1, Ministry 
of Agriculture and Rural Development. Key products are beer in kegs, alcohol 96%, liquor 
of different types, and candy. Beer production at the brewery generates a large volume of 
wastewater - on evarage10 litre of waste water/ litre of beer. Wastewater contains a large 
amount of basically suspended matters, nitrogen, phosphorus, COD, and BOD. Main solid 
wastes are from grains and yeast, packages, labels, spoilt plastic bags, broken bottles, and 
domestic wastes. The spent grains are used as feed while the other wastes are collected by 
Việt Trì URENCO. Gases encompass CO, CO2, NO, NOx, SO2, etc. (Viet Nam Cleaner 
Production Centre 2004f :3-14). 
Vĩnh Phú Plastic Joint-Venture Company was established in Bến Gót ward, Việt Trì city 
in 1995 as a result of the partnership between Sông Lô Trading Company (Vietnam) and 
Sung Lip (South Korea). Main products of the company are PVC (Polyvinyl chloride) carpet, 
whose production capacity is 7.2 million metres per annum, and PVC plastered cloth, whose 
production capacity is 6 million metres per annum. At the company, the dust and organic 
solvent vapour in the workshop seem to be the most severe problems since they directly 
affect the workers’ health (Viet Nam Cleaner Production Centre. 2004o:1-3).  
Vĩnh Phú Textile Company was founded in Nông 
Trang ward, Việt Trì city at the beginning of the 70s with 
the assistance of the Chinese government and is today a 
member of Việt Nam Textile Corporation. The company 
has three member factories: yarn factory, weaving 
factory, and dying factory. Main products of the 
company are yarn (capacity approx. 4,000 tons/year), 
grey fabric (capacity approx. 5 million m2/year), finished 
fabric (capacity approx. 5 million m2/year), and finished 
towels (capacity approx. 200 tons/year).  
Primary production inputs are cotton, PE fibre, dye, DO oil, coal dust, gas, electricity, and 
water; whereas the outputs include yarn of all types, grey fabric and grey towel. Solid wastes 
are fundamentally fibrous particles and cinders, whose daily volume is about 1.2 tons. 
Wastewater (800-1000 m3/day and night) which contains different kinds of chemicals is 
treated in microbiological tanks before being discharged to the Red River. Dust in the 
 
Wastewater of the company is 
treated in a microbiological tank  
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production workshops and gases are the next serious problems at the factory (Viet Nam 
Textile Corporation-Vĩnh Phú Textile Company 2003:1-3).  
Annex 3.2: Further information about Việt Trì People’s Committee, Việt Trì Urban 
Environmental Company, and the six urban markets 
Việt Trì People’s Committee (Việt Trì PC) is the highest day-to-day executive authority at 
local (city) level. It is elected by the corresponding People’s Council and is responsible for 
executing the Constitution, laws and written documents issued by upper echelons incl. the 
provincial, and resolutions of its corresponding People’s Council.  
Việt Trì Urban Environmental Company (URENCO) used to be a public enterprise and is 
today equitilised. It was established to provide Việt Trì city with such fundamental public 
services as street lightening, cleaning of streets and parks, collection of domestic wastes, 
planting of trees on the streets and parks, and maintenance of drains and sewers. Operation 
budget relies mostly on the collected sanitary and environmental fees.  
Bạch Hạc market almost did not exist until Việt Trì 
Project was launched. There were no basic buildings, 
stalls or vendors by the time the project proposal was 
made, submitted and approved (Informal conversations 
with Bạch Hạc market vendors). That is, a number of 
vendors doing temporary business like selling fresh meat, 
vegetables, spices, etc. around the existing Bạch Hạc 
market area was moved in after the market construction 
had been completed.  
Nowadays, Bạch Hạc market is under the management of the People’s Committee of Bạch 
Hạc ward. It’s located in a residential area and very near to a river. The sanitary conditions at 
the market are very poor.  
Dầu market is a kind of traditional market formed many 
years ago and located nearby a cultivation area. Before 
the existence of Việt Trì Project, all market vendors were 
sitting on the soil floor to do business. Some of them 
made temporary stalls for sun and rain protection. There 
were no toilets, no water and electricity supplies, and no 
fire prevention and control system.  
People gathered at the market only in the morning, and especially on the 2nd, 5th, 7th and 10th 
of the month – a very special local cultural choice which has almost no clear explanation. 
 
Fresh meat vendors of Bạch Hạc 
market 
 
 
The fish and seafood vendors of 
Dầu market 
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Today, Dầu market is under the management of the People’s Committee of Dữu Lâu ward, 
who appointed the so-called Dầu Market Management Board to take care of the daily 
supervision and management (Interview with Mr. Lưu Hùng Lục, head of Dầu Market 
Management Board).  
Gát market is a large market with 6,130 m2 in terms of 
area. The market is located in Thọ Sơn ward and has 
existed for many years. The business capacity of the 
market has however weakened since 1996 due to the fact 
that too many smaller temporary markets in the 
neighbourhood have come into existence. About 60% of 
the total area has been left unoccupied for several years, 
and it seems like more and more vendors tend to move 
out whereas fewer and fewer customers to visit the 
market.  
Before the Việt Trì Project’s intervention, there were water-electricity supplies and fire 
prevention control system, yet the sanitary conditions at the market were very poor, and 
there was no toilet either. Together with Gia Cẩm and Nông Trang markets, Gát market is 
under the overall management of Phú Thọ Provincial Market Management Board (Interview 
with Mr. Lưu ðức Thắng, leader of Gát Market Management Team).  
Gia Cẩm market is one of the central markets of Việt 
Trì city located on an area of about 2,000 m2 in Gia Cẩm 
ward. The market has existed since 1995 and has always 
been crowded with vendors and customers thanks to the 
central location, the high concentration of residents, and 
especially the higher income level of its customers vis-à-
vis that of customers at other markets.  
Before the intervention of Việt Trì Project in 2004, there were some buildings with divided 
stalls, limited water-electricity supply and fire prevention and control system at the market, 
yet no toilet, no concretised floors, and especially no water supply for the fresh meat vendors. 
Gia Cẩm market is under the daily supervision and management Gia Cẩm Market 
Management Team (Interview with Mr. Mai Ngọc Thắng, leader of Gia Cẩm Market 
Management Team).  
Nông Trang market was set up in 1985 as a temporary, unstable and small market located 
in Nông Trang ward. During the formation process, it was upgraded gradually by Việt Trì 
city’s related authorities. Today, the market has a total area of about 7,000 m2 with a big 
 
The food vendors of Gát market 
 
 
Entrance of Gia Cẩm market 
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building for cloths, clothes, garments and other dry miscellaneous stuffs; a free area for 
vegetables and food vendors; two new buildings financed by Việt Trì Project; and a toilet.  
There are water and electricity supplies as well as fire 
prevention and control system. The majority of customers 
of the market are those with low incomes – essentially 
factory workers. Nông Trang market is presently under the 
daily supervision and management Nông Trang Market 
Management Team (Interview with Mr.Vũ Sứ Quý, vice-
leader of Nông Trang Market Management Team).  
 
Tân Dân market has come into existence on an area of 
approx. 1,200 m2 in Tân Dân ward since 2000. At the 
beginning, it was a kind of temporary and unstable 
market. The vendors self-invested in some temporary 
stalls to do business. Like Dầu market, there were no 
buildings, no toilets, no water and electricity supplies, 
and no fire prevention and control system.  
The number of vendors and customers at that time was not many. Tân Dân market has been 
under the overall management of the People’s Committee of Tân Dân ward and the daily 
supervision and management of Tân Dân Market Management Team (Interview with Bùi 
ðức Ngọc, leader of Gia Cẩm Market Management Team).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The front side of Tân Dân market 
 
People doing business at Nông 
Trang market 
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Annex 3.3: Working Groups of Việt Trì Project28 
Project Working Groups Members 
Working Group 1 (Component: Industrial 
Cleaner Production, Occupational Health 
Safety and Industrial Hazardous Waste)  
Chambers of Environmental Management under Department 
of Science, Technology and Environment (Chair) 
Department of Industry (Vice-chair) 
Department of Planning and Investment 
Department of Labour, Soldier Invalids and Society 
Prevention Health Centre under Department of Health 
Environmental Monitoring Station under Department of 
Science, Technology and Environment 
Association of Trade Unions 
Management Board for the Industrial Zones 
Việt Trì City People’s Committee 
Việt Trì URENCO 
Việt Trì Water Supply Company under Department of 
Construction 
Working Group 2 (Component: Health 
Wastes and Wastewater) 
Department of Health (Chair) 
Việt Trì Central Hospital under Department of Health (Vice-
chair) 
Chambers of Environmental Management under Department 
of Science, Technology and Environment (Vice-chair) 
Department of Planning and Investment 
Preventive Health Care Centre under Department of Health 
Environmental Monitoring Station under Department of 
Science, Technology and Environment 
Việt Trì URENCO 
Việt Trì Water Supply Company under Department of 
Construction 
Working Group 3 (Component: Industrial 
Wastewater) 
 
Master planning Chamber under Department of Construction 
(Chair) 
Việt Trì Water Supply Company under Department of 
Construction (Vice-chair) 
Việt Trì URENCO (Vice-chair) 
Chambers of Environmental Management under Department 
of Science, Technology and Environment. 
Department of Industry 
Management Board for the Industrial Zones 
Department of Planning and Investment 
Department of Science, Technology and Environment; 
Chambers of Environmental Monitoring 
Prevention Health Care Centre under Department of Health 
                                                
28 COWI A/S & Danida. 2005b. Industrial and Urban Development in Viet Tri City. Inception Report. pp. 74-
80. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark 
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Việt Trì Central Hospital under Department of Health 
Working Group 4 (Component: Urban 
Environmental Planning and Management, 
Markets, and Green Belts) 
 
Việt Trì People’s Committee (Chair) 
Việt Trì URENCO (Vice-chair) 
Chambers of Environmental Management under Department 
of Science, Technology and Environment (Vice-chair) 
Việt Trì Water Supply Company under Department of 
Construction 
Management Board for the Industrial Zones 
Environmental Monitoring Station under Department of 
Science, Technology and Environment 
Prevention Health Care Centre under Department of Health 
Working Group 5 (Component: 
Community Awareness and Demo-
projects, Information and Educational 
Material) 
 
Department of Science, Technology and Environment 
(Chair) 
Việt Trì People’s Committee (Vice-chair) 
Việt Trì URENCO 
Việt Trì Water Supply Company under Department of 
Construction 
Chambers of Environmental Management under Department 
of Science, Technology and Environment 
Environmental Monitoring under Department of Science, 
Technology and Environment 
Prevention Health Care Centre under Department of Health 
Women's Unions 
Youth's Unions 
Working Group 6 (Component: 
Environmental Monitoring) 
 
Department of Science, Technology and Environment 
(Chair) 
Environmental Monitoring Station under Department of 
Science, Technology and Environment (Vice-chair) 
Prevention Health Care Centre under Department of Health 
(Vice-Chair) 
Department of Planning and Investment 
Department of Industry 
Department of Labour, Soldier Invalids and Society 
Việt Trì URENCO 
Việt Trì Water Supply Company under Department of 
Construction 
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Annex 3.4: Expected outputs of Việt Trì Project 
1. Developing Strategy and Action Plan, and a draft Project Document for support to 
Health Care Waste Management in Việt Trì city;  
2. Developing Strategy and Action Plan and a draft Project Document for support to 
Industrial Hazardous Waste Management in Việt Trì city;  
3. Developing Strategy and Action Plan and a draft Project Document for support to the 
Management of Industrial Cleaner Production including Occupational Health and 
Safety (OHS) for Việt Trì city;  
4. Developing Strategy and Action Plan for the Integrated Management of domestic and 
industrial wastewater;  
5. Developing capacity in Environmental Monitoring and Pollution Data Management 
within Phú Thọ DOSTE and Việt Trì city Water Supply Company;  
6. Increasing awareness and knowledge of environmental problems and solutions - 
particularly related to household waste and sanitation at community and ward-level;  
7. Increasing environmental awareness and knowledge of environmental management 
within industrial managers and provincial authorities; 
8. Establishing around 20 small-scale fast-track cleaner production demonstration 
projects at industries in Việt Trì city;  
9. Establishing a Green Belt (tree planting) as buffer zone between the domestic and 
industrial area in Việt Trì city;  
10. Improving the environmental and sanitary conditions at a number of market places in 
Việt Trì city;  
11. Developing ward-level environmental action plans and establishing low-cost 
environmental demonstration projects by local communities and ward-level 
representatives working in partnership with relevant authorities; 
12. Improving the English language skill of the key project staff; 
13. Producing and disseminating information and educational material (e.g. brochures, 
leaflets, videos) on environmental issues;  
14. Implementing guidelines on Urban Environmental Planning and Management for 
Việt Trì city; 
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15. Facilitating and submitting for approval Application for Soft Loan financing of 
domestic and industrial wastewater treatment. 
Annex 4.1: Key Articles about the Project Management Unit 18 (PMU18) Case 
Monday March 20, 2006 
 
 “State construction chief alleged of $500,000 bribe29 
 
Police said Sunday they have evidence to suggest a State construction director bribed senior 
policemen and State leaders with US$500,000 to clear his name from gambling charges. 
Bui Tien Dung, general director of State road-construction Project Management Unit 18 
(PMU18) handed out the money before he was arrested for gambling last month.  
Earlier Dung was alleged to have bet US$1.8 million on international football games in just 
four weeks.  
He has denied the latest charges by police– bribery and deliberate misconduct. 
Evidence 
Police said they have now identified three persons who raised some $50,000 and VND1 
billion ($63,000) in the hopes of bribing officials to clear Dung’s name. 
They include Pham Tien Dung, PMU18 planning department manager who gathered the 
$50,000 from the PMU18 State budget, Nguyen Mau Thon, chairman of management board 
of Hoa Viet share-holding company, and an unnamed person. 
Pham Tien Dung was arrested a month ago, while the two other persons came to police 
headquarters in Hanoi to return money they admitted was destined for bribery. 
A source quoting information from police revealed there are still many other people whose 
identity has been kept secret, having joined in the campaign to clear the disgraced official’s 
name. 
Earlier, Thon had been summoned by police to give a statement concerning poor-quality 
construction projects, which Bui Tien Dung had assigned company Hoa Viet to building. 
Last weekend, police convened Truong Tan Vien, chief of Planning and Investment 
Department under the Ministry of Transport, under allegations he had accepted a bribe of 
VND50 million ($3,150) from Bui Tien Dung. 
A source said Dung has bribed Vien to get the bid on a construction package building 
national highway 27 in Ninh Thuan central province. The police investigation is ongoing, 
with more to be summoned to give statements on their involvement in the case.” 
                                                
29 http://www.thanhniennews.com/society/?catid=3&newsid=13689  
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Wednesday, March 22, 2006 
 
“Deputy Minister admits to minor faults in corruption scam30 
 
With the PMU 18 state road construction agency embroiled in a major corruption scandal, 
the deputy minister of transport admitted to only a small part of the allegations against him. 
Nguyen Viet Tien, deputy minister of the Ministry of Transport, who was Tuesday 
summoned for police interrogation in Hanoi, admitted he made small mistakes in connection 
to serious corruption at the PMU18 – a state project directly managed by the transport 
ministry. 
Tien spent his day responding police to three main issues – National Highway No 2’s poor 
quality, the source of his large fortune in holdings including villas, plots of lands, farms and 
cars, and the illicit lending of at least 34 state cars to other individuals called ‘bribery’ by 
police, reported Nguoi Lao Dong. 
Saigon Giai Phong newspaper Wednesday quoted a police chief as saying, Tien admitted 
responsibility in lending cars to other people and agencies, but rejected all the other 
allegations. 
Nguyen Viet Tien was assigned by the transport ministry to directly manage fund investment 
capital of all projects carried out by PMU18. 
Bribery allegations 
Tien kept two of the 34 cars bought for PMU18 by the state, one of which was a Toyota 
Crown with valued at VND1.2 billion (US$75,500). 
According to Saigon Giai Phong, an official whose name has been withdrawn from the 
transport ministry work list told police in a letter that Bui Tien Dung had earlier given a villa 
and a Toyota Camry 3.0 to one of Nguyen Viet Tien’s girlfriends. 
Earlier, Bui Tien Dung instructed his subordinates to buy a Mercedes E240 worth VND1.57 
billion ($99,000) from state budget to give Nguyen Viet Tien as a ‘gift’. 
In addition, Pham Tien Dung, PMU18 planning department manager, once gave Bui Tien 
Dung and Nguyen Viet Tien each a villa worth VND3 billion ($189,000). 
It has also been alleged that contractors interested in bids would have to bribe Bui Tien 
Dung from 5% to 15% of the total project to build it. 
Under Vietnamese law a person making an illegal payment of VND500,000 ($31.5) or above 
is guilty of bribery. 
                                                
30 http://www.thanhniennews.com/society/?catid=3&newsid=13756  
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PMU18 was established in 1993 and till 1998, Nguyen Viet Tien was the general director, 
with Bui Tien Dung as his office manager. 
From April 1998 till now, Tien jumped to deputy minister of the transport ministry and 
Dung was promoted to replace Tien as PMU19 general director. 
Poor management 
An unnamed official from the transport ministry said all construction projects managed by 
the PMU18 were involved in poor quality scandals, reported Saigon Giai Phong. 
Since its establishment in 1993, PMU18 was allotted by its governing body, the transport 
ministry, to implement 20 projects which were divided into 3,000 construction packages 
worth VND32.9 trillion ($2.07 billion). 
According to newswire vnexpress.net, during construction of the motorway from Noi Bai to 
Bac Ninh in north Vietnam, PMU18 falsified documents to inflate material prices four to 
five-fold to pocket the difference – about VND 40 – 50 billion ($2.5 million - $3.1 million). 
The 140km, VND500 billion ($31.5 million) national highway number 2 project from Doan 
Hung to Thanh Thuy had cracks in its foundation, and sank after construction finished, 
reported the newswire. 
Most motorways built by PMÚ8 and checked by authorities failed to meet construction 
standards. 
Police questioning continues for the deputy minister today, March 22.” 
Reported by Nguyen Binh, Minh Thu – Translated by Minh Phat 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
